

SUMMER, 1957

REVIEW INDEX

Reg. U. S.

A Christian Survey OF OPINION AND DISCUSSION

CONTENTS

What Kind of America?	TERENCE KEELEY
The Ethics-Cultural Revolution in America	WILLIAM D. KEELEY
Escape From Formalism	WILLIE MARSH
Race Relations and the American Church	
The Church and State	EDGAR A. LOVE
The Mind of the White South	WILLIAM L. HALL
A People Different From My Own	ROBERT A. REINHOLD
Achieving the Inclusive Parish	EDWARD CHANDLER
The Valley of Decision	CLAYTON CALHOUN
The Substance and Practice of Unity in the Local Congregation	ROBERT YODER
"I Command You to Prophesy"	ERNEST WALL
The Meaning of "Christian"	TERENCE K. KOESE
Realized Eschatology and C. H. Dodd	THOMAS J. MC CALLUM
Evangelistic Song	JOHN F. WILSON
"Something for Your Comfort"	WILLIAM G. HANSHAM
Book Reviews	
Book Notices	

RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY of opinion and discussion

VOL. XXVI

Summer, 1957

NO. 3

CONTENTS

What Kind of America?	KERMIT EBY	323
The Ethico-Cultural Revolution in American Race Relations	GEORGE D. KELSEY	335
Escape From Provincialism	CARLYLE MARNEY	345
Race Relations and the American Church		
The Church and Race	EDGAR A. LOVE	354
The Mind of the White South	WARNER L. HALL	361
"A People Different From My Own"	ROBERT S. BILHEIMER	368
Achieving the Inclusive Parish	EDWARD CHANDLER	375
The Valley of Decision	E. CLAYTON CALHOUN	383
The Substance and Practice of Unity in the Local Congregation		
"I Command Unto You Phoebe"	ROBERT TOBIAS	388
The Meaning of "Christian"	ERNEST WALL	396
Realized Eschatology and C. H. Dodd	HENRY E. KOLBE	409
Evangelistic Song	THOMAS E. MCCULLOUGH	422
"Something for Your Comfort"	ROBERT STEVENSON	436
Book Reviews	HOWARD G. HAGEMAN	444
Book Notices		451
		479

Editorial

IF CHRISTIANITY is to be more than a sect of religionists, then it must face its social embarrassments. Clearly the current tension throughout America on the question of race has brought about a realistic revival of Christian consciences. The Supreme Court decision calling for desegregation has been a social embarrassment to those who have tried to avoid the unpleasant discussion.

In essence the problem is spiritual. It involves the question of human dignity. If one insists that desegregation cannot be forced upon us, it then follows that neither can segregation be forced. If one insists upon the right to assemble, then his own logic leads him to recognition of the right to disassemble. Thus it seems clear that more than the familiar patterns of logic, or even the calm dependence upon law enforcement, are necessary. What is needed, really, is the facing up to the spiritual qualities attributed to man.

The writers of the articles in this issue of *RELIGION IN LIFE* have devoted their efforts to searches that are unique and Christian. They represent not just Southern or Northern points of view—they speak for the universal application of Christian truth. These writers have recognized the *is* when they speak of the *ought*. The provincialism, traditions, educational and social gap between Negro and white, the fear, the difference between integration and desegregation, and all of the *is* and *ought* factors must be viewed by the Christian who would find his answer to this problem.

One of the wise Negro leaders of our time once said that he was about to accept the literal meaning of that Scriptural reference to God's curse upon Ham—the Negro. According to him the form this curse takes is that, because of the color of his skin, the Negro cannot blush. "You white people know when you offend or embarrass each other because you can blush," he said, "but you don't know when you embarrass me because I can't blush!" I saw an upsetting demonstration of my friend's statement one day in a meeting of a Board of Trustees of a small college for Negroes. A visiting denominational executive was pontificating (as they can), to the effect that the academic standards must be raised. "You know," he said, "you may not realize it, but there is a big educational and cultural gap between you Negroes and us whites." The Negroes on that Board did not blush!

Christians are embarrassed by this serious social question. The writers of the articles in this issue indicate that something more than embarrassment is needed, however, and have presented a series of quite positive opportunities and responsibilities for the serious churchman.

E. S. B.

What Kind of America?

KERMIT EBY

HERE is a school system built on state laws requiring segregation of pupils by race—white children in white schools, Negro children in Negro schools. Here is the Supreme Court decision saying that all state laws requiring segregation by race in public schools are unconstitutional. Here is a town split into fragments over what to do about it. Everyone in town has an opinion. Everyone in town has the question, "What kind of South do we want to live in?" But this is not just a Southern problem; it is a national problem. This decision concerns the kind of America "we want to live in."

The decision is in part being shaped, and at the same time being made complex for us, by a variety of related situations. The South is getting a new million-dollar working industry every working day. In 1940 Virginia—and only Virginia in all the South—had more income from manufacturing than from farming. Today all but four Southern states are in that fortunate situation. In 1900 the South was only one-sixth urban; now it is about half urban and half rural. What is more significant, eight Southern states suffered a population loss between 1940 and 1950 from net migration. In that decade, the Negro population of the non-South increased 56.6 per cent, while the Negro population of the South increased only 1.5 percent. This has meaning in terms of a diffusion of the racial problem and in terms of available labor supply. Surely such drastic changes are full of significance for future welfare.

The South is on the move, and is moving quickly. Out of its speed the desegregation problem is more forcefully made apparent, out of its speed correlative questions arise. Who, if any persons or groups, are driving this force? Where is it heading? Will it make it in one piece, or will there come out of this more factions, more splits, more problems? Through the impetus given by the Supreme Court decision, the schools are looking for the inherently best answer. But would the town consent to that which would be best for the school? The practical political problem is to work out something that not only an honest man but the whole town will support.

KERMIT EBY, a member of the Church of the Brethren, was formerly Director of Education and Research for the CIO. He is now a Professor of the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

Legally, the matter resolves itself into this question: How does the Supreme Court decision affect local school boards? To answer it, let us review the history of the problem.

I

The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868. Each Confederate State had to ratify the Amendment before it could send representatives back to Congress. One clause in this Amendment is the Equal Protection Clause: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

During the reconstruction period in the South, the racial problem was not solved by freeing the slaves or by the military occupation of the South. Before 1900, race segregation was enacted into law and widely practiced almost everywhere in the South.

In 1896, a colored man named Plessy challenged the Louisiana law requiring Negroes to ride in separate railroad cars operating within the state. Plessy claimed that this law deprived him of his personal right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, in the case *Plessy v. Ferguson*, ruled that the State of Louisiana had a right to segregate the races as long as the facilities provided for the use of Negroes were as good as those provided for white passengers. In other words, a Negro could demand *equal* facilities; but he had no constitutional right to the *same* facilities.

In a side remark in the written opinion, as an example of its point, the Court said, "The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced."

That decision was the beginning of the doctrine of "separate but equal"; and the side remark became the legal cornerstone of the South's segregated school system.

So long as the "separate but equal" *Plessy* rule prevailed, no Negro could claim that his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated simply because he was barred from a public school open to white pupils. The only ground for complaint was that the Negro school was not the equal of the white school, and the remedy sought was improvement of the inferior school.

Then, in the late Thirties and early Forties, there was a new development in a series of cases having to do with graduate and professional schools

in the South. In each of these cases, a Negro sued for the right to attend some all-white graduate or professional school because equal facilities were not available in the state. For example, in one case a Negro who wanted to attend the University of Texas Law School complained that a new law school created for Negroes was inferior. Texas had gone to great trouble and expense to create a good Negro law school in order to keep Negroes out of the University of Texas! but the Supreme Court ruled that even if the two schools were equal in such tangible things as library and buildings, the new Negro school could not become equal to the University in prestige and other "intangibles." That decision made it clear that Texas might as well forget about trying to make a separate law school for Negroes that would be equal to the University of Texas Law School. If it was not the University of Texas itself, it could not be equal to it.

The task in each of these cases was to measure one school against another, and the question arose as to what factors should be considered in making the comparison. Until recently, the tangible factors were the main items like the amount of money spent per pupil, the amount of training the teachers had, the condition and age of the buildings, the toilet facilities, the number of children per classroom, and so on.

The intangible factors that began to be introduced in these cases are such matters as the prestige of a diploma from a leading school, the value of association with students who will later on be leaders in their profession, the position and influence of distinguished alumni, and so on.

What these cases did was to change the content of the word "equal" in the "separate but equal" doctrine by emphasizing intangible factors. The concept of what makes one school equal to another grew broader and broader, and it led to the decisions that concern us most: the group of cases known as *Brown v. Board of Education*, decided May 17, 1954, and the "implementing" decision, May 31, 1955. In these cases—which came from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia—the question was not simply whether the particular Negro schools involved were equal to the white schools. The question was whether schools segregated on the basis of race *can* be equal. In its unanimous opinion, the court put it this way:

Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does . . . In the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

After fifty-eight years, the *Plessy v. Ferguson* decision had been overruled, and a ghost was made of "separate but equal."

The Court took a year to decide on the method of putting the school decision into effect. They decided to send the cases back to the District Courts where they were first heard, because such courts are closer "to local conditions." But the "implementing" decision contains instructions to guide those District Courts. This decision begins by repeating "the fundamental principle that racial segregation in public education is unconstitutional," and that all state and local laws that conflict with that principle "must yield." The decision ends with an order to the District Courts to do whatever is necessary "to admit to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases."

Between the statement of the principle and the action required, are many factors that the District Court may take into consideration. The school districts must make "a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance," but "the courts may find that additional time is necessary." It is up to the school boards, however, to prove that extra time is in the public interest. The Supreme Court did not set a time limit. The main principles may not be ignored "simply because of disagreement with them." In short, whatever the obstacles, school districts with segregated schools are now ordered to comply fully, as quickly as possible, given local conditions.

Though school affairs have always been considered a legislative matter and not a judicial matter, the two cannot always be kept separate. The Supreme Court is a court; it decides an issue only when a case is brought before it. There must always be a legal controversy between parties.

In the segregation case, some Negro pupils complained that their school boards deprived them of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; they asked the Supreme Court to order the school boards to admit them to the public schools without racial discrimination. The Supreme Court ruled that they had to be admitted. So, technically, the Court did not legislate; it just handed down a decision in a personal case that happened to require an interpretation of the Constitution.

In the process of deciding whether those particular colored children had a right to go to those particular white schools, the Supreme Court had to decide first whether the colored children had anything to complain about. They might have found, on the evidence, that the Negro schools were as good as the white schools. Or, when they found that the Negro schools were not as good, they might have ordered the school boards to build equal schools for the Negroes, or to fix up the old Negro schools.

But instead, they decided that segregated schools in general are unequal, and therefore they said that *any* state or local laws requiring racial discrimination in public schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment. These laws are unconstitutional as far as the Supreme Court is concerned. Where such laws exist, if no Negro pupil ever sues to be allowed to enter a white school, no problem arises. But as soon as such a pupil goes into Federal Court complaining of violation of a personal right under the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Federal Court can order admittance for him.

A School Board faced with the policy decision concerning admittance of Negro pupils into its school has a range of choice that extends from complete and immediate integration at one end to all-out resistance to any desegregation at the other, and the legal problem is different in each case.

With this range in mind, let us examine typical opinions on some of the main and most controversial sub-questions behind this choice that reflect its complexity.

II

First, we have the doctrine that mixing the races is harmful and wrong. The differences between the races are natural and segregation is natural. The Southern way of life is worth preserving, and keeping the races separate is the only way to preserve it. If we fail, the result will be a mongrel race incapable of carrying on American institutions and traditions. Since whites are superior to Negroes in general, mixing the races will lower the quality of the American people.

Opponents of this doctrine present the following argument. All the social scientists who have studied the matter—anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists—agree that racial superiority is a myth. Race is not something clear and definite. Geneticists are not even sure what race is any more. You can't always tell what race a man belongs to, and if you can, you still don't know anything about him as a man. In intelligence, tests show that there is the same range of variation among Negroes as among whites, from highest down to lowest. The American way of life means one thing above all—to treat each man on his own merits, as an individual.

Second, it is pointed out that there is segregation everywhere. An integrated society has never existed in this country except in a sociologist's crystal ball. In some few places in the North, where there are very few Negroes, there is no segregation to speak of. But wherever there are lots of them, which means in practically every large city, they segregate by housing. The northern cities don't need school segregation laws, because

their Negro ghettos do the segregating for them. Where it does not work out by itself, the authorities gerrymander the school districts. They may not get 100 per cent school segregation that way, but they keep it under pretty strict control just the same.

In cities like New York and Chicago, there are plenty of all-Negro schools and plenty of all-white schools, but there are very few mixed schools. The only time whites and Negroes live in the same neighborhood is while it is changing from white to Negro. There is no *stable* mixed neighborhood in the North. When the Supreme Court said those restrictive covenants could not be enforced, the white people began forming "civic improvement associations" to try to keep the Negroes out of their neighborhoods. If that fails, they use violence. In Cicero, Illinois, a riot made headlines several years ago when a Negro family tried to move in. They were driven out, and there is still not one Negro resident there. In a public housing project in Chicago the races were forced to mingle, and they have had to keep 300 policemen on duty at one time. In the South, a town with the number of people who live in that project would need one constable to keep order. The Negro districts are getting larger and larger in the big cities, but Negroes still live in Negro districts. Now, Southern cities so far are not like that: there are Negro streets and Negro neighborhoods all over the cities.

Negroes, it is claimed, have a very different culture. The South has never had the crime rate the North has, but the crime rate for Negroes is much higher than for whites. Their health is poor; venereal disease is prevalent among Negroes; their moral code is different; a high percentage of Negro births is illegitimate. Negroes are not any happier when they get a fancy education. They would be better off with a good training without frills, suited to the kind of life most of them live. But they should have decent schools, if that is what is demanded for segregation. The people in the South are willing to pay a higher price to keep the races separate.

These arguments are countered as follows. It is the way a Negro is treated, denied a chance for a good education and opportunities to live a decent life, that makes the Negro seem inferior and different. Just give Negroes the same chance as white men and they will do as well, on the average. Where there is no segregation the differences among men are seen to be individual, not racial. Segregation is evil because it denies the equal dignity of every man. Expressions of goodness within an evil system do not lessen the evil of the system. Even the best man has not the power to alter the injustice inherent in segregation.

The Supreme Court ruled several years ago that housing restrictions based on race cannot be enforced. Race relations are better in the North, because only equals can be friends. One who considers the Negro lower could not have genuine affection for a Negro who might be, for instance, intellectually superior to him.

Children have to be *taught* racial intolerance, they are not born with it. If race hate is not drilled into them, they will treat everyone as an individual, each on his own merits—the way it should be done in a democracy.

Third, some Southerners urge that the South must remain solidly against desegregation; each district in the South that gives way weakens the force of the South against the strategy of the Supreme Court.

The opposition says: By freeing the Negro from segregation, the South will free itself from the evil in its past. The race problem has been the South's shackle. The truly great Southern tradition is not race hate, but courage and nobility and justice.

Fourth, the segregationists state that the Supreme Court's decision is based on certain theories of social psychology, concerning the psychological attitudes of Negro children toward their education. What do the judges know about psychology? Where will it end if the Supreme Court delves into social science for its decisions? It should stick to law and the Constitution instead of dabbling in psychology. Instead of trying to usurp power the Constitution does not give them, they *could* have said that running the schools was up to the states, the way it has always been.

The Constitution has nothing to say about public schools. The judges have made themselves a national school board. The Tenth Amendment says that powers not delegated to the Federal government are reserved to the states. The Constitution does not delegate any power to control the schools, so it is clear that that power is reserved to the states and that the Supreme Court is usurping power unconstitutionally. The usurpation has been denounced in a manifesto by more than one hundred Southern Congressmen and many states have passed resolutions of "interposition," meaning that the states interpose their authority between the Supreme Court and the people to nullify the desegregation order. When we resist the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the Constitution, we defend the Constitution.

On the other side it is asserted that to deny Negroes their rights is disrespect for the Constitution and the democratic principles America stands for. There must be some final authority somewhere, or there is no Constitution. If everyone claims to be the final judge of what it means, there will

be anarchy. The Supreme Court has been recognized for 150 years as the final judge, and respect for Constitution means respect for Supreme Court.

Fifth and last, it is remarked that there are ways to discourage people from going to court. The cards are stacked against the white man in the Federal courts these days. The time to fight it out, then, is before it gets to court. The opposition movement is increasingly well organized and growing rapidly. Throughout all the South are groups, such as the white Citizens Councils, membered by influential people. They say they are dedicated (1) to opposing desegregation by all lawful means and (2) to keeping the lawless element from taking control of this opposition movement. But violence is always a clear possibility. The real cure is therefore to eliminate the cause of the racial unrest in town, i. e. the pressure to integrate the schools.

The other side asks: Can we allow ourselves to be intimidated by the possibility of violence? If we do, then whenever any kind of change is suggested, people will simply threaten violence in order to get their own way.

III

On these sub-questions, viewpoints may fall between the above outlined arguments in this way:

The decision is here; the courts are going to enforce it right down the line. Eventually it will be in effect everywhere. We have to desegregate. The only questions are when and how.

There is not enough money for separate and equal schools. The Negro schools were never equal; in the last ten years Southern communities have been pouring money into construction of new Negro schools, trying to prevent the decision. The only thing that saved them from bankruptcy was the Supreme Court.

Take the quickest solution that people will accept; the best Negroes are leaving, because they are the most dissatisfied with the way things are now. Result: loss of the labor supply industry needs, and of a good part of the market needed to attract business to Southern communities. Race segregation and industrial development don't go together. We must adapt to change.

Delay any radical change. Compromise! There is no such thing as a practical segregation plan any more. It is as impossible as immediate integration. "Anti-desegregation" is best.

Right now, all we can do is act to keep the situation from getting out of hand.

IV

The rationale behind these middle-of-the-road desegregation attitudes draws from the development of Negro education in American life. In the slavery days, most states had laws making it a crime to teach slaves to read. They saw the danger of education. Now for decades in the North, and even in the South, Negroes have been reading the same books as whites, about the Declaration of Independence and Democracy and Equality. They have had a chance to learn a trade, and some of them even a profession. And when the war came, they went into factories and made good money. A man with money in his pocket wants to buy things—"My money is as good as yours." A lot of them went into the Army and went overseas, where they met white people who did not mind their being black. They read war propaganda that they were fighting for democracy against Hitler and his race theories, and they believed it.

The only way to preserve segregation would be to do so completely. The clock would have to be turned back; Negroes would have to be treated as inferior in every way. They would have to live in separate districts, go to special schools with a very limited curriculum, be restricted to certain menial kinds of jobs, forbidden to read certain books and almost all magazines, kept out of the movies—in short, cut off from all the American ideas that make them want to be rich and free like everyone else in the movies and the magazine ads. To do all that, the South would have to repeal three Amendments to the Constitution, or secede again and this time win the war.

V.

No one decision is easier than another. Those who make a decision bare themselves to the anger of a lot of bitter people, and risk hurting their businesses, their political futures, and their social positions. A public official cannot separate his personal interest and the public interest.

Yet the decision must be made, in many places, under many situations, with many feelings.

Commentators have placed great emphasis on the importance of the ratio of whites to Negroes for desegregation. Generally, where there is a high proportion of Negroes there has been stiff resistance to desegregation, and where there are a few Negroes, there has been little resistance. There is as yet no majority for any clear-cut policy. Neither the side for integration nor the side for segregation has enough strength to do more than allow for a plan of free choice, in which each district does as it wishes.

In many places in the South, Negro schools are overcrowded. Those upholding desegregation say it can help by distributing the pupils more evenly. An integrated school system is simpler to administer and should be cheaper than a segregated system in the long run, but experience now indicates that desegregation can be expensive at first. Some schools have found that they had to hire extra teachers to help substandard pupils—mostly Negroes—come up to standard for their age and grade. It might be considered, of course, that this cost involves money saved by skimping on the Negro schools in the past.

A second problem concerns the Negro teachers. A decision must be made whether to lay off teachers on the basis of seniority or on the basis of race. Some communities that desegregated with little or no trouble have run into real difficulties when Negro teachers began teaching white pupils.

Most professional school men now acknowledge that the most important matter in desegregation is parent education. Parents are usually more against desegregation than the children are. A campaign of educating the parents to cooperate is crucial to the success of any desegregation program, no matter what solution is offered—whether to delay, to integrate gradually, or to integrate immediately.

In general, these three solutions typify those being offered and put into practice. One of the Federal Circuit Court judges has interpreted the segregation decision as follows: "The Supreme Court has not decided that the states must mix persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing schools they attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided, is that a state may not deny any person on account of race the right to attend any school that it maintains."

Thus some districts have concluded that the first thing is to comply with the Court verdict without doing any more than is necessary. Instead of assigning pupils by race, they would allow all parents to indicate what school they want their children to attend, assuming that most white people won't want their children to go to school with the colored, that some Negroes won't want their children to go to school with whites, and some Negroes and some whites will want their children to go to mixed schools. This plan would let them all do as they please, within certain limits. These districts approve or disapprove applicants to the three types of schools on the basis of standards they set up themselves: matters like the welfare of the child, his home environment, the possible threat of disorders, intelligence, health, previous training, compatibility with other students, etc.

This supposedly assures a complete control over the very little desegregation that might take place, and all without mentioning race.

Or, a fine school could be built for the Negroes; so that any Negro applying for a transfer would leave the most modern and elaborate school for an older and less attractive one. In several places where this plan has been tried, two per cent, five per cent, seven per cent of the Negroes applied for transfer to white schools. Such districts give Negroes the *right* to go to any school, yet provides the best school for them.

Under many state laws, there is power to set up such an assignment system, and there is a good possibility that the assignment decisions will be made to extend through higher and higher levels of the state school systems. That way, if a pupil thinks he is being discriminated against because of his race, he has to appeal through all these different administrative offices before he can go to the state courts, and he has to go through the state courts before he can go to the Federal courts. Several Federal judges have already ruled that all possible administrative and legal remedies must be exhausted in the state before the Federal courts have jurisdiction. That kind of procedure can take years, and each individual pupil is a separate case.

Objections to this solution point up this constant litigation. Each case will be struck down eventually.

Another solution proposes that Negro parents and lawyers be informed (not publicly) that an entry suit would be welcomed; that they go into Federal Court, of course against as tight a defense as possible—"We're not ready because we think the people aren't ready." The school loses, and the court orders it to prepare a plan to start admitting Negro pupils. Then it can say to the people that it has no choice, and that to comply with the court order, a very gradual plan can be spread over several years. Under this situation violence would be purposeless, it is maintained, because the Federal Courts ordered the admission; and there would be no point in appealing because appeals are expensive and all appeals, without exception, are losing.

Actually, such a gradual plan could be settled out of court. But aside from this, the problem is made an issue of public reaction for public servants to worry about. What gradual plan will the judge accept? Any gradual plan can be defended on the basis of local conditions, unless it is drawn out over some absurd period of time. At one extreme, it could be started with the first grade, one grade added each year, and thus the integration would be drawn out for twelve years. Or, integration could come

all at once, looking at it only from the standpoint of the technical school problem and leaving out the community reaction. It could be done in one year, or twelve, or anything in between; the more suddenly it is done, the harder it is.

Among the cities attempting immediate integration is St. Louis, which integrated in one year, without court action. The school board took a stand for immediate integration, took pains to educate the public and calm their fears, lined up community support from religious and civic organizations, and then pushed it through.

Another, Washington, integrated with a Negro school proportion over sixty per cent higher than that of any city in the South. Reports say that while people are moving to the suburbs to escape desegregation, that every private school in the area has a long waiting list, that school standards in almost all subjects are now well below the national average, and that teachers are at a loss how to teach classes in which the Negro children are about two years behind the white children in the same class. This situation gives material for further argument on both sides. The integrator says that variation is individual, and each pupil must be treated according to his own ability. Negroes being put back would be just a temporary situation. They have had years of inferior schooling, and no one should expect them to measure up. The fast ones will catch up; the slower ones should be treated however they treat the slow white pupils. The segregator points out that fast learners and slow learners were mixed in this case, with the natural result of an absence of any learning at all.

The segregator's position as a whole is that a *status quo* should be maintained—however illusory the possibility of maintaining it may be by now. His procedures include segregation legislation, "interposition" resolutions, and private school tuition grants.

VI

What is clear from these opinions, often violently expressed, is that the emotions both of whites and of Negroes must be considered. Perhaps townspeople cannot win an argument with sociologists, but politics is not a contest in sociology. The important factor is not arguments, but people. The way they feel, right or wrong, is a fact, a massive fact.

Everyone in town has an opinion; some have a solution! But everyone in America is faced with the question: "What kind of America do we want to live in?"

The Ethico-Cultural Revolution in American Race Relations

GEORGE D. KELSEY

I

THE EARLIEST EXPERIENCES of the Negro in America were those of a class. They were not racial. White indentured servitude was an established institution when the first Negroes, brought to these shores in 1619, were sold by pirates to the settlers of Jamestown, Virginia. These Negroes were subjected to servitude on the same conditions governing white indentured servants from England. As in the case of white indentured servants, some Negroes earned their freedom when the required period of servitude was completed. For a few decades, it would appear that no one had permanent servitude in mind. In all the court records of Virginia from 1632 to 1661, Negroes were designated as "servants," "Negro servants," or simply as "Negroes."

It is a strange expression of irony that the first legal decision in which the permanent services of one individual were granted to another involved a Negro indentured servant and his Negro master. By 1651 one Anthony Johnson, probably a member of the first group of Negroes brought to America, had obtained his freedom, inasmuch as the county court of Northampton County, Virginia, assigned him 250 acres of land in fee simple. In 1653, Johnson was haled into court by another Negro, John Casor, who accused him of holding him in indenture "for seven years longer than he should or ought." Johnson contended that Casor belonged to him for life because the latter had never presented him any indenture papers. Casor countered with the claim that he did have papers when he came to Johnson, and offered to produce witnesses who saw the papers signed. At this point Johnson resorted to a bold and unexpected move. He entered suit against one of Casor's witnesses, one Robert Parker, a white man. Johnson charged that Parker detained his servant, Casor, under the pretext that Casor was a free man. The court rendered the decision against Parker, charging him

GEORGE D. KELSEY, B.D., Ph.D., is Professor of Christian Ethics at Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey, and himself a Negro. Tracing the history of the Negro's status, he finds that the current change amounts to a revolution.

with "unrightly keeping Casor from his right master, Anthony Johnson." Casor was ordered to return to the service of Johnson, and Parker was ordered to pay all the charges in the suit and execution. This decision did not in itself transform temporary servitude into permanent servitude or slavery, but it was an important step in that direction. Obviously, the decision was not made on racial grounds.

For many years Negro and white indentured servants were treated alike. They associated together freely, ran away together, intermarried, and were accused of plotting together against their masters. They were thought of as a class.

Gradually indentured servitude took on two features which deeply affected the future of race relations in America. It developed into permanent servitude, and became entirely Negroid in personnel. Several factors account for both of these forms of transition.

As regards the racial character of slavery, the factors are as follows:

(a) The white servant knew his master's language. He came from the same general cultural background, even though, more likely than not, he had been a member of a class sub-culture. He was therefore in a better position than the Negro to make his resentment felt and to evoke sympathy.

(b) The white servant was nominally a Christian, while the Negro was a heathen. The fact of being a fellow-Christian laid some sense of obligation on the master. For a few decades of the seventeenth century, the medieval tradition that conversion to Christianity brings brotherhood and freedom was manifestly influential. On the other hand, medieval Christian teaching concerning slavery militated against the Negro. The medieval doctrine justified the enslavement of the heathen, provided the enslavement was for the purpose of conversion. This doctrine was supported by another to the effect that it is justifiable to enslave captives taken in just wars. In effect, then, medieval teaching favored the enslavement of the Negro, even though permanent servitude could not be defended on its basis.

(c) Since there was a shortage of women in the colonies, men of the master class often bought white women whom they sought as wives.

(d) The Negro possessed a high visibility. This physical difference put him at a greater disadvantage than the white servant in running away, and made it more difficult for him and his children to escape the stigma of the status of servitude. A Negro freedman's children could never escape the stigma of a slave ancestry. Since all Negroes known to the colonists were slaves, freedmen, or descendants of slaves, it was easy to assume that slavery was the natural and appropriate status of the Negro.

While these factors were operating to give servitude a racial character, another set of factors were contributing to the transition of indentured servitude to permanent servitude.

(a) Seventeenth-century soil culture was very backward in comparison to the best methods of today. As the result of tobacco cultivation the soil suffered rapid exhaustion. Planters were obliged to be constantly on the move, seeking new lands. This requirement of mobility of labor force made serfdom or "attachment to the soil" a handicapping system from the standpoint of the master, and called for a status of "attachment to the person." This state of affairs encouraged planters to have the period of service extended to life by whatever means might be available.

(b) The time of service of female servants was often extended by taking advantage of the appearance of children. As a rule the contracts forbade the marriage of servants during the period of indenture. Marriage increased the burden of upkeep. It divided the attention and obligation of servants; and the appearance of a child increased expense and took away time from labor. In some cases, laws designed to cover this situation extended the time of the mother. Some planters took advantage of this law by permitting extralegal relations as a means of obtaining a legitimate extension.

(c) In 1662 the doctrine of *partus sequitur ventrem* was enunciated. This doctrine required that the status of the child must follow that of the mother.

(d) As has already been indicated, the medieval theory that slavery should be confined to the heathen, and that freedom should follow conversion, was a great influence in seventeenth-century America. For a time the custom of justifying slavery on religious grounds was becoming fixed in the colonies. But planters did not wish to lose their slaves. At first they met the difficulty by opposing the baptism of Negroes.

Beginning in 1667, steps were taken to handle the issue by law. In that year the Virginia Assembly passed an act declaring, "Baptism doth not alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or freedom; in order that diverse masters freed from this doubt may more carefully endeavor the propagation of Christianity." Three years later Virginia passed an act which made possible the enslavement of those who had at any time been heathen. Maryland also passed a law declaring that "the conversion of the Holy Sacrament of Baptism does not alter the status of slaves or their issue."

In 1682 a new law appeared in Virginia. It denied Christianity as a

mode of gaining freedom to all Negroes, mulattoes, hostile Moors and Turks, and such Indians as were sold by other Indians as slaves. It repealed the act of 1670, and made slaves of all such non-Christians thereafter coming into the colony, by land or sea, unconverted or converted, whether before or after captivity. The institution of slavery was now complete. Indentured servitude continued to exist alongside slavery, but gradually slavery became the sole institution of servitude.

II

This new legal development had an immense significance for race relations. It left the slave masters without arguments for the justification of slavery. The claim that the enslavement of a heathen was justified by his subsequent conversion to Christianity was nullified by the law that conversion did not change his status. The claim that the enslavement of captives taken in just wars was justified did not explain the enslavement of their children. Similarly, the claim that the slaves were better off in America than in Africa did not justify keeping succeeding generations in bondage.

A new ground had to be found. Since the Negro was different in appearance and had come from an alien culture, the material for a new ground was ready to hand. Slavery now came to be justified on the ground of Negro racial inferiority. In the meantime, racial doctrines were being expounded in the European world to justify slavery and colonialism. To Americans this explanation came to seem natural and obvious. All Negroes were slaves or descendants of slaves. Many Negroes had been slaves in Africa. This fact seemed to buttress the view that slavery was the Negro's natural and appropriate condition. The fact that there had to be slave masters in Africa in order for slaves to be present rarely presented itself to consciousness.

Moreover, Americans and Europeans knew nothing about life in Africa. In the business of procuring slaves, Africans were the middle men. Europeans did not penetrate into the interior where they could learn about African cultures. This ignorance of African cultures contributed to the myth of racial inferiority in that it indirectly supported the claim that Africans were a completely savage people, living without any of the forms of social, political, and economic organization. By the time a knowledge of African cultures was gained, the concept of the savage was too well entrenched in popular thinking to be overcome. The net effect of events, that is, of the practice of slavery and the racial ideology which developed around it, was the entrenchment of racism in the American way of life.

The doctrine and practice of White Supremacy and superiority remained almost wholly without any alteration until World War I. About this time, events began to occur which produced new functions and roles for both Whites and Negroes, and effected new relationship patterns between them. These were what Charles S. Johnson has called system-shaking experiences. They were experiences of such proportions that alternatives adequate to meet them could not be found in the traditional culture. The case is best stated in Johnson's own words.

Only system-shaking experiences could be expected to influence fundamentally the culture. These system-shaking experiences appear to be the essential prerequisites for the initiation of purposive action directed specifically toward improvement of the Negro status, or of race relations. These major social experiences are themselves not directly concerned with race relations at all. We may characterize them as "vectors of social change." As mentioned earlier in this paper, they were circumstances which directed attention of Negroes and Whites not at each other, but toward a common goal. They were also circumstances of such importance that a sub-cultural variant would not be permitted to defeat the common effort.¹

The vectors of social change or system-shaking experiences, as seen by Johnson, are war, industrial expansion, migration, and depression. These "provided the framework within which purposive action could be taken to improve the Negro status."² Let us observe the cultural effect of these experiences.

While World War I was directed toward keeping things as they are, both in the colonial world and on the American racial scene, unintended changes nevertheless resulted. Thousands of Negroes migrated from the South to the North, and created a new political influence and a force against racial traditions. Between the two World Wars the traditional cultural pattern underwent significant changes. Whereas the democratic ideology of World War I did not apply to colored peoples, the Rooseveltian ideology of World War II did apply to them. "The kind of combatants involved in this war, and the role America played, was one that required Negroes expecting improvement in status."³ All available workers were required for the success of production. The political influence of Negroes, already gained in the North, was reflected in Executive Order 8802. Race riots which occurred were generally condemned. After the War, the American military was integrated, and hundreds of Negroes entered Southern uni-

¹ Johnson, Charles S., "Race Relations and the Dynamics of Cultural Change in the United States." (Prepared for the Board Convention, National Urban League, Kansas City, Mo., 1955, mimeographed), p. 15.

² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

versities. The beliefs, attitudes and values of many, as well as their actions, were reordered.

In relationship to both World Wars, there was an abrupt acceleration of industrial production. The speedy increase of production was regarded primarily as a national need and goal, and was the concern of both management and labor. "Customs and folkways that ordinarily govern recruitment and training had to go into the discard—a sacrifice to the common good. 'Speeded up' production is by no means undertaken with the thought in mind of changing anybody's status, but no status considerations could delay or obstruct production."⁴

The migration of workers to industrial centers was a characteristic of both wars. It must be noted, however, that there was a significant difference in the attitudes toward the migration of Negro agricultural workers as between the two wars. During the first World War, efforts were made to obstruct their movement. But during and following the second World War there were changes in attitudes, and also new agricultural machines which created a labor surplus in agricultural areas; the movement of Negro farm workers was therefore regarded as a measure of relief.

The depression brought significant changes in agricultural processes. Traditional row crop farming was abandoned, diversification and a much larger livestock industry appeared. Such changes in productive processes obviously call for new skills, new functions, and new bases for employer-employee and tenant-landlord relations.

To these factors, internal to the life of America, must be added the revolutionary movements and the social and political convulsions of the world.

Throughout the history of America, there has been a genuine moral sensitivity to the anomaly of slavery and later racial caste within a democracy. Sensitive individuals and organizations, however, remained very small and lonely. Until recently, the moral consciousness has had very little of an operating base. Exhorters and writers found themselves appealing to alternatives which were not present in the life of the society addressed. If they called for equality of opportunity, they found repeatedly that both the belief system and the institutional patterns made equality of opportunity an impossibility. But now the new cultural circumstances provide the moral consciousness with an opportunity. This opportunity has been seized by some, and results have been achieved in the form of judicial decisions, new relationships and roles in industry, government, and cultural institutions.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

III

Underlying the changes in status and role is the application of the democratic concept of "person" to the Negro. The pattern of race relations in America has rested on two sociological doctrines—the "separate but equal" doctrine, and the doctrine of "equality of opportunity." The "separate but equal" doctrine is now being called into question. The fact that discrimination is inherent in segregation is widely recognized in legal and social-science circles. It is not generally recognized, however, that the doctrine of "equality of opportunity," as traditionally applied, is also a fallacious doctrine. Since the fallacy in this doctrine is commonly overlooked, many people are unaware that this doctrine is implicitly under attack in contemporary Federal and Judicial circles.

The astounding thing is the fact that the churches have never subjected this doctrine to theological scrutiny. They have generally accepted it as a good statement of the "American way," and repeated it without examining its sociopsychological content. This procedure is called astounding because the weakness of the doctrine of "equality of opportunity," as applied to race, lies at the point of the neglect of the Christian doctrine of the person and in insufficient awareness of the mental-spiritual aspect of life.

The doctrine of "equality of opportunity," as applied to race, has been little more than a fiction because it has proposed equality of opportunity without equality of person. The word "equality" in this formula is usually given a quantitative connotation. It is generally a reference to external structures and arrangements, and describes the Negro as an object functioning in an external situation. It fails to take into account the spiritual and psychological quality of life.

There can be no consistent realization of equality of opportunity without equality of person. There are at least two reasons why this is the case.

In the first place, person and function can never be separated. When people speak of equality of opportunity, their own elaborations of meaning often indicate that they are thinking of objective action in an external situation. It is as though in the performance of a function a person becomes a mere functionary, an object, and ceases to be a person, a subject. The plain fact is, a person can perform no function without bringing himself along to perform it. A human being is body, mind, and spirit in conjunction. When an individual performs a function, he brings his whole person to bear on that situation, and into the environment of the function.

This is true even of something so physical as swinging a baseball bat. When Jackie Robinson first joined the Dodgers, he was subjected to a period of intense baiting. At one point his batting average dropped to .227. Under ordinary conditions he might have been shipped back to the minor leagues. But the Brooklyn front office and management were sure that he had major league qualifications, and were determined to support him through the sociological jungle. Their encouragement, in addition to that of some fans and players, helped Robinson to pull himself up to normal play. This is a well-known illustration of the little considered fact that equality of opportunity is not definable merely in terms of objective, measurable factors. Robinson wore the same kind of uniform and shoes used by his teammates, was free to select bats within the same length and weight range, and swung at the same kind of baseballs. But he did not have equality of opportunity. For equality of opportunity involves, just as much if not more so, equal access to comradeship and *esprit de corps*, and to the conditions which produce peace of mind, tranquillity of soul, stimulus, and hopefulness.

For horses, equality of opportunity is probably definable wholly in terms of feeding, pasturage, grooming, and conditions of the stable. But for men, it must include the things of the mind and spirit. These latter factors will not be made available unless a society is committed to equality and mutuality of persons. This is obviously a point at which the churches should long since have led the way in race relations.

The second reason why there can be no consistent realization of equality of opportunity without equality of person is the fact that man is a culture-bearing animal who judges and values, and reacts to prestige-bearing instruments. If one segment of a society is isolated from the principal institutions in which the main ideas and values of the society find expression, this is tantamount to their being separated from the main stream of life.

It has already been suggested that the new moral consciousness is beginning to find expression in all the principal areas of American life. This is the beginning of an ethico-cultural revolution. However, the clearest, most explicit, and specific expression of the new moral consciousness is found in the field of jurisprudence. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States has said, with perhaps a clearer voice than any other organ, that equality of opportunity is no longer understandable without equality of person, and considerations of the spiritual and psychological quality of life.

Let us give attention to the verdict of Chief Justice Vinson in declaring that the new law school for Negroes in Austin was not the equal of the University of Texas Law School.

Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question close.

Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware that it is an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned. The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to the University of Texas Law School.⁵

The obvious fact recognized in this decision is that no hurriedly established Negro law school could ever be the equal of the established state university law school for reasons that go beyond brick, stone, steel, and even books and endowments. The reasons are spiritual, psychological, and cultural. An ethico-cultural revolution is taking place in America inasmuch as, in recent years, these matters are taken into account for the first time by important centers of decision and policy.

The case of G. W. McLaurin versus the Oklahoma State Regents was finally decided in terms of the psychological effects of segregation upon the victim, and the nature of the learning process. The final issue in this case was a test of segregation itself. McLaurin had been admitted to the University of Oklahoma, but he was forced to use a desk in an ante-

⁵ Hill, Herbert, and Greenberg, Jack, *Citizen's Guide to Desegregation*. Boston, Beacon Press, 1955, pp. 75, 76.

room outside the classroom occupied by other students. In the library and cafeteria he was also segregated. The decision, written by Chief Justice Vinson on this matter, is as follows:

The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.

Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case represents, perhaps, the epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in education, to become, by definition, a leader and trainer of others. "Those who will come under his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the education he receives. Their own education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal to that of his classmates. State-imposed restrictions which produce such inequalities cannot be sustained."⁶

The Supreme Court decision of May 17, 1954, that segregated public education is unconstitutional followed the logic and spirit of the *Sweatt* and *McLaurin* cases. These decisions constitute the clearest and most specific application of the democratic concept of person to the Negro found in any leading agency in American life. This marks the establishment of a new philosophical foundation for race relations. It involves a shift from the quantitative, materialistic, and objectively measurable in race relations to the qualitative, personal, and spiritual. This great change is in the direction of Christian teaching. It, therefore, provides the churches with an excellent opportunity; but, at the same time, it deepens their responsibility.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Escape From Provincialism

CARLYLE MARNEY

I

MARIUS IS THE HORIZON-HUNGRY juvenile lead in the current Broadway play, *Fanny*. He is defensively accusing as he speaks to his father, Old César, barkeep on fisherman's wharf: "You think Marseilles is the center of the earth." "It is," cries César. "That is north, this is south; that east, this west, I am *here*, the center!"¹

"But there are others!" shouts Marius. "They are off-center," and César turns triumphant. . . . This, I think, is provincialism.

When Churchill says, "Look at the Londoners, the Cockneys, look at what they have stood up to—with their cry, 'we can take it'"; or when he says, "I have seen the king, gay, buoyant, confident, when the stones of Buckingham lay scattered on its lawns. . . ."; or when he says, "When I warned the French that Britain would fight on alone whatever they did, their generals said, 'In three weeks England will have their neck wrung like a chicken,'—some chicken, some neck!"¹ this is not provincialism, although Churchill can be provincial. This is patriotism, the impassioned loyalty of a seasoned leader, and there is a difference.

On the other hand, when we hear "All foreigners are fools," as Maynell put it,² we are in a different atmosphere. When the British say, "The only trouble with Yankees is that they are over-paid, over-sexed, and over here," this is provincialism. When the Poles call the Ukrainians "reptiles" and the Germans call Poles "cattle"; when in South Africa the British are against the Afrikaans, against the Jews, against the Indians, and all unite against the blacks, this is provincialism. When a Senator Bilbo writes that a Negro's skull ossifies in maturity so that he cannot take in new information, this is provincialism. In *Teahouse of the August Moon*, when Colonel Purdy says, "These natives are going to learn democracy

¹ Churchill, Winston S., *Maxims and Reflections*, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949; from a speech to the Canadian Parliament, December 30, 1941.

² Evans, Bergen, *The Natural History of Nonsense*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947, p. 247.

CARLYLE MARNEY, Th.M., Th.D., is Pastor of The First Baptist Church in Austin, Texas. His sermons and articles on Race Relations have been distributed by agencies of both the Southern and the American Baptist Conventions. This present article is based on a chapter planned for a forthcoming book, *Structures of Prejudice*.

if I have to shoot every one of them," this is provincialism. Sakini in the same play was wiser when he learned that "pornography is a matter of geography."

As the Roman empire fell the Christians were more frequently "lionized," and as our cotton economy slumped the rate of lynching rose—to show a local application. In 1947 we blamed Maine forest fires on Communists, but in 1950 the Czech potato famine was said to have been caused by American potato bugs. When the spire of St. Mary's fell in at Shrewsbury, the rector preached that this was because the villagers were building a memorial to Darwin; yet, in my own boyhood, I thought Clarence Darrow and Charles Darwin were one and the same at the Scopes trial in Dayton. "South America *free*, and English if possible," cried Canning in the Parliament, while Lady Astor wanted China and Russia "in" if they could learn to "think" British. These superb gems, says Lin Yutang, are London-cut.³ "If," we ask, "the yellow, brown, and black peoples are so smart, why haven't they got electric razors, and windshield wipers, and canned dog food?"⁴ And down in Paraguay I once heard a man say he had heard of Texas, he assumed it was a place in Chile! All this is provincialism.

What is provincialism? Provincialism is the loss, or absence, or distortion of one's critical faculties with respect to self and environment. Provincialism is the inability to be "other"-minded by reason of my preoccupation with and my uncritical acceptance of my own. Provincialism is that attitude of mind which issues in a series of false generalizations not subject to change or criticism on the basis of new experience. Provincialism is that distorted prejudgment of community which destroys the prospect of communion. It is the determined choice of the smaller world; a reductionism, an exclusivism, ultimately an isolationism. It is the rejection of the other, all others that are truly "other"; at bottom a solipsism, which is philosophically untenable, unthinkable—but who has to *think* in his provincialism? It may appear in a national, religious, racistic, cultural, or personal mold, but at bottom it is always the same: a prejudgment of community in favor of the smaller world. On its vast scale, provincialism is intra- and inter-cultural (East-West; Communistic-Capitalistic). In its deepest form it is intra- and inter-personal. But it is always the same: the predisposition to choose the lesser, closer world.

³ Yutang, Lin, *Between Tears and Laughter*, John Day, 1943, p. 18 f.

⁴ Evans, Bergen, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

II

All escapes from provincialism lie in the same direction—toward community. And time is not the healer; time heals nothing; time gets everything and does nothing for us. "Whatever man earns, nature eventually collects."⁵ Time is not the healer, for, says Whitehead, man can be provincial in time as well as space. It is not more time we need; we find escape through new experience. The cry for "more time" is the cry against new experience, for new experience creates the painful possibility of an enlargement of one's capacity for new relationships, and the expansion of community is a painful thing when the culture hinges are rusted by provincialism. It is a tearing thing to have one's cultural hinges opened.

In a brilliant series of lectures for the Hazen Foundation, Blake Smith re-establishes the claim that cultures swing on the hinges of value-judgment. The nature of a culture is predictable on the basis of its value reference points. Any escape from the lesser to the greater would require, therefore, an expansion of one's concept of the valuable. One escapes the limitations of his provincialism only as he finds higher value reference points around which new community is *created*. The basic means to this end is new experience; but the experience must be educative in a redemptive sense, by which I mean Christian education, and must result in the reference of conscience to a higher community, by which I mean the Kingdom of God, before experience can be said to be a means to true release from provincialism.

The experience that breeds familiarity may also breed blasé worldliness, compassionless, professional, and quite as provincial as any other localism. By the same token, education *per se* bears no true release unless its value reference points provide the prospect of release (redemption) from the lesser value judgment. Education approaches Christian education at the point that its value reference points become person-centered rather than function-centered. I see no release from provincialism in any emphasis on "group" or "function" that reduces the personal center of value.

What is required of education as a technique of release from provincialism?

All thought and capacity for thinking rests on man's ability to generalize. He can see that *this* is *that* and arrive at general impressions.

⁵ Reid, A. C., *Man and Christ*, Duke University Press, Durham, N. C.

He associates, then categorizes. Just as all thought rests on categorization, so all wrong thinking begins in wrong generalization. Prejudice is the emotion-controlled type of wrong thinking-acting that results from false generalization. It is the basic requirement of education that its character be such as will guard us from all types of false categorization. True education is *never* parochial in any sense of that word. There is no "Lutheran *Mathematique*" nor is there a Baptist Biology, and if Catholic Theology is pre-Copernican, and if Fundamentalism's view of Scripture is pre-Kantian, so much the worse for both.

But the problem is more general than this. By and large, we are ridden, in educational circles, by the "curse of departmentalization" (Frankfurter), bad departmentalization, a powerful form of false categorization from which nothing but a prejudiced view of reality *can* follow. Bad science begets bad metaphysics even in grammar school, says Whitehead⁶ in *Aims of Education*, then voices his complaint that we teach Algebra, from which nothing follows, Geometry, from which nothing follows, and so with History, Language, and Literature, with nothing following. This produces the curse of closed systems from which nothing but provincialism *can* follow; along with scrappy information, paragraph-picking, and general generalizations for avoiding the difficult. The net result may be provincialism in time *and* space.

For example, the highest ranking Liberal Arts graduate last year of a great university had read *only* Dewey. When I suggested that some of the problems he faced were also faced by Otto, Bergson, Whitehead, Russell, and even Reichenbach, he wanted to know their copyright dates!

It is required of education that its categories be such as will permit mature precision, not its prevalent opposite. It is required of education that some *synthesis* occur on the basis of a recognition of the interdependence of branches of study, if we are to be led out of our provincialism. It is required of education that the metaphysical inquiry native even to grade schools not be swallowed up in a false scientism so devoted to the great deceit of exactness. It is required of education that personality not be swallowed up in bad sociology, and that overt individualism, on the other hand, shall not make Fascistic the groups we can never totally forsake. That is to say, education must make community happen and expand in terms of *persons* in communion.

This is the peculiar task of Christian education, the leading into expanding life of the "new creation." Is it already too late to call for a

⁶ Whitehead, A. N., *Aims of Education*, Mentor Reprint, p. 755.

rereading of Whitehead's *Aims of Education* at this point? Can Christian education acquire and pass on an understanding of our mutual dependence in terms of the departmentalizations that so provincialize us? There are noble experiments in curriculum that could be cited. Is Christian education too parochial to provide a base in both culture and technical knowledge? Can there be mature precision, which means absence of distortion? Can the institutions of Christian education hold together under the pressures generated by the ferment-tension between the mighty opposites without which no learning really happens? That is, can Christian education endure the stress of putting its learners in a strut, tort, tension with their most personal and intimate values and provincialisms?

Dare we go under judgment? The judgment that realizes the variousness of things and permits still a not too timorous synthesis from which the continued provincialism of analysis can be moderated? If so, we have an approach to reverence, not for "life," but for the wholeness of things in present, past, and future; and more, we have the base for a higher sense of value within which our redemption from provincialism begins.

III

But there is more to this redemptive technique. There is a redemptive effect in Christian education without which the process is not only not Christian, it is not even education and is immoral. Nor is this to say that education is a means to redemption—rather it is to say that there is redemption for education, corporately and personally, in the sense that persons affected by such a redemption themselves, in the process of education, are used to produce a redemptive effect in those who submit to the encounter with redemptive persons in the education process. The work of the Christ has been mediated to me *best* by the redemptive persons who have given themselves to me with redemptive effect.

The redemptive effect of the educative technique is the effect of *release* from provincialism.

This is first a *gradational* redemption because the release is gradational. I am not wholly released from my provincialisms, not totally and not yet! (I still cannot understand why my neighbor cannot see that his historic episcopate is a provincialism, while I cling to my view of baptism, unwilling to concede *any* narrowness on my part.) And when I am released from my current limitation, in what new and more subtle provincialism will I find myself? I may escape from my nationalism, but even hemispheric solidarity is a provincialism. And when I have triumphed over

all and so approach the limits of finitude that there is nothing left for me but to become a rival to God, so free am I from localism, I still am involved in the ultimate of provincialism, my selfhood. The release is gradational, and so is the redemption.

But this redemption has also a *universal* meaning, the recognition of the possibility of the existence of other and higher value judgments than our own. In the framework of redemption from provincialism there is no room for exclusiveness; there are no closed circles of redemptive eligibility. Only on the base of this redemptive approach can education and its gifts be shared between East and West. We have a desperate need to hear; we need each other, which need refuses to allow the shriveling up of the genuine universal.

Charles Malik, at Evanston, was brilliantly convincing in his declaration of what such a redemptive approach to education would do for the East-West crisis of provincialism. "There are tremendous intellectual values, both in the local traditions of Asia and Africa and in the authentic traditions of the West, which can and should be *revived* and *cultivated*" [redemption]. He continues, "the revival of Avicenna and Averroes alone in the Middle East will produce an intellectual revolution *in one generation*." He pleads for the "responsible publication" of the world's greatest classics in major local vernaculars, and grieves over the lonesomeness of "creative thinkers" in the East who must work almost in isolation. "History," he says, "and literature, philosophy, theoretical excellence, creative art, the issues of life and death, the art of debate and discussion, the whole range of the humanities wherein the mind can enjoy, in freedom, the wonderful ecstasy of vision . . . is there any doubt that the way of peace and truth is to cultivate these things in and for Asia and Africa?"⁷

Is there any doubt, I would add, that this is the way of the redemptive approach to escape from our own provincialism, provided the translation is a two-way traffic? And could it be doubted that this kind of approach is a representation of what Hocking calls "the most impressive (saying) coming out of the experience of the early church"? "Behold, I stand at the door, and knock: *if any man* hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." But, Hocking adds, "*this is an unbound and unlimited Christ*, pervasive of the world and of history,"⁸ which fact alone presupposes redemption. One cannot follow this Christ into provincialism, for his "*if any man*" calls in the

⁷ Malik, Charles, Speech at Evanston, World Council of Churches Assembly, 1954.

⁸ Hocking, W. E., *The Coming World Civilization*, Harper & Brothers, 1956, p. 98.

opposite direction to community. This is the genuine universal of Christianity, of education, of redemption, and of community.

Which leads to the claim that by redemptive approach to community we have to mean *sacrificial* redemption. This is the meaning of tension and cross. The cross is an extra-cultural symbol too, which requires its local applicability. This requires the death of all ego-ridden notions of cultural superiority, all white men's burdens, all pride of largesse. This some are more ready to receive than others.

This gradational, universal, sacrificial redemption issues actually in the creative release of new values. New values literally rise out of the collapse of old systems. Something comes to life that had no life before. A culture finds a new community opening before it because a higher level of value has been centered and the means of finding this is redemptive education. The curse of closed systems, with all pedantry and deliberate delimitation of community, is lost in an educative approach to our cultural limits based on all the interdependence, knowledge, precision, ferment, variousness, and the wonder, curiosity, and hungers of reverence. The knowledge of the relativity of our release in the face of our great need for universal, sacrificial, creative redemption issues in that disposition or temper of mind which deliberately accepts *any* cultural limitations as an incitement to conduct which puts this creativeness to work in any neighborhood.

IV

But this can happen on earth only in the light of one's consciousness of belonging to a higher community. Christians know this community as the Kingdom of God and say that the source and ground of Christian Ethics is here, and on earth they know their own church as the reflection of that great Church which also lives as the channel and means of God's work in history and which, too, rises and lives in the Kingdom of God. And the awful sadness, the conviction for sin, the curse of his own provincialism that throttles a man is in part the reflection of his awareness that his church does not yet know to whom it belongs, nor where its only source rises, so he longs for the Kingdom of God and rebels against the confinement of his church-institution and stands with his chest against the fence, wanting his freedom to seek this beatitude of universal love on his own.

Why does he stay where he is? How can one stay within a framework he *knows* to be provisional and provincial?

He knows the temporary and provisional nature of any abortive escape.

Should he abandon the frame within which life first found him, he knows his escape from this immediate delimitation of community will only subject him to newer, more subtle, and so more vicious provincialisms. He knows the relative nature of any release and finds in even this a consciousness of kinship with all those men of other confessions, creeds, and nations who stand pressed against their fences too. He learns *there is no place to go*, for he feels the agony of confinement native to finitude and joins the race, the human race.

He knows the values and the potentiality trapped within the lower form, his own community. He is aware of submerged worthwhileness, of hidden possibilities that must not be forgotten or destroyed. He sticks around to be used in the saving of the salt. He cannot go outside and throw rocks from a larger pasture. For in spite of his despair, he loves the place.

He senses, then comes to know, the presence of other climbers on the wall. He is drawn to them by the common agony and delight of the seeking and finding. Communion happens in a touch of the hand, a flick of the eye, and frequently on this road, a confession of the heart late at night. There is constituted for him a most holy, most secret, most intimate personal church. In its light and strength and communion he lives his life knowing he belongs simultaneously to *these* and to this, and that this fellowship with other climbers exists only because there is a climb to be made.

That is, he knows all the time that he belongs to a higher community of which both his institution and his "fellowship of other climbers" are a reflection, and in this awareness of belonging always to the higher he *lives*. *And more*, he feels the call of the higher to come and to stay. He does both, knowing all the time that the call will split him. He knows all the time he lives on a cross, which means here the tension that maintains between the higher good and the local potential. And yet, on every day's journey he feels the penetration of the higher into the lower community in that invasion of love that will not leave us as we are and gives us friends for our journey.

Fog and mist hang heavily in the dense firred forests of the Brazos where it breaks out of its torturous canyon thousands of feet below the Brazos peaks. To ascend its bed to the crests is a thirty-mile agony over razor sharp ledges, torturous turns, dizzy cascades—the work of days, if indeed you can pack enough provender to make it.

But there is a long slide of shale and heavy rock, rising sheer to a

saddle a thousand feet below the summit. And if one has the heart and the lungs and the will, he can start in the forest darkness wrapped in its perpetual shroud and climb as daylight descends the walls—up, up, past timber line, agonizingly, heart breakingly, until at noon he breaks out on a saddle in good light, and by mid-afternoon he can crest the Brazos peaks in sunlight that reveals every torturing twist of the excruciating canyons that make North New Mexico a land of marvelous beauty and wild delight. From the top of Brazos you can see *everything*; you can see it all, heaving from your hours of aching climb—but you know all the time that there are higher mountains!

"Either All or None"

BENJAMIN E. MAYS

"Science has proved that by blood all races are kin. Christianity believes that God is the common father and that human life is of intrinsic worth. Yet it is not enough for anyone simply to say, "I grant these things." It is too easy to call *all* men brothers and then act as if only *some* men are brothers. We must go further. Either *all* men are brothers or *no* men are brothers. Either God is the father of *all* men or he is the father of *no* men. Either the lives of *all* children are sacred or the life of *no* child is sacred.

If the Americans and the English are brothers, then the Americans and the Russians are brothers. If God is the father of the Chinese, he is the father of the Japanese. If the life of the Queen of England is sacred, then the life of a miner in Wales is sacred. If the life of the President of the United States is of supreme worth, then the life of a mill hand in one of the Carolinas is of supreme worth. If the life of a multimillionaire is precious, then the life of a sharecropper is precious. If the life of a white child comes from God, then the life of the blackest Negro child also comes from God. All have worth."¹

¹ From *Seeking to Be Christian in Race Relations*, Friendship Press, 1947, p. 12 f. Used by permission.

Race Relations and the American Church

1. The Church and Race

EDGAR A. LOVE

IT IS TRITE to say that we are living in a crucial time—a time of challenge and of decision. Time is of the essence in the meeting of the challenge, and the answer must be forthright and unequivocal. The challenge comes particularly to the Church, and in no uncertain terms, from strong and powerful and somewhat sinister forces, chiefest among which are these: (1) communism, (2) the rising tide of nationalism, and (3) the aggressive upsurge of old religions.

Communism seeks to dominate the minds of men, in order to achieve control of the world. This godless government ideology, which becomes really a form of religion to its adherents, says in short: Religion is an opiate of the people, it has failed to give people happiness and the abundant life; it separates people rather than cements them into one agreeable whole; there is no place for God in human thinking or action; the State is supreme, and man has significance only as he serves the State. The Communists say theirs is to be a classless society in which all men are to share alike.

Such an ideology makes a tremendous appeal to subject people and people who are discriminated against because of race, color, or creed; and the Communists have taken advantage of the present social and political revolution going on among subject people and the discontent and dissatisfaction among people who suffer under discrimination and segregation. They have taken advantage of this world unrest and are attempting, not to stop it, but to channel it for their own uses.

The second great challenge which comes to the Church comes from subject people of the world who want to be free, independent nations. Will the Christian Church lend its moral support to their aspirations? Or is the Christian Church at one with the great Western Colonial powers?

EDGAR A. LOVE, B.D., S.T.M., D.D., was for several years Superintendent of the Department of Negro Work in the Methodist Board of Missions, and active in various interdenominational movements. He is now Bishop of the Baltimore Area, Central Jurisdiction, The Methodist Church.

The third great challenge comes from the aggressive rebirth of the old religions and the formidable outreach of Mohammedanism. Buddhism and Hinduism, which for centuries were quiescent and dormant, have recently become very much alive and are taking on new forms, sometimes even taking Christian hymns and using them in their services, substituting Buddha and Gautama for God or Christ.

And Mohammedanism, an offshoot of Judaism, always aggressive and missionary, is winning thousands of subjects in the newly awakened lands of the world. It makes much of its lack of discrimination among its members. They present a solid front wherever they go, and *all* adherents worship together.

Into such a world situation The Methodist Church of the United States comes to play its part. Is the church at home strong enough in its Christian foundation to sustain the superstructure of a world Christian Church? Is its practice sufficiently in harmony with its pronouncements to make a strong appeal to subject people and especially to people of color? (And we must remember that the Western nations, the bastions of the Christian religion, are responsible for "color" being the big issue in the struggle for the religious mind of the people of the world.)

Looking at itself as it is today, The Methodist Church must make its decision *now* as to whether it will be what it wants to be—a world church. Before trying to see what that decision ought to be (will have to be), let us review briefly the history of that church in regard to race.

When one speaks of race in this connection, it is common knowledge that we mean the Negro and that the chief problem of race in the United States concerns him. So we are talking primarily of him when we speak of race. (I am very well aware that there are other racial problems with "people of color" in the United States as distinguished from "colored people" [Negroes].)

The Negro has been a part of The Methodist Church from its beginning in the United States. John Wesley baptized the first Negro convert in 1758. The first group to gather for a meeting at the home of Philip Embury in 1766, included a Negro servant girl. There was no organized effort to keep the Negro slave from the influence of the gospel and from membership in the church. The early Methodists, however, were opposed to slavery, particularly Bishops Asbury and Coke, and John Wesley, the founder and early leader of Methodism. The latter wrote in his diary, ". . . shall not our Lord in due time have these heathens also for his inheritance?"¹

¹ Wesley's *Journal*, No. 11.

So great was the influence of the gospel among these people, that by 1816 one fourth of the Methodist Episcopal Church were Negroes. They received the gospel from the same preachers and in the same churches with their masters, but the galleries or a special portion of the church was assigned to them. From the beginning of the church in America, it took on the social pattern of the environment in which it found itself, which pattern had early decreed that the two races must live and function separately in all the relationships of life.

This pattern covered not only the slave states but also the non-slaveholding states, and the humiliations suffered by the Negroes under this system early led to a defection from the church on the part of a group in old Saint George's Church in Philadelphia and to the organization of an independent all-Negro church. This was in protest to the unchristian action on the part of the members of St. George's, which is reported by Singleton to be so unethical and unchristian as to pull men from their knees at the communion table because they attempted to commune with white brothers. "You must get up, you must not kneel here," the Reverend Absalom Jones was told. To which he "replied, 'Wait until the prayer is over, and I will get up and trouble you no more.' The trustee beckoned to another trustee to come to his assistance. He came, and went to William White, to pull him up. 'By this time prayer was over, and we all went out of the church in a body and they were no more plagued with us in the church.'"² The resulting Negro church now claims a membership of more than a million and a quarter.

In 1820, because of similar treatment, a group withdrew from the church in New York City and formed the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, which body today claims a membership of more than 600,000.

In 1870, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, which separated from the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1844 over slavery, set aside its colored membership into an independent organization—the Colored Methodist Episcopal Church, now the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. This church now numbers more than 375,000. The withdrawal of this group, according to Garber, was voluntary, with the blessing of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and this is the only Negro Methodist Church "whose existence is not the result of schism or secession."³

Toward all these independent Negro Churches, the parent organization, whether the Methodist Episcopal Church or the Methodist Episcopal

² Singleton, G. A., *The Romance of African Methodism*, New York: Exposition Press, 1952, pp. 16-17.

³ Garber, P. N., *The Methodists Are One People*, Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1939, p. 68.

Church, South, has been generous in its support and cordial in its relationship to them within the framework of segregation.

Immediately following the great schism in the church over slavery, efforts on the part of men of good will were made once again to unite these two great bodies with the Methodist Protestant Church, which in 1828 withdrew over the matter of lay representation. "The Long Road to Union" is well discussed under that title by Bishop John M. Moore, and also by Paul N. Garber in his book, *The Methodists Are One People*. For this article it suffices to say that finally a plan was produced which is the present plan of organization of The Methodist Church, bringing about unification under the jurisdiction system. This system contains within the parent body six administrative units—five geographical and one racial. It is to be noted in passing that no attempt was made to bring into this union the great independent Negro bodies who are also Methodists.

This plan of unification which united three branches of Methodism compromised with the Southern church by including all Negro conferences and missions into a racial jurisdiction.

Although there had been separate Negro churches and conferences in the Methodist Episcopal Church, these were not constituted by law; and the Negro in the Church was vigorously opposed to legalized segregation within the Church and voted decisively against the plan of union: ministers—583 for, 823 against; laymen—253 for, 477 against.⁴ Many of those who voted for the plan did so chiefly for two reasons. First, they did not want to be a stumbling block to the union of Methodism. Secondly, they felt that though this plan was a compromise, it would defeat itself ultimately through the wholesome contact that the Negro membership of the church could have with the white membership of the church, particularly in the South. The latter believed that such a compromise could not last under the impact of the new understanding that must come when Christian people see each other for what they are as individuals and face squarely up to what they ought to be as a corporate body in Christ.

Many specious arguments have been made for the segregated unit in The Methodist Church, chiefest among which has been the argument that such an organization allows for greater development of indigenous leadership and racial development. The writer wonders which is to the greater advantage of the church of Christ and the people called Christians: whether certain individual Negroes can come to places of leadership, or whether

⁴ *Zions Herald*, May 12, 1937, p. 586.

the total group of Negroes would be to better advantage through an unsegregated church allowing wholesome religious contacts at all levels.

After seventeen years of union with the segregated unit, the church must now face up to its position as a world church and make its decision accordingly. Tremendous changes are taking place in our day, and the hour of decision is upon us. No longer can pious pronouncements satisfy a world looking for results. We must make what we say we believe equate with what we do. "We multiply human communications and bungle human relations."⁵ "No longer must we talk about closer fellowship within respective jurisdictions."⁶ But something must be done to make a closer fellowship among all people across jurisdiction lines or with the elimination of jurisdictions.

Christianity makes no distinction as to race. "The church is the undivided body of Christ whose mission is to unite all races and nations into a single brotherhood of worship and love." What is important is no longer tribe or nation, but individuals. The ancient Jew thought himself a people set apart, but Jesus came among them teaching the fellowship of all who believed in him. They crucified him for it, but when he died the veil of the temple was rent in twain from top to bottom. Separation, isolation, and segregation by his death thereby received its death blow.

Jesus put the individual—the crowning glory of God's creation, and his first concern—at the center of his gospel. Peter discovered in his relationship to the centurion that "God is no respecter of persons"; and Paul declared that "of one blood has he created all nations to dwell together on the face of the earth." Organized Christianity has often prostituted the basic beliefs and teachings of Christ—the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man—to the extent of allowing race to make a difference, even to the point of segregation.

According to *The Churches and Segregation*: "The Church, when true to its higher destiny, has always understood that its gospel of good news has a twofold function, namely:

"To create new men with new motives;

"To create a new society wherein such men will find a favorable environment within which to live their Christian convictions."⁷

If such be the real function of the Church, then there must be no

⁵ Lord, J. W., *Zions Herald*, Feb., 1956, p. 2.

⁶ Statement of College of Bishops, Southeastern Jurisdiction, quoted in *Virginia Methodist Advocate*, Feb. 17, 1955, p. 5.

⁷ *The Churches and Segregation*—An official statement and resolution adopted by the General Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., in Chicago, Illinois, June 11, 1952.

limitations placed upon the individuals within that Christian environment to live their Christian convictions.

The Methodist Church at its last General Conference set up a Commission to Study and Recommend Action Concerning the Jurisdictional System.⁸ It is evident that the church realizes that something must be done to make easier the transfer of a local church from one conference to another and the transfer of a conference from one jurisdiction to another, and finally, for total abolition of the Central Jurisdiction and perhaps all jurisdictions. Amendments were adopted by the General Conference and sent down to the local conferences for ratification.⁹

In keeping with the trend of the times in which we are living, which is inevitably and irresistibly moving in the direction of one world and one people—the human family—The Methodist Church in America can take the leadership in the Christian conquest for the religious mind of the world by taking the following steps. First, there should be created in The Methodist Church a commission to make overtures to the great independent Negro Methodist Churches for organic union. The Methodist Church, the mother church, which is responsible for the schism, because of its intolerant attitude in other days, should take the initiative in exploring the possibilities with independent Negro Methodist Churches for one organic Methodist Church. Such a movement would have overtones which would be heard around the world, if they were made with sincerity and carried through with appropriate speed. Secondly, it must take steps toward the elimination of segregation within its own organic structure.

As is true of The Methodist Church, so must every denomination in the United States of America today make the basic teaching of Christianity synonymous with Christian practice (living). "Segregation (on account of race) is a tragic evil that is utterly un-Christian . . . and is a blatant denial of the unity which we all have in Christ."¹⁰ The Western Christian Church, in conforming to the pattern of Western culture and social practice, has let color of skin be a decisive factor in its corporate existence. This denies the Oneness of the Body of Christ. There must be no compromise, no equivocation, no marking time, no backward steps. The going on toward a completely integrated church at every level must be accelerated. Ministers of the gospel of Christ must be fearless prophets proclaiming the truth "that God is no respecter of persons," that "all are one in Christ

⁸ See *Discipline of The Methodist Church—1956*, Par. 2013, p. 686.

⁹ See *Discipline of The Methodist Church—1956*, Par. 26, note pp. 19-20.

¹⁰ Text of Race Relations Message by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.

Jesus." Too long, too many have been but perfunctory priests administering around established altars and speaking what they think the people want to hear.

Above Grant's tomb along Riverside Drive, New York City, are inscribed the words: "That Peace Might Prevail." Across from it is International House, above whose portals blaze forth the words: "That Brotherhood Might Prevail." There can be no peace in our world until brotherhood has become a reality in human existence. Where better to begin the practice of it than in the Christian Churches of America? Then will Christian America be strong enough to support the extension of Christ's Kingdom in all lands among every people.

"We Are Called Upon to Obey

HAROLD A. BOSLEY

"We are called upon to obey as well as to proclaim the judgment of God, who made us one and in whose holy sight our divisions and strife are sinful. We are called upon to repent of the strife in our own fellowship and to call to repentance men, races, and nations that struggle against one another. We are called of God to renounce strife and conflict ourselves as being sinful; we are asked to persuade all other men to do likewise. We cannot accept racial or ethnic fears and prejudices as being either necessary or good; they are evil through and through because they separate man from man and obscure God's will for man. We cannot accept racial segregation, which is an outgrowth of such fears, as being either necessary or good; it, too, is evil and must never be permitted to masquerade as good."¹

¹ From *What Did the World Council Say to You?* Abingdon Press, 1955, p. 89. Used by permission.

2. The Mind of the White South

WARNER L. HALL

LIKE ANY OTHER biracial area, the South has two minds—a Negro mind and a white mind. That these two minds differ from each other, every sensitive Southerner would agree. But beyond the conviction of difference I hesitate to go. I don't know what the mind of the Negro South is. It is to be doubted that today either race really understands the other. It is unfortunate that, at so critical a period in the relationship of the two races, they appear to have lost the capacity to communicate with each other. Many will contend, of course, that they never possessed it, and that what passed for mutual understanding was merely a superficial phenomenon—that both spoke their parts according to the script, as in a play, while the real thoughts of the actors remained unspoken.

I

What is the mind of the White South? Again, there is no simple answer to such a question. Some have what might be termed a *belated* mind. They refuse to admit the passage of almost one hundred years since the battle of Fort Sumter and the changes in the social and economic and political climate which the years have brought about. "Come weal, come woe, their status is quo." This group varies from quiet to violent. The more violent crusade under a number of banners for "white supremacy." Their forces have been swelled by a number of self-appointed delegates from the outside. These usually are persons experienced in hating. Some are very skilled, having hated as many as ten different groups at one time. Some of these have met with outstanding success in fomenting strife and acquiring TV coverage. The quiet section of this group takes no action, hoping by the glacial weight of inertia to slow down the rate of change. But all shades of opinion within this group are unanimous in believing that, as far as race relations go, yesterday was better than today and tomorrow is likely to be worse than today.

It is an *aggrieved* mind. Many feel that the manifest shortcomings

WARNER L. HALL, B.D., D.D., Ph.D., is Minister of the Covenant Presbyterian Church, Charlotte, North Carolina. Besides other pastorates, he has served on several Boards of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.

of the region and its people have been castigated by those living in other sections of the country in a manner marked by contempt but devoid of sympathy for the magnitude and complexity of the problem, and lacking humility born of the knowledge that this is not merely a sectional problem. One minister who has fought all his life for better race relations put it this way: "*The Christian Century* is always preaching to us, but never in love." A college professor complained that the most oppressed minority in the nation is the white people of the South. While they do not seek to impose their pattern of life upon other regions, the other regions seek to deny them that measure of local autonomy to which they feel themselves entitled under the American system of government. His position is held by many.

It is a *troubled* mind. Perhaps it would be more accurate to describe it as a *schizophrenic* mind. This does not apply to the small groups at either end of the gamut—on the one hand the fanatical advocates of white supremacy and on the other the pure-minded who see, as God sees, all men with the eyes of love. Both of these are remarkably single-minded. The vast majority of those who were born and reared in the South are troubled and divided within themselves. They are pulled in diverse directions by a fundamental respect for law and the inability to see how it can wisely be carried out. But more serious still is the interior cleavage occasioned by a conflict of principle and prejudice. They are pulled in one direction by convictions which are derived from their Christian faith and in the other by concepts and notions which are the almost unavoidable gifts of their environment.

II

The South has been contemptuously referred to as the "Bible Belt." Whether it be a stigma or an honor, it is true that the area regards the Bible with a respect likely unmatched elsewhere in the nation. For many decades, ministers in their sermons and teachers in Sunday-school classes have been trying to lay the message of the Christian gospel alongside our racial practices. Added to this has been the personal study of the Bible and a consequent searching of heart by an unnumbered but very considerable host. They know and accept the Pauline dictum that "in Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor free." To this they are prepared to add, intellectually at least, "neither white nor Negro."

This is no new doctrine created by the actions of the Supreme Court. It has a truly religious background. Fifty years ago, the retiring moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S., Dr. Howerton, preached to the

General Assembly of his church a sermon on "The Negro My Neighbor," in which he said:

If we are orthodox Christians we cannot relegate him to a different line of simian ancestry from our own. Great as are the racial differences, our creed is that the negro and the white man are descended from a common ancestry. He is our brother, and not the less so because he lives in our own country and not in Africa. His soul is as immortal as ours. If Christ died for the white man He died for the black man. Dare we assume that the great commission sends us to the black man on the Congo, but gives us no message for the negro in our own land? "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "But who is my neighbor?" "The despised Samaritan, thou proud Jew. The negro, thou proud white man, aye, the negro saloon-keeper." For if we are consistent with our creed, our duty is not only to the "good" negro, not only to the kind and helpful, to the honest, industrious and friendly negro, but to seek and to save the lost among them, to send physicians to the soul-sick among them. The more ignorant he is the more he needs the enlightenment of the Gospel; the more immoral he is the more he needs the saving power of the Gospel; the less he has in him to attract a natural love, the more he needs the spiritual love of the redeemed man. . . .

The recognition of the relevance of the Christian gospel has manifested itself in a number and variety of ways. Thirty years ago the owner of a large plantation in the Mississippi Delta came to the conclusion that he could not square his faith with the sharecropper system. So he eliminated all sharecroppers, bought forty tractors, and operated the plantation by the employment of labor paid what he believed to be a just wage. The problem was far more complex than his solution, yet he was driven by his faith to try to do better. A woman in Alabama fifteen years ago said to her minister after a sermon on race relations, "I think God may forgive all my sins except the wages I have paid my cook." She forthwith went and doubled the wages of the cook. Such efforts to meet the problem as Christians may be dismissed as incredibly naïve, yet they are typical of millions who have been troubled by a situation which was recognized to be less than Christian and by a faith which seemed to drive them farther than they wanted to go.

The major Christian Churches of the South have felt this tension. From time to time they have adopted official positions which were beyond the common practice. Most such were adopted prior to the decision of the Supreme Court. One example was the action of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S. taken in 1953 and 1954.

1. That the General Assembly affirm that enforced segregation of the races is discrimination which is out of harmony with Christian theology and ethics and that the Church, in its relationship to cultural patterns, should lead rather than follow.

2. That the General Assembly, therefore, submit this report for careful study throughout the Church, and that it especially urge:

(1) That the trustees of institutions of higher education belonging to the

General Assembly adopt a policy of opening the doors of these institutions to all races.

(2) That the Synods consider earnestly the adoption of a similar recommendation to trustees of institutions under their control.

(3) That the governing bodies of the various conferences held throughout the Church consider the adoption of a similar policy.

(4) That the sessions of local churches admit persons to membership and fellowship in the local church on the Scriptural basis of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ without reference to race.

(5) That in this time of crisis and concern, we commend to all individuals in our communion and especially to all leaders of our churches the earnest cultivation and practice of the Christian graces of forbearance, patience, humility and persistent good will.

This was adopted by an Assembly composed equally of laymen and ministers. Baptists, Methodists, and other denominations have also taken action approving the action of the Supreme Court.

It is easier to take such actions at the denominational than at the local level. Yet such actions have sifted down to the local level in a number of areas.

Lest it be assumed that all is sweetness and light among a population composed entirely of devout Christians, let the contrary evidence be noted. When the Christian gospel has been brought to bear upon social practices, a few ministers have been forced out of their pulpits. Many have been ignored. As one wrote, "Though there is virtue in having freedom to preach what is not popular, is there any virtue in doing it so long as the people simply feel that hearing it is part of the cross they have to bear to keep their preacher?" Recently the Duke Divinity School, armed with petitions and prayer-vigils, submitted a plea to the Board of Trustees that qualified Negro students be admitted. The Board rejected the plea while saying that the position taken by the Divinity School was one which should be expected of such a group. A very few ministers have written articles supporting segregation on the basis that it contributed to progress and was ordained of God and commanded by the Scriptures. These are not only few in number, they do not have the respect of their brethren.

III

Throughout the South, there is the uneasy feeling that our way of living is under the judgment of God. The intensity of the feeling varies very greatly from a vague unease to an acutely troubled conscience. Throughout the South there is the feeling that the proposed remedies, in the final analysis, are unacceptable and that they threaten cherished values. This too varies very markedly from a reluctant willingness to try integrated

schools to a conviction that another civil war may be necessary. Herein lies the schizophrenic nature of our mind.

This fear of integration is not wholly based on blind bigotry. It has its reasons, which may or may not seem cogent to others and which would be denied by some.

One such reason is the assumed difference in the level of preparation of a white and Negro child in, let us say, a coastal county of South Carolina where the ratio of Negro to white is often four or five to one. This is not an appraisal of native intelligence, but a recognition that education is a product of the total environment. Parents face a similar problem in certain areas of great cities where great variation in the level of preparation of the school children is to be found. There is the belief (whether it be true or false the reader must judge for himself) that integrated schools in most such areas would work to the educational disadvantage of both groups.

"Separate but equal" facilities are honestly regarded by many as a better pedagogical approach. The educational facilities for white and Negro children are substantially equal in many areas. New schools for Negro children are a common sight throughout the South. These new schools may be a token of the region's concern for justice or merely "running scared," as one Southerner described it. In several states the average salary paid to Negro teachers is higher than that paid to the white teachers. Most such gains, it should be noted, were achieved before the Supreme Court decision.

Another fear is derived from the belief that the moral standards of the two races are not the same. This assumed difference is most keenly felt in the area of sex. This is no effort to indict a whole people. No doubt it is greatly exaggerated. But it continues to influence many.

Perhaps the chief fear is of intermarriage. That this fear is largely irrational matters not at all. Parents start with two sound premises. One is that marriages are the product of the social group, and, more often than not, the school is the social group. The other is that any marriage in the United States across religious, cultural, and racial lines gives serious hostages to fortune. They then jump to the unsound position that that which they fear most is the most likely to occur.

The dilemma of the churches is not easily resolved. One minister frankly stated his problem thus:

I believe that the Christian faith must break down all barriers which separate man from man. I believe that in such matters the Church, if it is not to lose its own soul, must lead rather than follow. I have so preached. We have had a number of interracial meetings and meals at the church. Our youth groups have visited Negro youth groups, and they have visited us. When a Negro attends a service in our church

it causes no ripple. The law of our Church indicates that all Christians are to be received into the fellowship of the Church. Our officers have gone on record as accepting this position. I honestly believe that we could take two or three Negro families into the church without serious incident. Yet I am just as certain that thirty Negro families would cause the white families to leave en masse. I saw this happen in a vacation Bible School in a church in a great Northern city. The school went on several years with a few Negro children enrolled. The staff of the church sought to bring in more Negro children. When the percentage of Negro children reached thirty, the parents of the white children quietly withdrew them. It may be that the Church must lose its life in order to save it. I don't know.

IV

Occasionally, the South has a *sardonic* mind. Two examples may illustrate this facet of our thinking. Both are drawn from newspapers. One is suggested by Harry Golden, the editor of the *Carolina Israelite*. Mr. Golden believes that the problems of integration can be solved by a very simple device which he calls "vertical integration." Negroes and whites shop side by side in the same stores, ride side by side in the same elevators, without the slightest objection being raised. So if all seats were removed from the classrooms of the schools, Negro and white children could stand peaceably side by side. It is only when we sit down that we become acutely racially conscious. According to the latest information, no school board has adopted Mr. Golden's proposal officially.

The second is an editorial by Mr. P. D. East, editor of the small-town *Petal* (Mississippi) *Paper*. Mr. East has fought a long and bruising battle for the principles of democracy and Christianity. The editorial was a full-page spread inviting his readers to join the "Citizens Clan" and thereby become "Super-superior." "For only five dollars, guaranteed superiority." For the same five dollars, one can acquire certain important freedoms, such as "freedom to interpret the constitution to your own personal advantage!" "Freedom to yell 'Nigger' as much as you please without your conscience bothering you." "Freedom to be superior without brain, character or principle." Reliable information indicates that more people have joined "White Citizens Councils" than Mr. East's "Citizens Clan." Nor has his movement to segregate the Scotch-Irish because of their manifold and manifest objectionable qualities really caught the popular fancy.

It is a mind that is a little *ashamed*, ashamed of many of the spokesmen for the area. Some of these spokesmen are the elected representatives. Many are self-appointed. These latter appear to be, without exception, hopeless. Few Southerners can hear their public utterances without wincing. Those elected officials who take the same line, while they may be intel-

lectually honest, give the impression of cynically adopting the lowest common denominator, thinking thereby to achieve or maintain political preferment. These men are not the respected leaders of the section. Senator Eastland spoke to a "mass meeting" in Charlotte, North Carolina, in an auditorium seating 2,500 people. Several Charlotte churches had more persons at their weekly prayer meetings than turned out to hear the Senator from Mississippi.

Many are ashamed of the fact that many, both whites and Negroes, but especially the Negroes, have been denied the franchise. Happily the areas where this situation obtains are growing smaller year by year. Many are ashamed of any situation where a human being, helpless to defend himself, is compelled to suffer indignity. Many are ashamed that they have been in some instances unaware of galling inequalities, and in others far too comfortable in the presence of such inequalities.

The mind of the South is more *hopeful* today than it was a year or two ago. It now appears that it has more time to achieve a solution to its problems than was thought to be available immediately following the action of the Supreme Court. The decision of the Court could not have been implemented immediately without violence. Time has been allowed. Areas either more courageous or more suited to integration have moved toward a solution. Their progress has been marked by greater ease and happier results than might have been anticipated. Many have recovered from the shock of the Court action and have begun again to work for the betterment of conditions as they had done prior to 1954. In retrospect the changes which have occurred in the social structure in the last fifteen years appear to be considerable and good. More people are aware of our failures in common courtesy and are determined not to fail in this regard as egregiously as in the past.

Basically this hope for the future rests not upon law but upon the character of the people. As our experiment in prohibition demonstrated, in a democracy the absence of popular support can effectively nullify a law. We dare hope because we have confidence in the Christian convictions of the majority of the people of the area. This confidence is not as fatuous as it may appear to those who live elsewhere. The acts of violence have been headlined, the acts of love and courage have been unnoticed. The latter outnumber the former by a thousand to one. Some dare to believe that our faith is stronger than our prejudices.

3. "A People Different From My Own"

ROBERT S. BILHEIMER

I

WE WERE SITTING after dinner and over coffee in the living room, my wife and I with another minister. We had different jobs. He was the pastor of a church in Queens. I was the Secretary of the Interseminary Movement. He preached, ministered to people, and supervised the activities of a congregation. I organized conferences, edited books and produced pamphlets, traveled and spoke—all among theological students. My friend was in his forties; I was in my late twenties. He challenged me. "You have said yourself," he said, "that the parish ministry is the front firing line of the Church; why do you stay in the back areas?" I did not wholly accept his premise, for there can be more than one front line. But I felt his point. "All right. I can't give up my job, but it does not occupy me on Sundays. You connect me with some small church where I can help."

I was in San Francisco a couple of months later, when a telegram came asking if I would preach on the first Sunday of March, 1946, at the Westminster Presbyterian Church in Jamaica, Queens, New York City. This meant a communion service, since Presbyterians are wont to celebrate Holy Communion on the first Sunday of the month. It would be the first time I had conducted a communion service. I worked hard in preparation for it, but for what really happened there I was totally unprepared.

When on that Sunday morning I arrived at the church, I found that one service was just concluding. This was held by a small group, only ten or a dozen, who had been worshiping in the building for years. Outside the door, waiting for the first service to end and their own to begin, were the first few of those whose service I had come to conduct. They were both Presbyterian congregations. They did not worship together, because the one was white and the other was Negro. The white congregation worshiped at eleven. As I came along about ten minutes before twelve, the Negroes were waiting to get into the building. I was not prepared for the shock of seeing with my own eyes what this separation meant.

ROBERT S. BILHEIMER, B.D., D.D., is Associate General Secretary of the World Council of Churches and Director of its Division of Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. He writes from an eight-year experience as pastor of a Negro congregation.

Then we had our service, some fifty of the sixty-seven who were members of that church being present. My own skin never felt so white! The building, moreover, though outwardly of good colonial style, offered on the inside a frightful spectacle of cheap patchwork. A wheezy pump organ and the squeaking of ancient pews complemented each other. During the service, however, I forgot this, because the big thing began to happen that I had not anticipated at all. In the midst of racial contrasts and architectural indignities, a great dignity of spirit and of worship was as apparent as if it might be touched and seen. There began to emerge an intensity of worship that I for one had never felt before.

This was not produced by any particular technique. We had a straight, staid Presbyterian order of service. It reached its climax, for this participant at least, in the Sacrament. Presbyterians usually partake of the bread and wine as they sit in the pews, the elements being passed to them by the elders of the church. During the distribution, the organ began, then one after another of the congregation took up the music; even the elders on their feet who were passing the Body and the Blood sang, "Just as I am, without one plea."

"I came," said Jesus, "not to save those who are righteous, but to the lost." I felt in this service that I was among those who knew that they were lost, but also knew that already on this earth they were being saved from their lostness. So I began to understand these great truths of life, in the vivid intensity of the worship of that congregation.

II

I was the minister of that church for eight years. There came a time when the arrangements with the other congregation, the congregation of white people, had to change. For a rental fee, we could use the church on Sunday between twelve and two (Church twelve to one, Sunday School one to two) and two nights a week. We were growing in numbers and activity. We needed more space and time. We decided to ask Presbytery (which is the agency of the Presbyterian Church that stands, like county government over city government, just above the congregations) for permission to buy a building of our own nearby. Presbytery responded vigorously: "Nothing doing, we shall not have two Presbyterian churches in South Jamaica! These two churches, the white and the Negro, must unite."

This was not a very spectacular decision, but it showed us some factors which are important. The actual progress of events called, first, for an invitation by Presbytery to the two churches to unite. The Negro congre-

gation responded at once, favorably. The white group refused. This was no quick decision on their part. They had, as they said, long been afraid of being swallowed up by the Negroes. They had debated the matter long among themselves. They had had meeting after meeting with representatives of Presbytery. It was in these meetings, where I was not present, but of which I had many reports, that the depth of the bitterness of the white people in this northern and cosmopolitan city was most fully revealed. These people had, to be sure, a deeply rooted prejudice. They did not want to be associated in church with Negroes.

They were not, however, angry with the Negroes. "Nice people, many of them," they said, "not their fault!" They were angry with their white fellow-Christians. In a very difficult meeting one officer of the church lashed out in words which now have a humorous sound, to the clergymen representing Presbytery: "You are so low that you wouldn't scratch the belly of a centipede if you walked under him in a top hat!" Not humorous, those words, when spoken in anger, as they were. White man felt betrayed by white man. So deep are the roots of prejudice.

The next move was Presbytery's. Exercising its legal function, Presbytery voted to merge the churches, forming one congregation by legal action. The meeting of Presbytery took place, with less fanfare and opposition during its course than was expected. The Sunday on which the merger was to go into effect was appointed. There was regret in the white group, but we could sense nothing stronger than that.

When the Sunday arrived, however, we were confronted with a church building where a certain amount of vandalism had been perpetrated the night before. Pews were overturned, the big Bible taken away, the chancel in disorder. This had not been instigated by the minister of the white church. He had been a man in his middle eighties, retired years ago, not interested in the issue at hand, gracefully withdrawing himself from the entire scene. The work of that Saturday night was done by some, not all, of the laymen, whose church was too precious to them to be lost without a struggle. We learned that day just a little of what vindictiveness means.

Afterward the church grew steadily. We had one evangelistic campaign—meetings and house visitation—which was a failure and which we did not repeat. We adopted a policy of never having an organized campaign of evangelism. In many ways, we kept the Christian duty of evangelism before the people, and waited for them to speak up to their friends. The minister never asked anyone to join the church. Our growth in numbers

was not spectacular, but it was steady. With a minister able to spend only about two nights a week and Sundays (I had shifted from the Interseminary Movement to the New York Office of the World Council of Churches), the church grew from sixty-seven to slightly over 400 in eight years. Our growth in the Spirit is not for us to judge.

We did, however, grow into each other, this Negro congregation and I, their white minister. I do not know what they learned from me; but I do know what I learned from them. It was a curious experience, showing me unexpected things. I do not know whether I had any race prejudice in me or not. Perhaps so. But as I danced with the girls in the young people's group, went all over New York and Long Island by twos or by fifties with church members, ate with them, was admitted to the deep confidence of both the psychiatrically ill and the spiritually vigorous, I think that to a reasonable degree I got beyond what is usually called race prejudice.

Yet the plain fact is that I am more conscious now that this is a Negro church than I was when I preached my first sermon there those years ago. I am less conscious of the color of the skin, and more conscious of a distinct culture. When I mixed with my white friends, whether socially or on business, I was conscious of being in a certain kind of atmosphere, part of a certain kind of culture; and when I was in the context of my church and its members, I was conscious of being in a very different realm. I went through something into something, and it was not just the boundary of the segregated housing area. Perhaps the most precious human experience of my life—though not only human, because for me there was the hand of God in it—is that I have been admitted into the life of a "people" different from my own, and possessed of rare qualities.

III

One may spend a lot of time analyzing this culture, this people, and it is still elusive. It is partly like a white culture, but underneath it there is something different. The man who says that the people who form this culture of Negro America should be segregated is patently wrong. But the man who will not see that here there is a people and a culture is blind. It is real, and it is very great.

My eyes were first opened to some of the qualities of these people when I bought my house. It was wartime. Housing in South Jamaica, in the "Negro section," was scarce and high. Landowners were exploiting the incoming Negro. I could find nothing I could afford. I found a bun-

galow seven miles away close to my price range, but still above my reach. I had about decided to give it up. We were riding one Sunday in a borrowed car, and when we returned a man from the church was waiting for us at our door. He had been there for two hours. After the pleasantries, he said he had something to talk to me about. I took him to the kitchen. "Do you want that house?" he asked me. "Yes, but I can't raise the money." "I'll let you have what you need." "But," I said, "it's a lot and I can't pay you back for at least ten years." "How much?" "Three thousand." "I will have it tomorrow." He refused a note; he refused interest. I gave him both.

Why had he done it? For one thing, he did it because we were forced to move from our rented first floor by the owner who lived upstairs. He did not like having Negroes come to visit us, and made it necessary for us to move. As we discovered later, there is a deep sense of *solidarity* among Negroes. It is a part of the "people." This man was showing that solidarity to me, and it was something I had never seen before. Moreover, he was doing it spontaneously, quite freely, and without fanfare. No one else ever knew of his loan. That spontaneity, too, was something we came to see and appreciate.

Perhaps it is their own sense of community and solidarity which makes them demand it of others, perhaps it is their segregated isolation which makes them long for it from others; but Negroes respond to any real demonstration of solidarity in profound measure. I saw this in our ecclesiastical relations. The first act was when a Presbytery, almost entirely white, voted to merge the two churches, against the wishes of a white congregation. The second was in the matter of a substantial loan to the church. We needed, as time went on, to enlarge the building. We applied to the Board of National Missions. It was granted more quickly than we had a right to expect. Again solidarity had been shown—trust and expectation and confidence by the white man in his Negro brother. I cannot describe the sense of appreciation in that group, but I knew that it was there. It showed in their own gifts. It showed in what they did for their church life.

These people demand *justice*. The degree of education did not seem to make much difference in the urgency of this demand. All had made up their minds. The injustice attendant upon segregation must be done away with. This was the key point. But their sensitivity to this point opened their spirits to other problems of justice as well. A sharp perspective, the perspective of the underdog, enabled them to see what more favored people do not habitually see, and in the seeing to feel for those oppressed

with a deep sympathy. So pervasive was this that I became aware that it was an ingredient of their culture; a part of the substance of what makes them a people living within a people.

The Negro sense of community and of solidarity, together with their sensitivity and demand for justice, has far-reaching implications for the Christian church. For one thing, no church which is not a genuine community on the side of social justice will long or thoroughly claim their allegiance. Our task in South Jamaica was one of re-evangelism. Most of those who joined did not simply transfer from another church to ours. Neither were there many adult baptisms. These people had been baptized, but the majority had left the church, five, ten, or fifteen years ago, generally because their instinctive as well as their reasoned expectations from the church were higher than what the churches were providing. They joined our church slowly, and nearly always after long consideration. They did not want to be disappointed again. It was not that they wanted a church which was merely a movement for social justice. But they demanded integrity of purpose, message, and life in the church.

From quite another angle, the Church is presented with an immense opportunity by the qualities and experience which Negroes possess. One of the elements underlying their deep sense of solidarity and their demand for justice is their *suffering*. They have suffered in their history and in the present, and they all suffer in the same way. No biblical passage gripped this congregation more in the reading than Isaiah 53: "He was despised and rejected of men." I began to see that here was a background of experience which enabled them to penetrate to the center of Christian faith, to crucifixion and resurrection, to a degree I had not known to be possible.

These reflections, and others which space does not permit me to outline, were forming in my mind when I read Arnold Toynbee's *A Study of History*. There I read a passage in which there is expressed a great vision:

"The Syrian slave immigrants who once brought Christianity into Roman Italy performed the miracle of establishing a new religion which was alive in the place of an old religion which was already dead. It is possible that the Negro slave immigrants who have found Christianity in America may perform a greater miracle of raising the dead to life . . . They may perhaps be capable of kindling the cold, gray ashes of Christianity which have been transmitted to them by us until in their hearts the divine fire glows again. It is thus perhaps, if at all, that Christianity may con-

ceivably become the living faith of a dying civilization for the second time. If this miracle were indeed to be performed by an American Negro church, that would be the most dynamic response to the challenge of social penalization that had yet been made by man.”¹

I believe that this is possible.

On Nonviolent Resistance

MARTIN LUTHER KING

“Finally, the method of nonviolence is based on the conviction that the universe is on the side of justice. It is this deep faith in the future that causes the nonviolent resister to accept suffering without retaliation. He knows that in his struggle for justice he has cosmic companionship. This belief that God is on the side of truth and justice comes down to us from the long tradition of our Christian faith. There is something at the very center of our faith which reminds us that Good Friday may reign for a day, but ultimately it must give way to the triumphant beat of the Easter drums. Evil may so shape events that Caesar will occupy a palace and Christ a cross, but one day that same Christ will rise up and split history into A.D. and B.C., so that even the life of Caesar must be dated by his name. So in Montgomery we can walk and never get weary, because we know that there will be a great camp meeting in the promised land of freedom and justice.

This, in brief, is the method of nonviolent resistance. It is a method that challenges all people struggling for justice and freedom. God grant that we wage the struggle with dignity and discipline. May all who suffer oppression in this world reject the self-defeating method of retaliatory violence and choose the method that seeks to redeem. Through using this method wisely and courageously we will emerge from the bleak and desolate midnight of man’s inhumanity to man into the bright daybreak of freedom and justice.”²

¹ Toynbee, Arnold, *A Study of History*. Abridged by D. C. Somervell. Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 129.

² In *The Christian Century*, February 6, 1957, p. 166 f. Used by permission.

4. Achieving the Inclusive Parish

EDWARD CHANDLER

I

THE TERM "INTERRACIAL" has always seemed somewhat unfortunate particularly when applied to the work of the Church, since it raises the whole concept of race to an essential importance far beyond that which it should hold in the Body of Christ. Furthermore it has a connotation of a self-conscious, specifically willed demonstration—the Brotherhood Week sort of thing—which always implies a temporary "in-spite-of" that reveals still powerful reservoirs of condescension. It seems to me that the word "inclusive" avoids much of this.

Although it would scarcely seem necessary at this date to make an apologia for the inclusive parish, it might be well to review some of the reasons in order to understand why clergy and laity, especially in the urban situation, feel a demand and a command to work toward such an end. Although it is easy to point out evidences of feelings of racial separatism and superiority in the Old Testament, it is well to remember that these represent only one side of a tension. After all, according to the Book of Ruth, the great-grandmother of King David himself was a "Gentile." The evidence of the New Testament, both in our Lord's attitudes toward the Samaritans and in the classic passages from Acts and the Pauline Epistles, stands firmly against racial separateness within the Body of Christ.

As biblical strictures are strong, there are also social and economic pressures which the churchman cannot evade without endangering the future welfare of the institution he serves. Many observers would agree that the great movement of the second half of this century is a racial revolution. This revolution is already an accomplished fact in large areas of Asia and Africa, and a heady yeast is brewing elsewhere. In our own country there are signs of this ferment doing its work, most notably in the increased pressure of the NAACP campaign by "due process of law" and

The Rev. EDWARD CHANDLER, M.A., formerly on the faculty of the General Theological Seminary in New York, is now Vicar of Saint Peter's Episcopal Church, 346 West 20th Street, New York City. Previously he had been Priest in Charge of Saint Christopher's Chapel of the Lower East Side Mission of Trinity Parish, New York.

in the extraordinary introduction of an ostensibly new force into the racial situation in the South by the amazing accomplishments of the group for which the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., stands as leader.

Furthermore, these movements are based realistically on the new economic and social position of the Negro especially in the North. Economics and social advantages have redounded to the Negro as he has become one of the major responses to the North's insatiable demand for labor since the virtual cutting off of European immigration. And in almost traditional fashion, as the first generation of this new immigrant group has filled the ranks of unskilled and semiskilled labor, so the second generation has been working in the ranks of civil service, skilled labor, the professions, and the entrepreneur class. The American and West Indian Negro is well up on the old American escalator. And everything that has been said of the Negro can equally well be said of the more recently arrived Puerto Rican, who is for the most part still at an earlier stage.

On purely secular and self-interested grounds it behooves the Church—or any other continuing institution—to identify itself as thoroughly as it properly can with the interests of these people who are the growing element in the inner-city population, if the Church is to continue in the inner city. To do otherwise is to run the risk of becoming a church of a desiccated and intellectualist aristocracy, an esoteric cult rather than the Holy Catholic Church. If the future of our social and political structure is to contain these groups as organic members, the social patterns of the Church as institution must reflect this too. If the Church is to speak with convincing power to the new integrated city, eleven o'clock Sunday morning must cease to be the most segregated hour of the week.

Beyond this, it is certainly of the nature of the Church to exercise a redemptive function within whatever social structure it is found. The problems of races living together ought to be touched in a redemptive way by the Lord's special agent in the world, namely the Church. The tensions of "interracial" living in the city, as in the whole country, leave many wounds on the souls of our brothers in Christ. It is the Church's task not only to heal these wounds, but also insofar as possible to prevent them. In an inclusive society this can not be done by exclusive congregations.

II

Even when one accepts the biblical command to achieve inclusiveness in parish life and is willing to recognize the prudential wisdom of doing so, the end is not achieved by simple fiat from clergy or prelate even in

the most authoritatively administered communions. The habits of even the best-hearted and best-minded of people do not change easily, especially when they are reinforced by the social patterns of the secular community that for long have been accepted into the Church in its character as social institution.

Concerning methods of achieving an inclusive parish, I speak from the immediate experience of leadership in two—Saint Christopher's Chapel of the Lower East Side Mission of Trinity Parish, New York City, and Saint Peter's Episcopal Church, New York City; and of intimate friendship with the leaders and frequent participation in the programs of two others—Saint Augustine's Chapel of the Lower East Side Mission, and Grace Church (Van Vorst), Jersey City. I would add that Saint Christopher's was an entirely new foundation where it was possible to help create a tradition in this as in other areas, and that Saint Peter's was a parish in which many preliminary steps had already been taken and much of the present work has been consolidation. A further remark must be made about these four congregations: each of them receives its major financial support as well as much of its direction from outside the parish, since two are chapels in the unique structure of Trinity Parish, and the other two are diocesan missions under the supervision of the Bishops of Newark and New York respectively.

In my experience there have been two chief methods of initiating work of this sort in a parish, although these naturally do not occur in pure form. One might be called overt, self-conscious, militant, explicit, positive; the other might be called covert, indirect, implicit, pervasive. Both emphases have proved successful in the parishes mentioned, and I imagine choice between them rests largely with the particular "attract" of individual staffs and the situation of their congregations.

The direct method begins with a clear statement to the congregation or its governing board, of the problem, of the related issues, and of the method of attack. Every parish organization and gathering is used as a means of achieving the end. Not only are non-church movements such as the NAACP or the Urban League commended but active participation in them is urged. Everything possible is done in programming to make the "in-group" aware of its obligations and to make the "out-group" aware that the parish is identifying itself with their concerns beyond the parish.

The indirect method works on an assumption that may never be stated, but is simply accepted by the leadership. Assuming that every parish as a family of God is by nature inclusive, the leadership then goes

on to demonstrate this in action more than in word. Without forcing the old in-group to face up to its position explicitly and verbally, it allows them to live in the atmosphere of inclusiveness; it does not demand from them an explicit admission of errors of their past or a crisis of change in social patterns or habits of thought. Individual cases of resistance are handled as individual cases.

The former method confronts people with immediate decision; the latter allows for slow growth. The former enlists enthusiastic and dedicated support; the latter is more relaxed and allows for passive acceptance. The former draws interest away from the immediate parochial situation but also stimulates interest from outside the parish; the latter is concentrated on the total parish situation and performs a silent and undramatic witness to the community.

Both methods enlist support from other techniques. One of the most important of these has to do with staff. It is extremely effective and almost mandatory that the staff should represent the actual or potential mixed nature of the congregation. When minority groups see members of their group in official, salaried positions of responsibility, they realize that the program is not lip-service. This is also important as an aid in the interpretation of feelings of minority groups to the rest of the staff. Most desirable is the inclusion of minority group members at every level, although this has been difficult to achieve at the ministerial level in the parishes mentioned—because of lack of proper recruits, not lack of desire or attempt. Even minimal engineering can also usually assure representation of minority groups on governing boards, and this has a value even if only a token.

The liturgy of the Episcopal Church affords an unexcelled opportunity for silent demonstration. In the most solemn moments of the Church's life, when it is most truly itself, it is possible to exhibit its inclusive nature dramatically and really. In the normal run of Sundays, this is largely a matter of careful selection of acolytes so that all minority groups are represented at the Altar. This can be further highlighted on such occasions as the annual Day of Witness of the New York Urban Priests' and Urban Laymen's Groups, when the officiating clergy have been carefully selected to represent as many groups as possible. On one notable occasion there was a native African Bishop presiding, an American white as celebrant, a Negro from Costa Rica as Sub-Deacon, and a Dutchman who had served as a missionary in Puerto Rico as Deacon. The Day of Witness itself with its solemn religious procession through the city streets, numbering as many as five thousand persons, has done its work too.

This same sort of thing can be achieved frequently at the parish level in a lesser way. In parishes where there is a specific Spanish service, on great occasions such as Christmas midnight Mass, Episcopal Visitation, Palm Sunday, Easter, or Whitsunday, all the members of the congregation worship together with some of the service in Spanish and some in English. This has a peculiar double effect. On the one hand, although English-speaking worshipers are sufficiently familiar with the liturgy itself to recognize and follow it even in a foreign tongue, they realize some of the language problem facing the Spanish-speaking members. And on the other hand, Spanish-speaking members feel that the autonomy of their culture has been recognized and respected at the very heart of the Church's life. As always, liturgical expression by action as well as words communicates the Word of God at non-intellectual, non-verbalistic depths.

A word should be said about the use of Spanish by the clergy. Certainly the clergy must be able to administer the sacraments in the language "understood" of their people. Also they should know at least enough of the language to show that they respect it. Any further knowledge is, of course, useful; but one finds that in even the most difficult situations the children are usually sufficiently bilingual to make adequate interpreters.

It need hardly be said that the life of the clergy and staff should represent the sort of inclusive living that is our desired end. This is not only a matter of the ordinary run of social life such as hospitality at table. The clergy of the parishes I have known often take into their homes members of minority groups in emotional or social difficulties. In two cases priests have practically adopted colored boys, so that the whole fabric of their family life presents an "interracial" picture to the parish.

Perhaps the easiest place to work is in the Church School and other children's activities. As we all know, the younger the child, the less the prejudice. As the children grow up in their schools in the city, the interracial pattern is the complete norm of their social life. Only occasionally is there difficulty specifically because of different ethnic background. Relations thus established can be brought home to the adults in their interest and co-operation in the Church School.

Similarly it is relatively easy to get people of different groups to co-operate on parish projects where as many helping hands as possible are needed. Friendships can begin easily and naturally over the parish stove or the paint bucket, and when interracial friendships are started amongst adults, the battle is more than won. It is perhaps the hardest job of all to get members of one group to see and respect the members of another as

the individuals they are, rather than as stereotypes or generalizations. Such respect can be established not only within the parish but also by participation in diocesan activities or in such interparochial activities as the New York Urban Laymen's Group.

It has been possible for the clergy to enlist the interest and support of laymen in such matters as the struggle of our communion against the forces of *apartheid* in South Africa. Here there exists ready-made a bond of sympathy in our joint participation in the life of the Anglican Communion, which has been further brought home by visits from such heroes of the struggle as the Rev. Michael Scott, Alan Paton, and the Rev. Fr. Trevor Huddleston, C.R. The same sort of thing has been possible in relationship to our own South, although our admiration for the heroic witness of Martin Luther King has not had the sense of intimate family membership.

III

Resistance toward achieving the inclusive parish is to be expected. However, I am sure that we frequently overestimate its strength. Where we live and work—especially in cities and in the North—to take part in such a movement is only to put into action words that we have been mouthing all our lives. Whatever a person's home upbringing, in school and in civic activities generally he has given at least lip-service to ideals of "brotherhood." When faced with it in fact, he may offer resistance, but most frequently it is with a bad conscience. When the Church takes on the inclusive pattern, it is only reflecting the commonplaces of the market.

Before one undertakes such a movement, he must of course be sure that he has the complete, explicit, and unyielding backing of his ecclesiastical superiors. Fortunately, in the parishes and dioceses in which I have had experience, there has been no doubt of this in anyone's mind. The pattern was clearly set for us years ago when one Bishop threatened to open the doors of an intransigent parish with an ax if necessary, and arrived at the church equipped to do so. Bishop Donegan's Pastoral Letter, which was read in all parishes of the Diocese of New York on Palm Sunday, 1956, insured the continuing position of this Diocese. Furthermore the establishment of a diocesan strategy for work amongst Puerto Ricans—integration into existing English-speaking parishes rather than the setting up of Spanish-language congregations—indicates the direction which both parish clergy and laity are to take.

Backing from within the parish is another requisite. Sometimes this cannot be achieved explicitly from the governing board or even from a

majority of the laity. In any case the clergy should be sure to have a nucleus of faithful supporters who will defend their position both officially and informally and also help them in the minor tactical matters. New members should also be indoctrinated in this matter as well as in such more usual Church matters as pledging.

One must recognize that financial pressure may be exerted to maintain a status quo. In many parishes in "changing neighborhoods," this can be a real danger point, especially if the Bishop is not prepared to back up his clergy. However, I think it is absolutely necessary to face the problem squarely, to be ready to accept reduced income and to reduce expenditure accordingly even when it hurts. This is a calculated risk, a bet on the future, for I am sure that a firm position taken at some cost will in the long run produce results far beyond those temporarily lost. Furthermore, the loyalty of the minority group members for whom one has made the sacrifices will be all the stronger. Another result is that the inclusive parish naturally attracts the interest and support of young, liberal-minded people even from outside the parish boundaries.

It even seems to me that this position is sufficiently clear as to be made a matter of sin on which one stands or falls. When there are cases of people who refuse to accept the inclusive status, I believe that the Christian pastor is under obligation to say that this is the gospel as he has received the same: "Here I stand, I can do no other." If a member then withdraws from the congregation, even after personal explanation and counsel, that is too bad and, to be sure, a loss. However, there is little doubt that he will be able to find a congregation where he can be happy; in the meantime he may have learned something of the quality of absolute demand in the gospel, and he may even learn eventually a respect for the position taken.

The more inclusive the parish, the more difficult the job of inclusiveness. In most neighborhoods of New York there is always at least one common bond of secular life which unites the parishioners, whatever may separate them. In my present parish, we are faced with the difficulty of preaching the gospel to a neighborhood which includes not only Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and others, but also includes a complete cross-section socially, economically, geographically, and culturally. A typical congregation includes the three ethnic groups, and also heads of academic institutions, clerical workers, artists, graduate students, dishwashers, major and minor business executives, truck drivers, people of independent means, juvenile delinquents, professional people, garment workers, retired people, welfare

cases, social workers, nurses, and many others.

It is the clergy's duty to preach a sermon so that each one of these hears the Word of God. This also provides difficulties in every aspect of establishing a parish program. However, although this is the clergy's headache, it is certainly the parish's great opportunity for glory. If we are under God's grace to achieve an inclusive parish which is a real family of God, then we will be close to understanding the Holy Catholic Church in its deepest sense.

"Human Understanding Requires Artistry"

HOWARD THURMAN

"Many people think that they understand others when they merely maintain a kindly attitude toward them. While it is true that a generous mood toward other people again and again elicits a response of friendliness, this is no substitute for facts, for information and the kind of understanding which comes only from sustained natural exposure to others. This constant exposure is apt to be a sure check and corrective to one's understanding. Intergroup relations are handicapped by awkward and clumsy means of communication. Often this is a matter of language, of our use of words, of our use of anecdote and accent. There is no more exacting enterprise than the conscious quest for precise communication between people. . . .

"We can be so earnest and sincere in our grim determination to be brotherly that we are completely unmindful of the effect of our action on those whom it is our greatest desire to understand. There is such a thing as bad taste in trying to be helpful. Often our very heaviness and seriousness close doors in our faces and cause us to alienate those with whom we seek authentic fellowship. Human understanding requires great artistry; the touch of the artist may be light, but it is sure. This is one of the reasons why conversation and good talk are of such immense value. They provide moments of direct quickening in contact that instructs the emotions and feeds the understanding with revelations of interests, slants and overtones of the other person, without which there can be no deep sure respect for personality."¹

¹ From *Deep Is the Hunger*, Harper & Brothers, 1951, pp. 23-24. Used by permission.

5. *The Valley of Decision*

E. CLAYTON CALHOUN

I AM ASKED to address myself to this day's most tense and crucial dilemma in the light of man's most idealistic venture, the Christian mission. I speak as a white Southerner with real pride in that heritage, with no apology for my southern accent, but with a hope that it may have been impressed in some very vital sense with Galilean tones. I speak for one of the lands of decision, our land among the decisive lands. In that decision the spirit of Christ must be compelling and his Church must be expressively committed. In truth I see no hope at all if it cannot be found in the Christian Church.

Hardly anywhere can one be so cordially misunderstood as when he speaks of interracial understanding. For several months just after his graduation from college my brother was employed in the small county bank in our home town. He was waiting on a farmer from the southern part of the county. In the relaxed way of our kind, they chatted while they attended to business. The current political campaign was a natural topic. To a particularly apt comment the farmer responded, "Son, you shore fixed your mouth jus' right when ya said that." When one tries to express his views of the racial tensions of our time he finds it very difficult to fix his mouth just right. A man must be true to his ideals by something in excess of words. He must also be fair to the sensitive natures of men, all men. Idealist, zealot, conservative, obstructionist, whichever, we know that in the South human relations are very personal, and that the changes in interracial affairs will be, for better or for worse, very personal. In this knowledge I must say what I must say.

So that this view may be succinctly stated and graphically understood, let me attempt to paint and interpret a mural. My mural will have four blended panels filled, in the manner of murals, with symbols. In three lower sections I shall set three pictures from life which blend into

E. CLAYTON CALHOUN, B.D., D.D., is President of Paine College, Augusta, Georgia, which is a college for Negroes under the auspices of The Methodist Church and the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church. The present article is based on an address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Woman's Division of Christian Service and the Division of National Missions of the Methodist Board of Missions, at Buck Hill Falls, Penna., January 15, 1957.

the unfinished panel above them. That part of the picture remains to be painted by a company of artists whose spirits are sufficiently enraptured to follow the Master into dangerous ways. Somewhere, as if it were impressed into the very canvas of that unfinished upper panel, I think I see a cross.

The First Panel

Within a few hours of our arrival at Paine College I came upon this scene. Two boys were stretched out on the parlor floor across a game of Scrabble. One, our thirteen-year-old, Ashley, the other, thirteen-year-old Sammy Shaumba, son of a Crusade Scholar from the Belgian Congo—Sammy as dark as the night and as sleek as the jungle, Ashley as blond as his Nordic sires and built on his father's ponderous proportions—utterly unself-conscious, their feet in the air, their heads together over a game of words.

I thought, how typical of children, how proper for youth, how prophetic of the future. *IF* we can keep them from unease and anger in the very delicate business of fitting words together.

The Second Panel

Some members of our faculty enjoy relating a story told them by a very distinguished professor, a white Southerner, from one of our great seminaries. A Negro yard man came quite often to his door to ask, "Boss-man, have you got any leaves that need raking?" He always got the job, whether or not there were any leaves "that needed raking." Said the distinguished professor, "It was the way he said 'Boss-man.' He always got the job."

There is the second segment of the mural: a distinguished white man at the head of the back stairs and a Negro laborer at the bottom of the stairs, hat in hand, each of them patronizing the other—the pattern of an era dead and done for.

The Third Panel

Not as an escape, but because, to be honest, the pattern must stretch out until it touches every man "who cometh into the world," I should like to go a long way off for my third panel.

In Changchow, in the broad alluvial valley of the Yangtze in eastern China, I came one bitterly cold day upon a mass of refugees, huddled in a deserted temple. They were the flotsam and jetsam of war

and famine, famine and war. I wondered what I could do for them—no blankets, and not enough to eat here or in my small supplies. The cold seeped into me or out, perhaps, from the shivering frustration of thwarted compassion. Then I saw an ancient Chinese gentleman arise near the battered altar and cross over to me, stepping gingerly over the ragged, quivering bundles of human misery. I saw that he was carrying a teapot and a cup. I wanted to retreat. I had nothing to give of tea or bread for such a crowd. When he reached me this old gray gentleman with a scraggly beard stood to his full height, bowed in oriental courtesy, and invited me to tea.

I was taken aback, but with the best courtesy I could muster I declined, very courteously, you understand. I thought of the meager supply. I thought of the microbe-ridden cracks of the dirty cup. These were the mingled reasons of my refusal. I have never fully recovered from my sense of shame. I stood there thinking of the limited tea and the crack in the cup, when there stood before me in a tattered robe one man's magnificent dignity—in huddle and hovel, humanity's innate dignity.

The Fourth Panel

Oh yes, that one, I remember, is hardly touched, except for that haunting stark impression of a cross. Yet as I look upon it, it seems to me I see emerging as if from the lower panels, something like that vision of the prophet Joel, "Multitudes, multitudes in the valley of decision: for the day of the Lord is near in the valley of decision." (Joel 3:14.) That is the impression which emerges upon my fourth panel: multitudes, men, mankind in the deep valley. Possibly here is my impression of the cross. Yes, I am sure of it. There is a cross in the valley of decision.

There is my mural, then, in process—the problem of communication, at heart a matter of devotion, at soul a matter of human dignity.

Here are these youngsters, symbols of the present, prospect of the immediate future, black and white involved with words, sensitive to their correctness, sensible of their accents, responsive to refinements of inflection and evaluative of every nuance of personal communication. Communication in any very personal matter is highly sensitive in the South, the problem of communication between the races is crucial, the difficulty of communication between differing views is critical.

In the perpendicular pattern—the yard man (hat in hand at the foot of the stairs), and the professor at the top of the stairs enjoying the gratuity of "Boss-man"—there is a kind of communication and, whether or not

it is universally understood, a kind of affection, patronage surely, unworthy undoubtedly, but affection nevertheless. Across the South there is a widespread and sincere nostalgia for the devotion between the races which existed in "the good old days." But that kind of affection is gone, except in stories, and that kind of communication will never return.

The loss of communication in this perpendicular pattern was inevitable. In the soul's own demand for dignity it was inevitable. In the struggle up to the levels of the dignity of achievement, it was inevitable. The truth is, that old pattern is unworthy of the dignity of either man at either end of the stairway. The man denied his dignity inevitably moved away from the foot of the stairs to make his climb—seeking, sometimes in near hopelessness, the acknowledgment of the dignity he felt in his soul. In that separateness the only communication which remained was that with the man who ran the risk of walking the stair with him as he climbed.

It is hardly possible to overestimate the critical effect of this loss of communication in the South. At a time when it is desperately urgent that men of intelligence, and certainly men of goodwill, should be able to discuss with mutual respect and understanding matters of mutual concern, it is most difficult to affect such meeting. When mutual respect is in effect, it is often strained by the absence of that depth of understanding which comes from many levels of association other than those restricted to committees. Hardly any cause of strain is more costly in this critical, decisive period than the poor quality of our best communication.

This communication will not be restored by restoring the perpendicular pattern. That pattern, as I have said, is dead and done for. It cannot be restored. It fell apart of its own weight and its own faulty structure. No society has been able to sustain forever a structure which secured in fixed relationships groups of men in perpendicular pattern—one group above the other in strata, and group after group beneath the others in perpetuity. History has written record upon record of the fall of all such structures. Rome, with the power of her armies, could not maintain her perpendicular pattern structured on the Grecian philosophies of right relationships. China, with the added cohesion of a highly moral ethic, could not sustain forever a perpendicular pattern structured upon that careful Confucian assessment of the proper relationships of men. Any pattern which ignores at its base the dignity of the human spirit and in its perpetuation ignores further the ability of every man to learn, will fall. In our land of decision the structure which long showed cracks at its base and faults in its pattern, has fallen. It remains only to memory and imagination. It will not be restored.

As desperately as we need the affection which comes from understanding, and that understanding from communication, it will not be achieved, as some vainly suppose, by the restoration of the perpendicular relationship. The affection born in this pattern was real; it was vital; it served many worthy purposes; it provided the protection and concern in which the Negro could emerge from enslavement into a society of free men. But the very affection which served so worthily lacked at its soul a sufficient quality of understanding, the kind of understanding out of which alone a full affection can proceed.

The fear of affront stalks every effort at communication, however ideally intended or however carefully structured. It has become a fear, not of one group, but of both groups. It is a fear not more of receiving than of inadvertently giving affront. Here again is that delicacy of words, weighted words, emotional symbols by which we communicate. Here is another element in the tension of our time.

Some of us must risk the barbed barricades of affront so that the barriers may be broken, so that, across a broader front, communication may be restored. It will not be done along the perpendicular of a back stairway, it will be the conversation of peers. It will begin with those who sense in the soul the dignity of man as man, who, at the beginning, are willing to suffer the stigma of strangeness, those whose faith, like Christ's, discovers the dignity of man, those whose dedication to Christ enlists them to aid such men to find the other part of dignity which comes with useful personal achievement.

This communication, this devotion, this acknowledgment of dignity does exist in the South, sometimes in isolation, sometimes in little centers of sanity, lumps of leaven whose influences move laterally into the structures of community life. Almost always it springs from the spirit of Christ. This spirit moves not only laterally but upward, up into the unerected structures of a newer life, up into the unfinished picture of a better day.

Looking forward, looking upward toward that better day, I am still challenged by the strong impression of a rugged cross. Yes, yes, I am very sure of it. There is a cross in the valley of decision.

The Substance and Practice of Unity in the Local Congregation

ROBERT TOBIAS

I BEGIN WITH this presupposition: unity, for those in Christ, does not have to be sought. It *is*. They practice it.

What is the unity that *is*, and does not await our establishing it?

In ecumenical conversations the word "unity" is often used to suggest an idyllic relationship among Christians and church bodies. But unity at this level, generally called "Christian Unity," is a part, indeed a derivative part of a larger unity which gives it its meaning. It must be seen in the larger context if it is to move beyond "practical co-operation," or institutional merger, or theological tolerance.

"Unity," as used here, means first of all unity with God. From this unity is derived our unity with fellow-Christians and with all men with whom God has identified himself through Christ (John 11:52). We shall deal briefly here with unity at these three levels: unity between self and God, between self and Christian brother, and between self and all men.

Now there are differences in the qualities of unity at these three levels, and there is no perfect or complete unity at any. The foci of unity are changing beings, personalities. Unity may not be described therefore as a static matter, but as a uniting process, a dynamic relationship—or rather three types of relationship so vitally interrelated as to be inextricable, even for purposes of study. One cannot neatly separate his unity with God from his unity with all men, even if these involve different qualities of unity. For one cannot love God, that is, be *in Him* (or in Christ), without participating in God's love for all men. One is thereby in a real sense involved in the destiny, the frustrations, and the being of every man. In a more particular way, fellow-Christians who have acknowledged and responded to God's identity with them cannot isolate their unity with one another from their unity with God.

One further presupposition: there can be no unity except it lead to

ROBERT TOBIAS, B.D., Th.D., is Associate Executive Secretary of the Council on Christian Unity (of the Disciples of Christ), and currently on the faculty of Butler University, Indianapolis; previously he traveled extensively in East Europe as a staff member of the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

manifest action. If I am in any sense united with God, and thereby with fellow-Christians and with all men, then I am constrained by that relationship to minister, to serve and to witness in demonstrable ways. The reality of the unity which *is* makes its appearance inevitable.

I. UNITY WITH GOD

God and Individual.

Unity with God, or what we take to be unity with God, manifests itself initially in the sense of forgiveness, or of illumination or "revelation" which comes to individual believers. Because this, like the broader faith of which it is a part, comes essentially as a personal matter, and involves a variety of experiences, the natural result is diversity in the life of the congregation. The expressions of the individual's "unity with God" may appear to be in sharp conflict with the expressions of his Christian brethren and of their unity with God. When this happens, is the individual to submit to the common mind, to maintain his unity with fellow-Christians and deny his presumed experience of unity with God?

The answer is clearly "no." Even though it may result in a stormy life in the congregation and perhaps eventually schism, the individual involved, if he is convinced of a relationship of unity with God, can and must be responsible to that prior unity above all others. For without this primary relation of the individual to God, all other unity with God becomes impossible. The community of believers, however, has a very important role in this regard which will be mentioned later. Here we record only the presupposition that the diversities ensuing from our different experiences of "unity with God," while they may produce variations in patterns of worship, in formulations of faith or visible structures, cannot be essentially in contradiction, nor their results in opposition.

The problem is, of course, to know in the absence of incontrovertible guidance from God (which incidentally would deprive man of freedom) which is of God and which not of God; to know whether that which we take to be revelation from supposed unity with God is that, or merely a figment of imagination. There is no absolute, infallible measuring stick available to man at this point, and it is here that the larger community in its continuity is the complement, though not the absolute perfector, of the individual.

God, Individual, and Brother.

Worship, as a three-way conversation of praise, adoration, penitence,

forgiveness, thanksgiving, intercession, illumination, is an integral part of unity with God. There is no unity with God except it lead to worship.

On the other hand, there is no worship, at least not in its fullest sense, without unity at another level; namely, with and among Christian brothers. To put it another way, the measure of unity we have with God is directly related to the measure of unity we have with others "in God." This does not mean that unity with God is not possible when we are estranged from Christian brethren, but the expression in worship of that unity-with-estrangement takes a quite different form from the worship of reconciled unity. If, therefore, between brothers united in God there is aught, and they would manifest that unity in worship, ". . . first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift" (Matt. 5:24). Brotherly unity must precede unity with God in God.

If there is no worship without brotherly unity, it is equally true that there is no brotherly unity without worship. Unity or reconciliation among the brethren leads back directly to worship or unity with God. "Where two or three are gathered together in my name there am I . . ." (Matt. 18:20). Worship is, therefore, inevitably a corporate act. This is true even if the worshiper is in his own private chamber, since the presence of God encompasses more than one individual. I can worship, therefore, or be in unity with God only as I am in understanding unity or in unity-with-estrangement with my Christian brethren, but not in disregard for them.

God and All Men.

In a still broader way, there is no worship which does not involve the unity we have with all men. In that sense worship involves all men. The fact that unbelievers do not acknowledge any bond of unity with God or with me as a Christian does not nullify the reality of God's unity with them, nor therefore of my unity with them, one-sided though it may be. The Christian and God, therefore, meet not alone but laden with the care of all those from whom they are partially estranged, yet identified. Here lies the ground of our priestly function, the relating of our unity with all men to our unity with God in the act of worship.

II. UNITY WITH ALL MEN

Our unity with all men derives from God's associating himself with all men, and our being in unity with God. There are also other ways in which we are identified, e.g., as sinners, which cannot be examined here.

Visibility.

The reality of this unity, which is partly a yearning for more complete unity, constrains us to minister, to serve and in other ways to proclaim the love of God for every man to every man. This we do corporately; that is, with God (in the Pauline sense of co-laboring) and with one another. In this process, unity becomes visible. And while visible acts manifest themselves as being a part of a total unity, and related to the same form or body (i.e. the Church Universal), they are not of one shape but involve a variety of symbols, of teaching, preaching, healing, and other activities.

Order.

There is a fourth level of unity which has some relevance at this point. It concerns the relationship of the whole creation to the God-self-Christian brother-man relationship. Paul refers to it in Romans 8 as an interdependent relationship between the whole creation and the sons of God, without either of which the other cannot be made whole. It is at this level of unity that meaning is given to our economic practices, the way we use natural resources, till the soil, and regard matter in general.

Without going into the many implications of this unity with the cosmos, we should note that orderliness has a relevance to unity here where it involves the world. Without orderliness, the visibility and continuity of unity are effectually nonexistent vis-a-vis the world. And if these are nonexistent, so also is unity. The contrary is also true: without visibility and continuity, order also is effectually nonexistent. If, therefore, one can assume that the process of creation is orderly, and that creation itself is one of the factors involved in the total unity interrelationship, then one can expect visible forms, continuity and manifest acts, while encompassing diversities, nevertheless to reflect orderly processes if they spring from unity.

III. UNITY BETWEEN CHRISTIANS

I have set this level of unity in third place deliberately, because it appears that God gives shape or form to our unity with one another as fellow-Christians only as we are engaged in the relating of our unity-with-God and our unity-with-the world to one another. In other words, our unity as Christians, i.e. the church, is constantly being formed as we witness, rather than being perfectly formed *a priori*, then set in motion and sent off on its mission. In this sense one may speak also of the church as

"begotten, not made." It is the result of the interrelating of more basic factors.

Church and World.

Unity among Christians is also in some measure instrumental, i.e. it is for the sake of the world. On the other hand, an ultimate value sought for the world is that already known in brotherly unity. Brotherly unity, therefore, is by no means only instrumental. The *koinonia* is not only a means for uniting all God's children with Him and with one another, but is already an earnest, a preview for the world of what that unity may be.

Churches and Revelation.

It was suggested above that the individual Christian receives his calling and his "revelations" from God in his unity with God. This is fundamental. But it is also the area in which Christian unity becomes the most difficult. When "revelations" between individuals, or between an individual and congregation, or between communions, are contradictory, presumably one or the other does not spring out of unity with God, and the unity between Christians is severely strained.

There is no final answer to this problem, though there may be provisional methods sufficient to deal with it. Certainly the judgment of the larger community of Christians, insofar as that community lives in unity with God, is to be taken seriously. Its word is not final, as the experience of the prophets and reformers testify. But being a continuing community, it has possibilities of self-correction or of correction under the Holy Spirit.

On the other hand, the individual's unity with God, and in this sense his personal integrity—even if misguided—still takes primacy for him over judgment of and conformity to his brethren.

The primary unity of both with God, whether individual or church, should, however, constrain them to continue to witness their respective "truths" to each other, while maintaining sufficient unity with each other to allow their unity with God still to be manifest. This may involve prophetic utterance, conversation and debate, exercised in frankness, in mutual exhortation, submitting to one another in love. It may temporarily result in schism. It must ultimately lead again to fuller unity, as long as the prior will for unity with God is not cast aside.

Continuity.

Those united with God and in God are united with those who have

gone before and with those who will follow. Unity is not, therefore, bound by time-space dimensions. (If it were, there could be no unity, but only an infinite series of fragmentary "unities" which exist from moment to moment.) We have already said that unity becomes visible in specific times and places in manifest acts. Through time it becomes visible in continuing forms, symbols, signs. This involves no less than continuity of congregation (i.e. believing people), continuity in witness, and continuity in worship. But in whatever forms, and these may conceivably be changed, the body of unity is manifestly continuous so long as there exists an interrelated God-brother-man-world.

IV. THE PRACTICE OF UNITY

If the above propositions concerning the substance of unity are true, then one may expect to find in the life of the congregation the following manifestations of unity.

In its worship:

Adequate provision for each individual and the whole community of believers to join in corporate worship of God and to receive of his grace and revelation.

Expressions of penitence, personal and corporate, for our divisions from one another, our separation from God and the world.

Intercession which presents before the throne of Grace the burden of the whole world.

A sense of solidarity with all Christians through exchanges of information and leaders, use of various liturgies and hymns, special days observed together, and particularly ecumenical prayers.

Ultimately, unrestricted communion in sacramental life.

In its faith and witness:

Respect for and study of the experiences, gifts and vocations of other traditions, their practices and possible "revelations."

Responsible stewardship of its own faith and "revelations," with sufficient humility not to impose doctrines as absolute, and sufficient conviction to witness to its faith with boldness.

Adequate interchurch channels of communication for self-examination, mutual exhortation, study of issues, sharing of judgment and renewal.

Sufficient doctrinal agreement for a clear, visible manifestation to the world of the unity described above.

In its ministering:

An effective counsel table to consider together with others the concerns of God in the world, locally, nationally, internationally.

An effective means of sharing the resources of all in manifesting the love of God for the whole world (e.g., interchurch aid, missions, international affairs).

In its church associations:

Regard for its own facilities and local program as being in association with and on behalf of the whole church, indeed regarding itself as the whole church at work in its locale.

Responsible participation with others in common planning and efforts through councils and federations of churches, ministerial associations, etc.

Serious consideration with other churches of the meaning of unity and the desirability of organic association in mergers or united churches, and of the relation thereto of existing church governments, institutions, practices, and canons.

Manifestation, in its relationships and order, of such unity that the world may exclaim: "See how they love one another!" (John 13:35).

In its educational program:

Adequate provision for youth to become acquainted with the ideas, traditions, practices and personalities of others, and to sense that they are involved in a concern and a unity which are world wide.

An assurance to catechumens that in uniting with Christ in a particular congregation, they are uniting with him for his worship and ministry in all congregations.

Opportunity for study on central themes of unity such as the nature of the church, the meaning and method of revelation, the meaning of history and its relation to the church, the church in international life.

Many of these practices which one might *expect* to find, are to be found. The nonbelieving in disaster areas have indeed exclaimed, not only, "See how they love one another," but "See how they love us!" because the churches have banded together in their World Council of Churches and International Missionary Council in a glorious ministry to the whole world. The instances of congregations helping one another across confessional boundaries are legion. The creation and effectiveness of the Commission on International Affairs, our common study and action through the World Council's Divisions are cause for encouragement. Between East and

West, between black and white, between younger and older, state church and free, between left and right, youth and sage, between Orthodox and Evangelical, conversation has begun. And where mechanical means were impossible, the spiritual means, imaginative prayer, has been the more exercised. This does not add up to perfect unity, but it is a clearer manifestation of the deeper unity which *is*.

This essay began with the assertion that the ground of all unity is unity with God. If I am united with him, his will becomes my will, his concerns become my concerns, his people become my people, some measure of his joy and anguish becomes real to my experience. For being bound to him binds me to all with whom he is bound.

"As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee . . ." (John 17:21) suggests the degree such unity might attain. ". . . that the world may know . . ." (John 17:23) reveals our Lord's confidence of what would result if such perfect unity were to be realized.

“I Command Unto You Phoebe”

ERNEST WALL

WHEN PHOEBE PALMER had finished her earthly pilgrimage, The Rev. T. A. Talmage of the Brooklyn Tabernacle spoke of her as a Columbus of the Higher Life. “She showed the Church of God that there were mountain peaks of sanctification that it had never attained, and created in the souls of us who had not reached that elevation, a longing for the glorious ascent.” This impetus to holiness, Phoebe of New York imparted to a multitude of souls of many religious denominations in the United States, Canada, and the British Isles: and when her task was done, Talmage could say: “Twenty-five thousand souls saved under the instrumentality of Phoebe Palmer! What a record for earth and heaven! What an array for the judgment day! What a doxology for the one hundred and forty-four thousand! What a mountain of coronets flung at the feet of Jesus!”¹

Twenty-five thousand converts is indeed a remarkable figure when it is recalled that at the beginning of Phoebe Palmer’s life Methodism could muster less than seventy-five thousand members. It is a testimony to the earnestness and character of people like Mrs. Palmer that during her lifetime the Methodist membership exceeded two million five hundred thousand.

I

Phoebe was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Worrall, born in New York City, December 18, 1807. She thus belongs to the days when Methodism was young and zealous. John Wesley had only been dead fifteen years when she was born; and her father had become a Methodist through Wesley’s preaching at Bradford, England. Mr. Worrall was a Yorkshireman and an Episcopalian; but the Wesley Gospel of Regeneration won him to the new society. He married a Methodist girl; thus Phoebe, the fourth of ten children, was born in a Methodist home, and her life was spent in the avenues of service provided by the Methodist Church.

¹ Wheatley, Rev. Richard, *The Life and Letters of Mrs. Phoebe Palmer*, New York, 1876, p. 612.

ERNEST A. WALL, M.A., B.D., Ph.D., is Minister of the Bay Ridge Methodist Church, Brooklyn, New York. In previous articles he has delineated various recent woman “saints,” and now turns his attention to an “elect lady” of nineteenth-century American Methodism.

Methodism was still young and vigorous and enthusiastic. It marched to the frontiers with the pioneers. No new settlement was too small to beckon and challenge its itinerant preachers. Protracted meetings were the rule. Revivals were expected. Camp meetings fanned the flames of enthusiasm; and Methodism's leaders were men of God. Those were the days when bishops were not only fine men and good executives, but great saints. When Bishops Janes and Hamline were elected, Mrs. Palmer (who liked to consort with bishops, and constantly wrote or consulted them) tells her impressions: "This morning, witnessed the ordination of Rev. L. L. Hamline and E. S. Janes to the office of Bishop. . . . They are in no ordinary degree lovers of holiness . . . seldom has any church been favored with such models of Christian excellence at the head of ecclesiastical affairs."² Methodism was young, and its bishops felt the Pauline burdens: the care of all the churches, and the necessity of preaching the gospel.³

America was expanding; so was Methodism. When Phoebe was twenty-two years of age—she had been married two years to young Dr. Palmer—a little western settlement on the shores of Lake Michigan was visited by a Methodist preacher, Jesse Walker. There were only a few houses there, eight or ten at most; but the tiny year-old settlement was destined to become the great city of Chicago. Before this time, however, there had been a vigorous "Home Mission" work among the Indians of Ohio; and fifteen years earlier Dr. Coke, the first American Methodist missionary, had died off the coast of India; though no permanent Missionary Societies had yet been formed. These came later; and Mrs. Palmer was to have a great deal to do with their formation.

To understand Phoebe Palmer we must remember that she lived in days when children were urged to the adult decision of conversion; when church membership implied regular attendance at the class meeting, and occasional visits to the camp meetings. Phoebe was subject to all these influences. She was surrounded by Methodists who had a vivid sense of obligation to the cross of Christ. Her friends and family regarded highly the words of Paul that "This thing [the cross] was not done in a corner." Therefore they believed that Christian testimony had to be manifest in word as well as deed. Moreover, Phoebe was brought up to recognize the great

² She goes on to tell of the request "Brother Hamline" made the night before the ordination: "Sister Palmer, pray that I may go to the altar on the morrow with a holy heart. . . . I feel as if I could never lay my hands on others to set them apart for the sacred office, unless these hands, as also this heart, were pure."

³ Mrs. Palmer tells of a shut-in in New York being visited by Bishop Janes whenever he was home in New York. Not only did he call, but conducted a weekly preaching service to a few people who met in this invalid's house, and prepared for it "with as much pains as though hundreds of thousands were to have been present."

cleavages of privilege as acts of God. There were the privileged and the unprivileged; the civilized and the pagan; the respectable and the "vile"; the saved and the perishing; the rich and the poor. The privileged were obligated to reach and bless the unprivileged. So Phoebe became busy, not only in Sunday-school work and teacher training, but as a diligent distributor of tracts, a reclaimer of drunkards, a visitor of the sick, the prisoner, the orphan, the bereft. She must be excused if playing "Lady Bountiful" made her appear unctuous. Self-conscious she was: but because John Wesley himself had engaged in these things, her activities were not snobbish slumming, but proper Methodism.

Women were not yet emancipated. In general, the serious ladies and the outstanding were either sentimental or pious; and in either case they wrote poetry. Phoebe was a little of both, and she wrote lots of poetry! This was the Victorian era; and its spiritual expression is apparent in Phoebe's poetry, Fanny Crosby's hymns, Francis Havergal's little books of devotion, and the philanthropic agencies which bore such names as "Moral Reform," "Female Assistance," "Homes for the Friendless." Phoebe assisted all these, but her vision was much wider. She was one of the first officers of the "Ladies' Home Missionary Society." One of their many evangelistic projects was the "Five Points Mission" in New York; and Phoebe was instrumental in getting it started.

It would be difficult to ignore the fact that Mrs. Palmer liked people, and loved to help them. Judged by our standards, her help was of a limited kind; but she truly believed that what all people needed most was the gospel. So she wanted that gospel brought to them. Shortly after her marriage she had thought her husband and herself might be guided to the mission field; but it was not so. However, her persuasive personality decided Dr. Palmer and twenty others to subsidize the establishment of a mission in China; and soon the Methodist Church had five missionaries in China, and Mrs. Palmer was fast recruiting more. She had a strong personality and great capabilities; but she knew she could not do everything herself, nor did she try. She was always enlisting help and seeking the best advice available; but it was *her* active mind that caught the visions and initiated the projects.

For instance, she was among the first to see that Methodism needed an Educational Society that would concern itself particularly with the training of ministers. There was already a Biblical Institute at Concord, Massachusetts, but now the need for more adequate training was apparent. The liberality of Miss Garrett and of Messrs. Drew and Rich called into

existence Garrett Biblical Institute and Drew Theological Seminary, and the Concord school was moved to Boston. It is worthy of note that the creation of these major Methodist institutions of ministerial training testifies to the insight and zeal of Mrs. Phoebe Palmer.

By far the most important interests in Mrs. Palmer's life were Evangelism and Holiness. Concerning evangelism her conviction was: "Every soul saved ought to be a guaranty for the salvation of another."⁴ She felt that the soul of man was lost without God; for this had been her own experience. "My soul of late has been going out after God," she wrote, "I know I ought to be more"; and when at one remembered Class Meeting the leader asked, "If Jesus should stand in person before us and say, What wouldst thou that I should do unto thee? what would you ask?" She says, "My heart quickly responded: Lord that I may be conformed to thy image!"⁵ We are so afraid of piosity that we may view such expressions with suspicion; but when we recall how she labored in prayer for hours upon her knees, so that she might receive some cherished spiritual benefit, we see that she was sincerely striving for the goal we all would reach—the goal William Booth had in mind when he explained the secret of his evangelistic success by saying, "There came a moment when God got all there was of William Booth."

There are many things about her which do not appeal to us today. Her theology would certainly bar her from some of our Methodist Conferences if she applied for admission as a preacher today. She believed simply in Salvation by the Blood. She had no reservations about the Bible; she called it "the literature of heaven" and seems to have believed we should read our Bibles in heaven!⁶ She could see the wrong of Dr. Miller's attempt to predict the Second Coming; but she believed there would be such a second coming in God's time. Satan was a real antagonist. Her battles with self were verbal contentions with the devil.⁷ She could hardly be termed "other-worldly," but her strict ideas of worldliness must have been a great trial to her less devoted friends.

Mrs. Palmer had six children, three of whom died in childhood. She saw that those who lived were early converted; and, partly we may hope, because she left her home so often to go on long preaching missions, she saw to it that the servants were converted also. Her extreme zeal for the souls of others, however, could not always have been appreciated. She tells

⁴ Wheatley, R., *op. cit.*, p. 434.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-42.

of rebuking a businessman for not making time to attend her meetings!⁸ She chided a minister for receiving an honorary D.D. She condemned her friends for wearing gold or ornaments or ostentatious apparel. She voiced her displeasure with Dr. Henry Ward Beecher for sanctioning the use of billiards, nine pins, and tableaux for his church members. Despite the good accomplished by Mrs. Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, she condemned it because it was truth mixed with fiction; and we can be sure that she never sang "Darling Nellie Gray!"⁹

Phoebe Palmer was actively against liquor. "Did I tell you," she wrote from England,¹⁰ "of the circuit steward and Sabbath School Superintendent who was carrying on a large business for his satanic majesty in this town? While the revival meetings were held in the Wesleyan Chapel, this leading layman in the church was furnishing the intoxicating draught, by which the hosts of sin were being incited to the commission of all sorts of uproarious iniquity." The man didn't give up his business, but he did resign from the church, and Phoebe remarks, "On the evening of the day he withdrew from the church, twenty souls were born into the kingdom!" Had she lived a little later she might have given her blessing to the crusade of Carrie Nation; but I doubt she would have joined!

She was very generous; but she believed that money was the gift of God, a blessing to be paid for in wise stewardship. She cared for the unfortunate, but she knew little of what later came to be called "the Social Gospel." From one point of view this was her religious blind spot; though it was one shared by many in the church of her day. Owen, Maurice, Kingsley, and Hughes were pioneering in social reform in England; but in America Walter Rauschenbusch had not yet written his *Christianity and the Social Crisis*. Nevertheless we must not forget that she had reason to feel that she was in the great tradition. Jesus never mentioned the biggest thing in his day—the Roman Empire. He certainly was conscious of great social problems, but he did not treat them as issues; rather he reduced them to personal elements, and attacked the roots of social evils by spiritual power, beside which political power is finite weakness. It has always been the unalterable conviction of the saints that the enduring accomplishments are achieved "not by might nor by power but by my Spirit, saith the Lord."

If she did not speak much against slavery, it must be remembered that Methodism was not actively on the side of the Abolitionists. Indeed men

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁹ A song composed by Benjamin Russel Hanby in the 1850's which helped to stir antislavery sentiment to a high pitch in the North.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

were suspended from the ministry for having such ideas; and not only did Methodist ministers and laymen hold slaves, but in 1840 the General Conference was so against the Abolitionists that some Methodists seceded to form the Wesleyan Methodist Church. Mrs. Palmer did not favor slavery, but when the issue was raised at the General Conference of 1844 she was not present, being busy preaching holiness at various Camp Meetings; and when in 1861 the Civil War wounded the land, she spent most of the wartime in evangelistic work in the British Isles.

There was a stabilizing mixture of realism and idealism in Mrs. Palmer. Her absorption with the subject of holiness was moderated by a realistic belief that the effect of holiness was proscribed by the inherent limitations of human nature. "There are gradations in society which always have been and doubtless always will be till the end of time."¹¹ She did not discriminate, but she urged no antidiscrimination law. She relieved poverty by distributing toys and provisions to the "poor and vile" at Five Points Mission; but she had no vision of lifting the general standard of living. She believed in the orderly processes of government; but conceded that we could not expect the "powers that be" to be "ordained of God" unless we united in earnest activity to see that God's men were placed in positions of influence. "Perhaps only thus may our prayers for God-fearing rulers be answered."

She had a simple, almost naïve belief in prayer. Many would call it a childish belief. Actually it was the childlike faith of a Christian whose theology was free from doubts. She trusted. In her journal she speaks of coming home "last night (November 26, 1853) quite ill and with prospects of being seriously ill on the morrow." "I asked the Lord that He would restore me, and cause me to rise in comfortable health in the morning." She finishes her entry by saying, "This morning, at the command of Him who spake and diseases obeyed His word, I arose in comfortable health."¹² More remarkable is her belief that prayer was a physical as well as a spiritual force in the universe.

In her journal entry for September 16, 1857, she tells of having "a remarkable answer to prayer." She was at Union, New York, and the weather was severely cold, so she asked that God would "mellow down" the weather, so that people might come to worship at the Camp Meeting in favorable weather that week. Someone asked her if she really believed that, should the weather change, it would not be incidental but a real answer to

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 600.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

prayer. "I would regard it as an answer to prayer, and would speak of it as such." The weather did "mellow down" and become "comfortable," and exceptionally well-attended meetings followed. The noisy Methodist Camp Meetings, despite their excesses, had recognized social and spiritual significance. They were dedicated to the conversion of sinners and the consecration of the saints. Mrs. Palmer thrived on noisy meetings,¹³ for noise was a kind of Methodist trade mark. Methodists were distinctive in those days—and Phoebe Palmer was one of them!

In such a milieu of enthusiasm, it could be expected that the success of Mrs. Palmer's preaching and teaching was phenomenal. In New York or on the frontier, down South or in Canada, her meetings were attended by the multitudes, and thousands were blessed. It was inevitable that invitations should come to her from afar. Four fruitful years were spent in the British Isles, where she preached, and talked about her favorite subject, "The precious theme of present holiness." But before we consider her writings on this theme, let us attempt to lift her into the fellowship of the great Christian women of the ages, specifically by comparing her life with that of another kindred soul, Saint Catherine of Siena.

II

It has been observed that in all the fundamental pursuits of the soul of man—Religion, Philosophy, or the Arts—there is a definite likeness among human expressions. This is true even when the particular persons and their expressions are in different realms and are separated by the centuries. There is, for instance, an evident kinship in the artistic vastness of Aeschylus in poetry, Michelangelo in sculpture and painting, and Beethoven in music. Or by comparing the work of Sophocles in poetry, Raphael in painting, and Mozart in music, we may observe a real comradeship of mind which expresses its mood in the exquisite. Sometimes a similar source of inspiration can be discerned, as if certain souls drank from the same well, though separated from each other by time or space. John Constable, for example, painting the glory of the country scene at noon, is clearly brother in spirit to William Cullen Bryant, and to Wordsworth and MacDowell. Their work reveals a like source of inspiration, and a similar delight in nature.

It is because this same principle is manifest in religion that we can discover the kinship of the mind of the saints. There is evident likeness

¹³ Mrs. Palmer tells of a disaster at sea. The boilers burst; but above the cries of panic the singing of hymns was heard, and the frightened passengers calmed their fears with the cry, "Some Methodists are here!"

between St. Francis of Assisi, Sadhu Sundar Singh of India, and Kagawa of Japan. That modern pioneer of missions to Mohammedans, Henry Martyn, is clearly brother to the first Moslem missionary, Raymond Lull. In like manner Phoebe of New York has an apparent kinship with Saint Catherine of Siena; and it is an interesting exercise to compare their lives.

Catherine of Siena was born at Siena in 1347, and died at Rome in 1380. Her life was only half as long as Phoebe's; but the parallels of circumstance and response in these two souls are unmistakable. Phoebe was a Methodist, Catherine a Catholic who disciplined herself according to the Dominican custom. But both belonged in spirit to the disciplined order of Christ; and both expressed their devotion to God by a great concern for people, and became the recognized friends of sick and poor, as well as the counselors of the high and mighty. Both were pre-eminently saints in action. Both of them were mystical in temperament; both spent much time in quietness, meditation, and prayer; yet both had a genius for friendship.¹⁴ Both combined their "otherworldliness" with a keen this-world concern. Catherine was more involved in the politics of her time; but both were supremely interested in persons. Evelyn Underhill¹⁵ calls Catherine "the mother of thousands of souls." Phoebe also could bear that title. Catherine's advice to Pope Urban VI was the rule both she and Phoebe lived by: "Be always virile, always a model in words and manners, and in all thy operations. Let everything be clear in the sight of God and men."¹⁶

Both lived in grave times of church schism, rampant plague, and civil war. In Catherine's day every city of Italy was disrupted by the Guelph-Ghibelline conflicts. For some time the rival powers of Church and State had been contesting strength. The Guelphs were those in Italy who espoused the supremacy of the Pope; the Ghibellines sided with the Emperor. These divisions were further complicated by the quarrels of the great families involved in the larger struggle. This "civil war" and the struggle for temporal power led to ecclesiastical schism. When the Pope Boniface demanded subordination in temporals from Philip of France, the King defied him, fought him, imprisoned him, and established the papacy at Avignon as an appendage of the throne of France. Then matters became worse until eventually the wrangling between French and Italian Cardinals caused the election of rival popes. It is one of the great achievements of Catherine that by sheer spiritual power and persistence she finally succeeded

¹⁴ Miciattelli, P., *The Mystic of Siena*, Appleton Co., 1930, p. 133.

¹⁵ Underhill, E., *Mysticism*, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1930, p. 467.

¹⁶ Miciattelli, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

in moving the papal seat from Avignon back to Rome. But that achievement did not stem the spiritual debacle which was inevitable. The "Age of Questioning"¹⁷ had begun and it would not end until the inner schism was epitomized in the story of Luther.

Phoebe did nothing so dramatic as Catherine, but the times of both were like a bubbling cauldron. In Catherine's time half the population of Italy died of the Black Death. Phoebe tells of New York plagued with cholera, and speaks of hundreds dying in the city.¹⁸ In Phoebe's time also there were Civil War and schism. In 1830 The Methodist Protestant Church seceded, in 1840 The Wesleyan Methodist Church was formed by those who demanded the abolition of slavery; and on this same issue, in 1844, The Methodist Church was rent into North and South.

Perhaps it was inevitable that the minds and attitudes of these women should be influenced by the tenseness of their worlds. They were students of God's word and will—though neither would have claimed to be a "Theological Doctor."¹⁹ But the unsureness of the hour caused the terminology in which they imparted their insights to be somewhat confused. Thus both were assailed as heretics. Monks laid traps for Catherine and abused her,²⁰ and ministers fiercely attacked Phoebe for making a specialty of holiness.²¹ It must be admitted that both could be called extremists. Sheldon Cheney²² remarks that, as a mystic, Catherine was an extremist; but admits she lived in an atmosphere which incited her to this. Siena, in Saint Francis' country, was the city of mystic painters, and a town in which the "Society of the Gesuati" demanded that its adherents should die to the attractions of the world in order to be reborn to the spiritual life.

New York was not Siena. It did not incite to saintliness, but it needed it. Phoebe declared that the state of both the Church and the world called for energetic action. "I feel that there is not that explicit line of demarcation between the Church and the World which the spirit of the Word requires." Time and again the religious life of her times lacked vitality. During the Civil War she complains of the general falling away from religion; and earlier, when in 1844 the great Methodist Schism occurred, religion was at such a low ebb that she wrote, "I have never witnessed con-

¹⁷ Raynor and Tanton, *The Fight for the Faith*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931, p. 101.

¹⁸ It is interesting to remember that during the plague epidemic Fanny Crosby, another New York elect lady, nearly lost her life.

¹⁹ Catherine was so called. See Sigrid Undset, *Catherine of Siena*, Sheed & Ward, 1954, p. 154.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

²¹ See Wheatley, R., *Life and Letters*, p. 131—where Mrs. Palmer speaks of the "continuous ragings of poor mistaken Mr. Mattison."

²² Cheney, S., *Men Who Walked With God*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1945, p. 184.

formity to the spirit and usages of the world so prevalent."²³ Like Catherine, Phoebe also was strict in her warnings against worldliness, and urged the Christians to give up "the love of unreal things."²⁴

Both felt the neediness of their world. In her "Dialogue" Catherine wrote: "Each one according to his condition ought to exert himself for the salvation of souls; for this exercise lies at the root of a holy will; and whatever he may contribute, by words or deeds, toward the salvation of his neighbor is virtually a prayer."²⁵ Phoebe also was energized by this spiritual concern; "I find it good to labor for God," she says. And her religious activities were so successful that, when her work evoked criticism and challenge, *The Methodist Review* in 1862²⁶ defended her by saying: "When theatres are emptied, rum shops closed, policemen left idle, blasphemers taught to pray, defrauders compelled to make restitution, and thousands of awakened souls made joyful in the Redeemer's love, the work must be confessed to be of God." Both urged spiritual crusades, but not all materialized. Both urged a Mission or Crusade to Palestine, but these were visions which failed. Both traveled far in the service of the Kingdom of God. Catherine's field was not only Italy, it extended to France, where she went to induce Pope Gregory XI to return to Rome. Mrs. Palmer not only preached the gospel all over America but in Canada, and spent four years traveling all over the British Isles.

Both had limitations in their vision of social justice. In Catherine's time a young man was condemned to be beheaded because he had spoken "flipantly," while drunk, of the citizens who governed Siena.²⁷ Catherine reconciled him to his fate, prepared his soul for heaven, accompanied him to the scaffold, and actually caught in her hands his severed head; but she made no protest against the social injustice involved. Phoebe's sense of social justice also had its limitations. Her social interests were on the personal level; as, when a maid needed a position, and a lady would have taken advantage of her need to engage the girl for a "less than reasonable wage," Mrs. Palmer found a better place for the girl and rebuked the lady.

What they lacked in social enlightenment they made up in a spiritual vision beyond their times. Both were contemplatives. Both practiced fasting as well as prayer. Both knew the mystic experience of "the dark night of the soul." Both would agree that God, "in order to raise the soul from

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 608-610. She cites dancing, feasting, fairs, festivals, etc., in Church life.

²⁴ Undset, S., *op. cit.*, p. 151.

²⁵ See *World's Devotional Classics*, Funk & Wagnalls, 1916, Vol. 3, p. 207.

²⁶ See Wheatley, R., *op. cit.*, p. 400.

²⁷ Undset, S., *op. cit.*, p. 198 f.

imperfection," withdraws himself; and that he does this in order to discipline the soul "and cause her to seek Me in truth, and prove herself by faith."²⁸ Both exalted the idea of perfect love; and both dedicated themselves in the ways and to the ends adopted by all true saints. The words of Catherine matched the ideas of Phoebe. Said Catherine, "I shall use my life to the glory of God and the salvation of souls." Having so fully given themselves to God, they feared no man. Catherine rebuked Kings and Popes; and Mrs. Palmer voiced her disapproval of President Lincoln, for theater attendance; and of Queen Victoria, for Sabbath breaking. "We wrote," she said, "a letter to Her Majesty giving, in the fear of the Lord, our views of the requirements of the King of kings."²⁹ In this holy fear of the Lord they both fulfilled their lives.

III

Recalling Mrs. Palmer's prolonged Holiness Mission to Britain,³⁰ it is interesting that, the next summer following her death in 1874, an annual conference for "the deepening of the spiritual life" was inaugurated at Keswick, England. In that same year, one of the most honored of Keswick speakers³¹ published a little book called *The Holy Life*, which might have been written by Mrs. Palmer herself. Her own book was called *The Way of Holiness*. One thing that would recommend it was that it was written after severe illness; and sickness often gives fertile moments of spiritual vision. This little book has many emphases similar to those made by Evan Hopkins. Probably it is safe to say that Mrs. Palmer's ideas were closer to the viewpoint of the Keswick Holiness Movement than to the Pentecostal groups which later became prevalent in America.

The argument of *The Way of Holiness* is that God desires present holiness since our redemption implies a complete surrender of ourselves to our Redeemer. When we comply with this obligation we are sanctified, and receive a "hallowed sense of consecration and an overwhelming desire for conformity to His will,"³² since God promises to receive our self-offering, and faith is taking God at his word. Holiness, sanctification, perfect love, seem to be regarded as synonymous with "a state of soul in which every believer should live."³³ Yet she sees clearly that the way of holiness is a way

²⁸ Underhill, E., *op. cit.*, p. 398.

²⁹ Wheatley, R., *op. cit.* p. 119.

³⁰ She wrote of her experiences in her book, *Four Years in the Old World*.

³¹ Rev. Evan H. Hopkins, Vicar of Holy Trinity Church, Richmond. Published in London, 1875.

³² *The Way of Holiness*, 1846, pp. 31-32.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

of interminable progression, and says definitely that one act of faith is not enough. Sometimes she suggests that by the grace of God the blessings of salvation and holiness may be received simultaneously. Sometimes she seems to suggest that holiness is a "second blessing"—a second work of grace in the heart accomplished in response to complete self-commitment to God; but at the close of her seventy-page book she tells us plainly that a continuous act of faith is requisite.

Twenty years later she wrote again on this subject³⁴ a book which continues where she left off in *The Way of Holiness*. Faith, she tells us here, is not self-effort, nor is it "doing nothing." It is the appropriation of help from an objective God and Savior; hence, holiness begins by our giving all to God, and continues by God giving himself to become our "all in all."³⁵ She then urges the importance of public witness to the "blessing of holiness," saying, "Now though I know that this blessing is the gift of God, I fully believe, if I had not yielded to these convictions relative to confession, I could not have retained it."³⁶

Occasionally it does seem that Mrs. Palmer is inclined to confuse sanctification with holiness. She is fond of the text, "The altar sanctifieth the gift," and interprets "sanctifieth" as "makes holy" instead of "sets apart for a holy use." Yet, in the book of her poems—published the year following her death—the poem, "Consecration," suggests that her stress upon holiness being God's work rather than ours was an expression of her humble sense of dependence upon God.³⁷ She could declare that holiness was salvation to the uttermost, but she qualified the statement by adding "in effect, but not degree." So that although she appears to place the burden of holiness all upon God, she would have contended that holiness is the union of perfect passivity with the highest activity—the activity involved in what Père de Caussade called "self-abandonment."

Dr. Sangster helps us to consider the way of holiness as divided into three steps or stages. The saints, he says, "have a blinding realization of the love of God. Their own love flames in response. Their love widens to embrace the world."³⁸ Evan Hopkins gave three stages which might be compared with these. He said, "Holiness consists of three things: Separation from Sin, Dedication to God, Transformation into Christ's image."³⁹

³⁴ *Faith and Its Effects*, 1867.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

³⁷ This volume contains 250 poems with an introduction by Bishop Janes.

³⁸ Sangster, W. E., *The Pure in Heart*, Abingdon Press, 1954, p. 239.

³⁹ Hopkins, E., *The Holy Life*, p. 11.

Mrs. Palmer's idea and practice of holiness was in accord with both analyses. "Holiness unto the Lord" was written upon all she did and loved. The Bible, she called "a holy book"; the missionary cause was "a holy cause"; the evangelistic message was "the holy Gospel"; music was "a holy spell"; she reveled in "holy thoughts"; and heaven was "The Holy City."

To Mrs. Palmer, a holy life was a Christian obligation. It was a life of clear-cut separation from evil and utter surrender to God. It was a transformed life and a love-filled life. Its secret was expressed in the verse:

I take the promised Holy Ghost,
I take the power of Pentecost
To fill me to the uttermost.
I take; He undertakes.

Holiness, said Mrs. Palmer, was "an endowment of power, by an act of faith";⁴⁰ but she was no Quietist. Neither was the Archbishop Fénelon; and the message of Phoebe's life, and a summary of it, can be conveyed by quoting from Fénelon's *Maxims of the Saints*:⁴¹

"True holiness of heart is the object at which the Christian aims. He beholds it before him as an object of transcendent beauty, and as, perhaps near at hand. But as he advances towards it, he finds the way longer, and more difficult than he imagined. But if on the one hand we should be careful not to mistake an intermediate stopping place for the end of the way, we should be equally careful on the other not to be disengaged by the difficulties we meet with; remembering that the obligation to be holy is always binding upon us; and that God will help those who put their trust in Him."

⁴⁰ Wheatley, R., *op. cit.*, p. 525.

⁴¹ Section 45. "On the way to victory."

The Meaning of "Christian"

HENRY E. KOLBE

ONE OF THE PROBLEMS confronting anyone who speaks or writes of religion and theology arises from the fact that the words which he uses—and often the key words—are ambivalent. Because the same word has several meanings, opportunity for misunderstanding is always present. Not only is it possible for the writer or speaker to write or speak in one context of meaning while the reader or hearer thinks in another; it is also quite possible for the speaker or writer to slip from one meaning to another, often without recognizing that he has done so. When either of these occurs, it is inevitable that confusion should result.

It is, therefore, a matter of importance that attempts should be made to set forth brief and relatively nontechnical analyses of certain key words for the benefit of the preacher and of the layman concerned to know more of the basis for his faith.

One word, whose central importance is hardly open to question, which might well be subjected to analysis to determine its meaning is the familiar word "Christian." Does it have a clearly defined or definable meaning? Does it denote anything definite or does it simply connote a feeling of approbation?

These are not simply academic questions, for one's answers to them will reveal a great deal about his conception of what the Christian faith is and of what being a Christian means or requires in the way of action. Language is not life, and life is not reducible to language, but linguistic analyses and the understanding based upon them affect life and are, therefore, of practical as well as of intellectual significance.

The attempt to find the meaning or meanings of such a word ought to begin with the actual usages of that word in speech and writing. Formal dictionary definitions are far less revealing of the significance of words than are the practical definitions established by such usage.

When this pragmatic rule is applied, several fairly distinct kinds or

HENRY E. KOLBE, B.D., A.M., Ph.D., is Professor of Christian Ethics and Secretary of the Faculty at Garrett Biblical Institute, Northwestern University Campus, Evanston, Illinois. The present article may be considered a companion article to his "What Is Liberalism?" in our issue of Autumn 1954.

groups of usage-meanings become apparent. The word "Christian" is used to designate or to refer to:

- (1) A particular culture or civilization, Christendom or the so-called Christian civilization of the West—i.e. of Europe and America.
- (2) A particular religious community, the church, usually but not entirely within that culture.
- (3) A set of ideas—an ideology or a creed—most commonly but not exclusively associated with the Christian community or church.
- (4) A pattern of ethical and social values and their attendant conduct or judgment upon conduct.
- (5) A relationship to a person, Jesus Christ.

Other classifications are doubtless possible, but it may be that all significant usages of the word "Christian" can be subsumed under one or another of these five classes. A brief analysis of the several meanings to be found under each of these classes may, further, prove helpful in this connection.

I. "CHRISTIAN" AS DESIGNATION OF A CULTURE

The first, or cultural, usage of "Christian" conveys the least specific content. We speak of Christian civilization, meaning most commonly those parts of the world in which the most prominent religious tradition is Christianity, or, as was perhaps more true in certain periods of the past than of the present, where the cultural-social order was directed toward realizing or fulfilling or propagating the moral and spiritual ideals of Christianity. "Christendom" originally meant "the domain of Christ," as opposed to unevangelized or pagan lands or as contrasted with the lands of the Moslem, as in the period of the Crusades. In more recent times, the application of "Christian" to a culture or civilization has most frequently been intended to distinguish the European-American culture from that of Asia or Africa, or in general the lands of the white man from those of the colored races.

This particular cultural usage has not generally been overtly accepted within Western lands. It is, however, virtually—if not exactly—parallel to the general Western practice of using the word "Hindu" as a synonym of "Indian" rather than to designate an adherent of a particular religion. It is a meaning, too, which we of the West shall do well to note. In many parts of the world the designation "Christian" suggests the foreigner, the alien, the white tradesman or governor. And, since the basis of the usage of "Christian" in such a case is that Christianity has been identified with

the European-American world, when subject nations or peoples have turned away from the commercial-cultural-political overlordship of that world they have also tended to reject its religion. In such a case, "Christian" may tend to become an appellation of disapproval, a term of criticism. This is often particularly severe when it is applied to the convert to Christianity from the indigenous religion, since it then may suggest a rejection of the traditional structures and customs not only of his religion but of his nation and people as well. The attitudes of Gandhi and some other Indian leaders toward the evangelistic aspects of Christian missions is a case in point.

The word "Christendom" has rather largely dropped out of current usage, but it has been replaced by an increasing frequency of usage of terms such as "the Christian democratic West," designating the so-called Western bloc of nations in distinction from the Iron Curtain or Communist lands. This is chiefly a negative usage of "Christian," for in such a context it means almost nothing beyond "non-Communist," as is clearly evident by the inclusion of certain nations, e.g., Turkey and Israel, whose dominant religious tradition is Moslem or Jewish rather than Christian in the religious sense of that word.

A concomitant usage of "Christian" may be noted here, not, perhaps, as a separate class of meaning but as a cognate of the preceding. This is indicated by its use in terms such as "the Christian era," a temporal equivalent of the spatial-geographical concept of "Christendom." The common connotation of "the Christian era" is the period since the birth of Jesus Christ. Some writers, however, have suggested a more restricted and critical meaning; namely, "the Christian era" refers to that particular period, i.e. the medieval, within the history of Western culture in which Christian ideals and values were of direct and significant influence in determining moral, spiritual, and even economic and political principles and practices.

The resurgence of Greek intellectual emphases in the Renaissance and, perhaps even more significantly, of the philosophical emphases of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment marked, it has been claimed, the decline of the age of faith and thus the end of the Christian era. As a consequence, the period since the age of reason has often been referred to as the post-Christian era. This suggests the decline of Christendom as a cultural-political concept. It suggests, too, that the predominance of Christian religion in relation to the ethical-social ideals and values of Western culture has declined, though even the most severe critics of Christianity will hardly assert that its influence has in fact disappeared.

II. "CHRISTIAN" AS DESIGNATING THE CHURCH

There is another conception of "Christian" which connects it with the idea of community. Here, however, it is not the whole of Western or European-American culture which is intended but a community within that community—the specifically religious community of the church. However the church may be defined, its definition must include the conception of the religious community. The word "Christian," therefore, comes to be associated with that community and its ideals and, often, with its practices. The Christian man, therefore, is a member of this community; and, conversely, the member of this community is the Christian man.

It is altogether likely, of course, that no one would be completely satisfied with this conception of the meaning of "Christian," yet it must be recognized that this empirical meaning is an important factor in the total concept "Christian." One need not accept all the connotations of the dogma that "outside the church there is no salvation" to be able to recognize that all our contemporary knowledge of Christianity as religion or as ethic has come to us through the agency of the Christian community, and most largely through the specifically organized institutional expression of that community, i.e. through the church.

A modification or variant of this meaning, one which has, in fact, never been absent from the word, is that "Christian" derives its most significant meaning not from its association with this total religious community, and still less from the total culture, but from what we may term a community-within-a-community, the "true church" or the "true Christians" within the church. Strictly speaking, this "true church" within the church—the invisible church as contrasted with the visible, or the church of the spirit as contrasted with the empirical-historical church as institution—is not a community, for it lacks the factor of structure which is characteristic of all empirical communities. Its orientation is not toward structure but toward value. It is, therefore, a movement in the direction of conceiving "Christian" as a normative rather than simply a descriptive term.

It is this connotation of the term which makes it possible to say that one may be a member of the church, a Christian in the historical-descriptive sense, and still not be a Christian in the normative-axiological sense. Here "Christian" has come to mean not simply membership in the religious community of the church but conformity to a normative value pattern, however that pattern may be conceived or defined (e.g., whether the form of the value-scale be determined by liberal or fundamentalist or other standards).

III. "CHRISTIAN" AS ACCEPTANCE OF A CREED

The orientation to value may assume either of two forms. It may be centered on attitude and action in relation to a scale or standard of moral value, or it may be centered on a relationship to a creed or pattern of theological belief. The suggestion of variance here suggests that it is not possible to draw value lines with exactness. Amid the conflicting claims of what constitutes Christian belief or conduct it is impossible, apart from *a priori* assumption of one or another meaning as definitive, to delimit precisely the pattern of what true Christianity is.

In this community-within-a-community meaning of "Christian," therefore, we have been led into two other meanings of the term, one creedal and the other ethical-axiological. The stress on the former leads to the various conceptions of Christian orthodoxy. The Christian man, in this view, is one who accepts, in the sense of assents to, the established creed. The creed which is the norm of orthodoxy, however, may vary from the precisely formulated classical creeds of the church to the largely *ad hoc* creeds of free churches.

It is also the case that highly sophisticated theological discussion may become a form of creedalism even when formal creeds are not accepted as constituting adequate norms. It may be said, for example, that an adequate Christian faith does not involve the acceptance of certain propositions about God and Christ, but that such genuine faith is known only in the existential confrontation with God, or with Christ, as the case may be. The necessity of this I-Thou meeting, which must be lived through in order to be known, may, however, then be asserted as true in relation to genuinely Christian experience or faith. When this happens, then the experience which is not objectively determinable or describable, that which in its essential being is unique, is in actuality taken up into a universal logical proposition—namely, that only he who knows the meaning of such confrontation existentially or experientially knows the real meaning of Christian faith, or that only he is a Christian.

When this experience is referred to in terms of truth rather than adequacy, then at least incipiently there is the claim that its acceptance is called for. For at its very minimum, to claim that any statement is true is to claim not only that it ought to be accepted but that it will be accepted by all right-thinking people. The rejection of propositional creeds in favor of a nonpropositional or existential experience of living through, or meeting, or confronting, or being involved in, may, therefore, in its turn lead to the establishment of another propositional creed, although the propositions

here are not those about, e.g., God, but about the necessity of a way of knowing God. This, however, leads toward creedalism, which is not simply the insistence upon the acceptance of propositional statements of a certain type of propositional statements of any type as normative.

These considerations suggest that some form of creed, some pattern of propositional statement, is inevitable in religion. The question is not whether there shall be a creed, but what creed there shall be. Within the range where each creed or type of creed is held as the norm, the Christian is one who assents to the creed, whose words and actions are compatible with the creed's requirements. There is, however, always left unanswered the deeper question as to which creed is the best—*always*, for there is no precisely definable authority outside the various creeds in the light of which they may be evaluated with objectivity.

IV. "CHRISTIAN" AS A MORAL VALUE TERM

When the stress is laid not on formal creed but on a pattern of ethical-social values, so that "Christian" designates an orientation to a given value scale, much the same kind of situation develops. For, as the history of Christianity reveals, no one value-scale has been accepted as normative everywhere and by all who profess to be Christians. The modern ethical or axiological interpreter of Christianity is often likely to overlook this, but it is true nonetheless. To be sure, there has been rather general agreement on certain *formal* value principles. The Christian man is to act in love and mercy, for example, and acts of love and mercy are therefore termed Christian acts. Two difficulties, however, present themselves here. The first issues from the conversion of the proposition, "The Christian man acts in love and mercy" (or whatever value predicates may be substituted), into "The man who acts in love and mercy is a Christian." We may note, but it is not necessary to labor, the logical fallacy involved here. It is the common error of taking the converse of a true affirmative proposition to be true. It is, of course, formally possible for the converse statement to be true, but it is not true necessarily—i.e., it does not follow from the truth (or assumed truth) of the statement of which it is the converse. The assertion of its truth, therefore, must, if it is to be sustained, be based upon something other than the original proposition.

Further, even though the requirement to act thus may be recognized as binding upon the Christian, there is no similar agreement as to the kinds of action which fall within these categories. It is, therefore, not always clear just what "Christian" means when it is used to designate an

act in accord with this value interpretation. An act may be so designated on the ground that it is *compatible with*, that it *fulfills*, or that it is *entailed by* Christian religious or ethical teachings. That this is a series of ascending rigor is evident.

"Compatible" may be interpreted to mean simply "not incompatible." On this ground, any act of care or concern for the welfare of another, no matter how trivial that act may be, or even any act in itself harmless or neutral, might be called Christian. In such a case the word may suggest simply that the act is not out of conformity with the accepted mores of a relatively Christianized culture. It may have no specifically significant content in itself but may be essentially a negative judgment, an absence of explicit criticism.

At the second level—the act which fulfills the Christian requirement in the situation so far as observable characteristics indicate—there is more significant content. Assume, for example, that in a given situation the requirement of Christian ethics, however that requirement might be measured or determined, would be in fact met by a given act. Then, by this definition, the act might be termed Christian even though its conformity to Christian principles might be quite accidental and even though the doer of the act might not in any sense consider himself a Christian. The will and decision of the doer with reference to Christian religious faith or to Jesus Christ may then be considered either not at all or only secondarily.

At the third level a new element enters in. Here the act is not simply not incompatible with the standards or requirements of Christianity, nor does it simply fulfill those requirements *de facto*, but it is done in order to fulfill those requirements. The act, then, is expressive of conscious Christian faith and commitment, so that the agent and his decision are in the center of consideration.

It would contribute to clarity if the term "Christian" were used only to designate such acts, even though this would greatly limit its usage in discourse. At first glance, this might seem unnecessarily restrictive. It would, for example, mean that highly praiseworthy acts done by a Jew, a Buddhist, or an atheist would not be designated Christian acts. This, however, would not be an opprobrious judgment, for the usage suggested would not entail a one-one relationship between "Christian" and "praiseworthy" or "good." The relationship would rather be one-many: i.e., the range of "good" would be wider than that of "Christian." The designation of an act as Christian would, therefore, be approbative in that acts so designated would be considered praiseworthy or good. Not all good or

praiseworthy acts, however, would be designated Christian acts.

Seen in its proper perspective, therefore, such a limitation of the term "Christian" to designate acts done on the ground of Christian faith would, far from being an unjust or unkind judgment on systems of faith and morals which are other than Christian, in fact be genuinely liberal in its attitude toward them. By its refusal to equate "good" and "Christian," it makes it possible not only to assert but to insist that good acts may be done for reasons other than Christian faith and devotion. It would not require, for example, that an act of kindness by a conscientious Jew be either labeled "Christian" or else placed outside the pale of morally commendable acts. In fact, to say that such an act performed by a Jew is a Christian act is not necessarily, from his point of view, a charitable judgment. It may seem quite uncharitable, since it might suggest that only the designation "Christian" is adequate for praiseworthy acts. This, however, may be interpreted as a rejection of the ethical adequacy of Jewish principles. It may, therefore, indicate the very arrogance against which protests from non-Christians are quite frequently raised. In the recognition that morally commendable acts are not in every case to be labeled "Christian," we may well be saved from an intolerable Christian pridefulness.

A further development of the concentration of attention on the value scale and on attitude and act in relation to it has been a development of moralistic legalism. Often this legalistic aspect of axiological liberalism is obscured because idealistic interpreters of Christian faith and ethics have tended to avoid the Pharisaic fallacy of spelling out the specific *acts* which their theory implies. When, however, the word "Christian" is interpreted to mean "devoted to or acting in conformity with" certain designated values, the faults of ethical legalism begin to appear. Two chief among these faults are despair on the one hand and complacency on the other. If one sees himself, his acts and attitudes, in relation to the value-scale, then he thinks that the requirements of that scale either are or are not possible of actual realization or fulfillment. If they are regarded as impossible of fulfillment, and if the fulfillment is a necessity before one can call himself a Christian, then despair results. Again, if they are regarded as possible of fulfillment, but if personal experience indicates that one does not in fact fulfill them, the result once more is despair. If, on the other hand, they are regarded as possible of fulfillment, and if one deems himself to have fulfilled them, the way is opened for the rising of the complacency and self-righteousness associated with the term "Pharisaism."

An alternative to this private sort of complacency is the sanctification

of some given *status quo*, the identification of some prevailing culture or value standard as normatively Christian. This canonization of some particularity of history is quite obviously evident when one thinks of particular and peculiar modes of dress or speech adopted by some sectarian groups, e.g. the early Quakers or the Amish. It is not very far beneath the surface when some given political or socio-economic order, whether it be the divine right of kings or modern political democracy or laissez-faire capitalism, is regarded as normatively Christian. It is not so readily perceptible, however, when what is thus centralized is an abstract value-pattern or scale such as is often found in the writings of modern idealistic religious value-theorists. More careful attention, however, would indicate that even here cultural and thus relative factors are advanced to a position which is in its essence intended to be beyond such cultural relativity. The same process is at work here as in the former cases, and the result is the same tendency to self-righteousness and complacency, and ultimately to dogmatism and, in some cases, separatism.

V. "CHRISTIAN" AS RELATION TO JESUS CHRIST

There is still another meaning to which reference should be made: "Christian" as indicating a relationship to Jesus Christ. More specifically, "Christian" in this sense designates one who believes in—or, better, has faith in—Jesus Christ. This again, however, is not a clear or simple thing, for there are many conceptions as to what belief or faith in Christ means. The emotional pentecostalist, the austere high-churchman, the mystic, the moralistic philosopher, the socially concerned liberal reformer: all may speak of themselves as believing in Jesus Christ. Obviously, however, the meaning of belief or faith is significantly changed as one moves from one member of this series to any other. Yet all agree in this, that they find the sanction for their life and conduct in the person, the teachings, or the example of Jesus.

Traditionally, Christian belief or faith has involved a factor of explicit commitment to Jesus Christ, although some contemporary interpreters assert that this explicit awareness of a relationship to him is not necessary, provided only that one devotes himself to the ideals and principles which Jesus taught and lived forth in the world. We have in this latter case a modern near-parallel to the conception which led some early church fathers to speak of some of the great leaders of Israel and Greece as Christians before Christ.

It is significant that the modern liberal movement which began with

a desire to return to the historic Jesus in an effort to rediscover the fundamental ethical principles of Christianity has often shifted its center of concern from this historic person to a pattern or system of eternal, and therefore a-historical, values. When this has occurred, and to the extent that it has occurred, there has tended to come about a diminution of concern for Jesus and, by a strange but quite understandable development, for his teachings in so far as they are regarded as *his*. The word "Christian" has thus become a simple approbative term, without the distinctive relation to Jesus which has been its traditional content. The way is thus opened for the word "Christian" to be used to designate persons who have never heard of Christ, or who are indifferent to him, or who may have explicitly rejected him. Interestingly, the stress on the religion *about* Jesus, the traditional faith in Jesus as the Lord and Savior, has in fact given not only him but his teachings a centrality and significance, not only in specifically religious but in the more distinctively ethical aspects as well, which the modern emphasis on the religion *of* Jesus, with its expressed concern for ethical ideals, has often not attained.

Let us return now, however, to the conception of decision in relation to Jesus as an essential part of the meaning of "Christian." Let us consider the case of the naturalistic or humanistic interpreter who asserts that Jesus himself is incidental, but one great historic teacher or example among others. Then why use the word "Christian" rather than, for example, "Buddhist" or "Socratic" to designate certain approved types of acts? Some might say, "Because Christianity is the dominant religious tradition of the culture in which we live." This may provide a satisfactory answer as to why "Buddhist" is not used to designate these acts. It overlooks, however, the fact that Platonism in one form or another has been the most influential philosophical-ethical tradition of the West, so that the use of Socrates as a norm is not so readily ruled out by this cultural-relativity appeal. Why "Christian" at all, except that in some way, often not clearly recognized, Jesus himself is held to be the norm?

When the Christ spirit, interpreted axiologically, rather than Jesus Christ himself is declared to be the norm, as among some modern interpreters, it will be found on tracing back, if the tracing is rigorously carried on, that the Christ spirit itself is seen in the light of the person of Jesus. Even he who might speak disparagingly of Jesus would probably agree that his disparagement is at the point of using the historic Jesus, or his words and acts, too narrowly or too rigidly, and that Jesus, if he were to live as a man now, would in fact act in accordance with the ideals and prin-

ples which are labeled "Christian" by the critic. Thus again, therefore, there is an appeal to Jesus as normative.

This suggests that, in one way or another, Jesus is ultimately the determiner of the norm of the meaning of "Christian." If this be the case, then "Christian" in its fullest sense must include the factor of decision concerning him. This is beyond question the historic meaning of the word. The Christian is the follower of Christ, who seeks not simply to know but to do his will. The earliest confession of Christian faith was "Jesus Christ is Lord." This was not simply earliest in time; it is earliest also in the sense of being most fundamental. All other meanings of "Christian" are extensions from this one. It was the *decision*—the confession of Jesus as Lord and Christ—which led his first followers into the fellowship of the church, which has been aptly described as "the community which remembers Jesus." It was their devotion to him and their commitment to this basic faith that gave rise to the evangelizing activity of the church, as those who had made the decision of faith bore testimony to what Jesus had meant to them. It was not a quest for values as such, but remembrance of and obedience to the Lord that led to the service of these first Christians to the poor and the outcast and which led later to the attempts to establish a Christian order in the world.

This factor of decision has, however, been neglected by many recent and contemporary preachers, teachers, and writers. In all too many churches, this faith-relationship is almost never mentioned either by minister or laymen. The preaching of God's role in the experience or process of redemption is replaced by exhortations to take part in social-moral enterprises. Why? Because such ways of serving are Christian. But *why* are they Christian? And this question is often left unanswered, or else answered by appeal to consequences such as peace of mind or soul or perhaps peace in the social world, or simply greater calm in the community. But *why* the achievement of these ends is obligatory for the Christian, or why Christian rather than other standards should apply to community and personal living, is all too frequently left unexplained.

VI. "CHRISTIAN" AND THE DECISION OF FAITH

If, as the foregoing suggests, it is impossible, without begging the question or displaying arrogance, to designate any act in itself as Christian either in the sense that only Christians do such acts (which it would be impossible to demonstrate in the case of any ethical act), or else that the very doing of the act (where "act" means ethical act, rather than the

peculiarly religious act of the decision of faith in Jesus Christ) makes the doer Christian, it would appear that the term "Christian" should not be primarily applied to acts but rather to the agent, the doer of the act.

What, then, is the Christian man? Or what constitutes a man as a Christian? According to the views just set forth, the Christian man is he who makes the act of faith and commits himself to Christ and, having willed so, endeavors to make his decisions and deeds accord with what in faith he apprehends Christ to will for him both in general and in the specific situations in which decision and action are called for. This definition shares both absoluteness and relativity: The commitment of faith is absolute in that it, in ideal at least, takes in the whole person; but there is relativity of awareness and fulfillment of the requirements of that commitment.

The preceding suggests, too, the inadequacy of moralistic interpretations of the way of becoming a Christian. If it be actual living in accord with the highest principles of Christian ethics, then one becomes a Christian only by living this good life in fact. An implication of this is that one does not become a Christian at the time of making the decision for Christ but at some future time. Further, if the fulfillment of the requirements is necessary to constitute one as a Christian, and if the ethical requirements are held as high as they have been not only in the historic Christian tradition but in the thinking of the moralistic Christian himself, then it might seem that there *are* no Christians but only those on the way toward *becoming* Christians. This has, in fact, sometimes been explicitly stated.

One implication of this claim, not always recognized, is that, if the claim be allowed, then Christians cannot logically be expected to effect changes for the better in the world, since there are no Christians. This, however, involves a denial of the whole prophetic-social tradition of Christian faith which few would wish to allow. On the basis of the moralistic claim, further, the paradoxical situation would arise that the only ones who would apply the designation "Christian" to themselves would be the pharisaically complacent or the ethically obtuse, and these would most generally be judged to be most unworthy of it. In this connection one is reminded of Nietzsche's statement that the last Christian died on the cross.

If, however, one becomes a Christian initially by what the evangelical stream of Christianity has termed "faith"—which may be defined as commitment to, dependence on, and trust in Jesus Christ—then one is constituted a Christian here and now, at the moment he makes that decision for Christ which theologians have called the response of faith to grace. This

does not imply that good works are either irrelevant or optional to the Christian life. Rather, as the abler interpreters of the doctrine of justification by faith have always maintained, the relationship between salvation and works is simply turned around. It is no longer that righteousness leads to salvation but that salvation leads to righteousness. Faith, properly apprehended, works in and through love. The distinction between the works which flow from salvation and those intended to lead to it is the distinction which Luther drew so dramatically between works of the law and good works, or works of love. The logical relationship here is as follows: Justification by faith implies that one will give expression to his justification by works of love. Where those works are not present, it follows that the antecedent condition—i.e. true justification—is not present. The Christian man, therefore, is a Christian by reason of his faith, and because he is thus constituted as a Christian, he reveals that faith through his works.

This meaning of "Christian" is, or ought to be, primary and normative; all others, secondary and derivative. It is in the light of the faith-response which constitutes a man a Christian that his acts become significantly Christian acts, for they then become the acts through which Christian faith is made manifest. The ideas through which the faith is given expression are then Christian ideas, and Christian values are those which are the actual or ideal ends of action deriving from such a faith. The Christian community is composed of those who have made this primary act of faith. A Christian culture or civilization derives its meaning from the values, direct and indirect, flowing from such primary acts of faith.

In the recognition and acceptance of the decision of faith in Jesus Christ as constituting the primary and normative meaning of "Christian" as it applies to a man, it is, therefore, possible not only to remove the otherwise unavoidable ambiguity surrounding the word but also to bring a principle of order into other meanings of the term. This will not, of course, settle all the problems which confront Christian faith or theology, but it may make for greater clarity of meaning in discussing them. And that, in the final analysis, is all that any definition may rightly be expected to accomplish.

Realized Eschatology and C. H. Dodd

THOMAS E. MCCOLLOUGH

THE PHRASE, "realized eschatology," has figured prominently in the discussions of New Testament critics and theologians for a generation now. It characterizes an interpretation of Jesus' teaching and ministry that has found wide acceptance and which has provoked on the other hand strenuous criticism. The name of C. H. Dodd is inseparably associated with the conception of "realized eschatology." He has certainly been its most thorough and persuasive exponent—in spite of the fact that (perhaps with tongue in cheek?) he refers to the term in a passing footnote in his latest major work, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, as a "not altogether felicitous term!" When the author of the phrase can thus describe it in such objectively critical terms, it would seem that sufficient time has elapsed for a full-dress review and criticism of the position itself.

I

C. H. Dodd has popularized the term "realized eschatology" with his thorough exposition—exegetical, historical, and theological—of the idea that the Kingdom of God was realized in human experience through the complex of events recorded in the Gospels. The basic idea was not original with him, for T. F. Glasson points out that Colani in 1864 declared that the Kingdom had already come in the ministry of Jesus.¹ E. Von Dobschütz in his *Eschatology of the Gospels* (1910) spoke of "transmuted eschatology" in the teaching of Jesus, "transmuted" in the sense that the Jewish eschatological expectations were considered to have been fulfilled in the inward experience of that which had been expected as an external change. William Manson set forth a similar idea in *Christ's View of the Kingdom of God* in 1918, though his view has been modified in his later books.

Both Von Dobschütz and Manson reacted to the extreme position of Albert Schweitzer's "thoroughgoing eschatology," which made of Jesus a misguided enthusiast who died under the delusion that his death would

¹ Glasson, T. F., *The Second Advent*, 2d ed., London: The Epworth Press, 1947, p. 135.

THOMAS E. MCCOLLOUGH, B.D., Th.D., is Assistant Professor of Religion at Stetson University, Deland, Florida. His article reviews Dodd's realized eschatology in light of contemporary criticisms and evaluates its strength and weaknesses.

precipitate the apocalyptic coming of the Kingdom of God. When Schweitzer's book was translated into English, with the title, "The Quest of the Historical Jesus," it exerted a tremendous influence upon the thinking of British New Testament scholars. C. H. Dodd recalls that it was during the post-World War Anglo-German discussions that the term "realized eschatology" came to his mind. In those days the discussions were generally either-or, and his theory represented a swing from the extreme of Schweitzer's position to its polar opposite. Dodd was unable to follow the liberal school's idea of the Kingdom of God, but neither was he able to accept the radical reconstruction of Schweitzer.

Dodd acknowledges a great debt to Rudolf Otto's significant book, *Reich Gottes und Menschensohn*, which appeared in 1934. Otto argues for a kind of anticipatory coming of the Kingdom in the ministry of Jesus, a proleptic manifestation of the powers of the age to come. In his methodology of parabolic interpretation, Dodd follows the basic interpretative principles of Adolf Jülicher, who, in his work *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu* (1899-1910), showed that in general the parables do not admit of an allegorical interpretation, but depict a realistic situation. Dodd, however, disagrees with the tendency of Jülicher's method to make the process of interpretation end with a generalization.

The most thorough exposition of C. H. Dodd's theory of "realized eschatology" is to be found in *The Parables of the Kingdom*, 1935, which was based upon the Shaffer Lectures given in Yale Divinity School in the spring of that year. W. F. Howard has called this book "one of the most remarkable contributions to New Testament theology made in our time."² In this book Dodd examines the teaching of Jesus concerning the nature and coming of the Kingdom of God, and by means of source and form criticism attempts to restore the meaning of some of the parables of Jesus which have been confused by the interpretation of the early church. In this manner, he says, we are able to discover in the teaching of Jesus "the unity and consistency which it must have possessed."³

II

Dodd finds that the earliest tradition of the teaching of Jesus proclaims the Kingdom of God to have come. In two crucial sayings of Jesus, found in Matt. 12:28—Luke 11:20 and Mark 1:14-15, Dodd translates

² Howard, W. F., "The Parables of Our Lord," *London Quarterly & Holborn Review*, CLXI (October, 1936), p. 458.

³ Dodd, C. H., *The Parables of the Kingdom*, rev. ed., London: Nisbet & Co., 1936, p. 109. The discussion which follows summarizes Dodd's position as set forth in this book.

the Greek verbs so as to mean "the Kingdom of God has come." His basis for this is his contention that both *έγγιζεν* and *φθάνειν* are used to translate the Hebrew and Aramaic verbs which mean "to reach," "to arrive." The Kingdom of God has come with Jesus and is a present reality. The Gospel sayings on this subject, Dodd declares, are the most explicit, characteristic, and distinctive of those dealing with the Kingdom of God. This is his fixed point of interpretation, in the light of which he considers the sayings and parables of Jesus whose meaning seems to be unclear or which appear to be misinterpreted.

If the Kingdom of God came in the ministry of Jesus, how are we to interpret his predictions of historical events which took place beyond the resurrection? With prophetic insight Jesus saw in the crisis gathering about his ministry coming disaster, Dodd declares. He could discern in the situation factors which, in the development of events, would bring about his own death and the persecution of his disciples. The fate of the Jewish people as a whole was involved in the same complex of events, and the situation would eventuate in the destruction of the Jewish city and temple. The disaster of the Jewish people was the historical embodiment of judgment, the result of the rejection of Jesus. The fact that these two events were separated by about forty years, when it seems that Jesus actually expected the tribulation of Judea to follow his death immediately, can be attributed to the characteristic "foreshortening" of prophetic vision, says Dodd. The time-scale is not significant.

Of Jesus' predictions which seem to point to future events, some clearly refer to that which is outside the historical order. Dodd doubts that predictions of the second coming of Jesus as Son of Man can be found in the earlier tradition, with the exception of Mark 14:62. That saying of Jesus he takes as referring to his resurrection from the dead. What Jesus had referred to as one event, the early church distinguished as two: one past, Jesus' resurrection from the dead, and the other future, his coming again in glory. The parables which have a future reference as they appear in the Gospels, Dodd examines critically in the light of his principle of realized eschatology. He relates them to the crisis which surrounded Jesus' ministry. When the crisis of Jesus' ministry, death, and resurrection was past, the early church interpreted these parables to refer to a future advent of the Son of Man.

In its earliest days the church lived under a sense of tremendous expectancy, awaiting the moment when the whole meaning of the crisis would be revealed. But the risen and exalted Christ did not immediately

return in glory, and the sense of crisis gradually faded. This demanded a readjustment in thought, says Dodd, and it took two directions. The eschatological significance of the ministry of Jesus and his death and resurrection as final, absolute, and saving facts became increasingly the concern of the "better minds" of the church, such as Paul and John, who concentrated on their meaning as realized eschatology. On the other hand, there developed a new line of Christian eschatology on the pattern of the Jewish apocalyptic tradition, in which the second advent of Christ as immediate confirmation of a present fact was translated into terms of a future event, as in Mark 13, Matthew, and the Revelation of John. So the sayings of Jesus which originally were related to one intense crisis were, during the days of a more stable period which followed, interpreted so as to apply to two crises, one past, the other future. It is Dodd's conviction that realized eschatology "was the true solution of the problem presented to the Church by the disappointment of its naive expectation that the Lord would immediately appear . . . [It was] life here and now."⁴

III

C. H. Dodd's case for "realized eschatology" is based linguistically on his translation of *ἡγγικεῖν* and *ἔφθασσεν* in Mark 1:14 and Matt. 12:28—Luke 11:20: "The Kingdom of God has come." It has been challenged by several scholars, who have submitted it to a searching criticism in the light of the textual evidence of the LXX and other ancient sources. J. Y. Campbell adduces data from the LXX to show that in the vast majority of cases *ἔγγιξεν* is used to translate words meaning "to come near," and that there is no evidence that it ever means "has come." He shows further that in the references in the New Testament which are clear, it has the meaning "has come near, is at hand."⁵ K. W. Clark finds that in the non-literary and literary papyri of the second and third centuries, in the LXX, the New Testament, and the Apostolic Fathers, *ἔγγιξεν* consistently means to "draw near."⁶ Clark argues from an examination of Greek sources from the LXX down to modern Greek that *φθάσσεν* means "to reach, to arrive." He declares, "It describes arrival upon the threshold of that experience."⁷ This is the meaning which should be given to both of the verbs in question, says Clark.

⁴ Dodd, C. H., *The Apostolic Preaching and Its Developments*, 2d ed., London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1944, p. 63.

⁵ Campbell, J. W., "The Kingdom of God Has Come," *The Expository Times*, XLVIII, 2 (November 1938), pp. 91 f.

⁶ Clark, Kenneth W., "Realized Eschatology," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LIX (1940), p. 371.

⁷ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 379.

In a reply to Campbell, Dodd acknowledged his error in stating that the perfect of *ἔγγιξεν* is used to translate the Hebrew verb *naga* and the Aramaic verb *m'ta*, but maintained that in using the other tenses to translate the Hebrew verbs, the Greek translators were aware of the meaning of those cases in the Hebrew where the idea of approach melts into that of arrival. And so he takes *ἥγγικεν* *ἥβασις* in the sense which he establishes for *ἔφθασεν* *ἥβασις*. Dodd finds no reason to give to *ἔφθασεν* any other meaning than that which he declares is attached to it all through Hellenistic literature, that is, "arrived," in spite of Campbell's contention that other meanings are possible in the Hellenistic Greek.⁸

Campbell contests Dodd's translation of Mark 9:1 as meaning "There are some of those standing here who will not taste death until they have seen that the Kingdom of God has come with power."⁹ In reply to Campbell's statement that most translators render the perfect participle by a present when regarded from the standpoint of the main verb, Dodd cites examples from outside the New Testament where the perfect participles could not be replaced by present participles without changing the meaning, and observes that Mark would not be insensitive to such a difference.¹⁰

Common to all of these objections to Dodd's thesis is the belief that though the Kingdom had not come, it was "at hand," "near," when Jesus spoke. Even if that is granted, it does not rule out realized eschatology. Dodd makes allowance for the fact that Jesus did not necessarily imply that the Kingdom had come at the moment of his speaking. It came in the whole complex of the events in his ministry, death, and resurrection. The full realization of this came at Pentecost, Dodd believes.¹¹

There have been a number of serious criticisms directed at Dodd's account of Jesus' place in the context of prophetic Judaism. His transposition of a future judgment and a future advent into wholly transcendental terms does not satisfy such scholars as Paul S. Minear, who declares that "Such a surrender of a future reference is thoroughly un-Jewish and un-Christian."¹² Howard C. Kee observes that it is strange that Dodd,

⁸ "The Kingdom of God Has Come," *The Expository Times*, XLVIII, 1 (December, 1938), pp. 189 f. Dodd's position is substantiated by W. R. Hutton, "The Kingdom of God Has Come," *Expository Times*, LXIV, 3 (December, 1952), pp. 89-91. Hutton's examination of *ἔγγιξεν* in other forms than the perfect leads him to conclude that *ἔγγιξεν* "conforms of itself to the well-established meaning of 'has come' for *εφέχασεν*" (p. 91).

⁹ Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 93 ff.

¹⁰ Dodd, "The Kingdom of God Has Come," *op. cit.*, pp. 141 f.

¹¹ This largely obviates R. H. Fuller's criticism of Dodd's theory on the basis that the Kingdom was proleptically operative in the person of Jesus and was to be ushered in by the decisive event of his death. See R. H. Fuller, *The Mission and Achievement of Jesus*, London: S.C.M. Press, 1954, pp. 20-49.

¹² Minear, Paul S., "Time and the Kingdom," *Journal of Religion*, XXIV, 2 (April, 1944), p. 87.

with his emphasis upon the historical kerygma, would not follow through with an exposition of Jesus' message in terms of fulfillment in history.¹³

The most strenuous objectors to Dodd's view are those who interpret Jesus' message in terms of this-worldly hope, of whom C. C. McCown and F. C. Grant are chief.¹⁴ Grant asks how it could be possible in the thought of first-century Judaism for the Kingdom to arrive without any preceding judgment.¹⁵ B. T. D. Smith says of Dodd's interpretation of Jesus' saying, "The kingdom is already here," that such a statement would appear "manifestly untrue" to those who heard it.¹⁶ One of the most incisive discussions of the historical and transcendental elements in the teaching of Jesus is found in *Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus*, by Amos N. Wilder.¹⁷ He argues that Jesus' affinity with the prophets, and his teaching which implies a continuing order, made an otherworldly transcendentalism unlikely in his teaching. The context of the Jewish eschatology of his day would preclude that: "If Jewish eschatology in the late period had taken a sheerly transcendental direction, it would have been a complete reversal and denial of the main stream of Jewish religion."¹⁸

In reply, it should be said that the ultimate validity of these conclusions depends upon the presupposition that the thinking of Jesus was necessarily confined within the limits of the Jewish prophetic and apocalyptic outlook of the first century. Dodd's interpretation of Jesus' teaching of the Kingdom of God stresses the uniqueness and finality of its coming in him, and as such it transcends the conception of the Kingdom of God held by his contemporaries. That the thought of Palestinian Judaism concerning the Kingdom of God was not uninfluenced by Greek ideas is borne out by evidence cited by W. D. Davies in his book, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*.¹⁹

Dodd's alteration of the setting of so much Gospel material would appear to lay him open to the charge of Clarence T. Craig that his theory "leads to an ultimate skepticism of our gospel sources."²⁰ This constitutes perhaps the most serious criticism of Dodd's view, from a historical stand-

¹³ Kee, Howard C., "The Development of Eschatology in the New Testament," *Journal of Bible and Religion*, XX, 3 (July, 1952), p. 189.

¹⁴ McCown, C. C., *The Search for the Real Jesus*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940; Grant, F. C., *The Gospel of the Kingdom*, The Macmillan Company, 1940; see Wilder, Amos N., *Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus*, rev. ed., Harper & Brothers, 1950, pp. 61 ff.

¹⁵ Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹⁶ Smith, B. T. D., *The Parables of the Synoptic Gospels*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1937, p. 78.

¹⁷ Wilder, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-70.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁹ Davies, W. D., *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, London: S. P. C. K., 1948, pp. 314-20.

²⁰ Craig, Clarence T., "Realized Eschatology," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LVI (1937), p. 21.

point. Craig's charge is double-barreled. He argues that it is impossible to get behind our sources to the original words of Jesus if the sources themselves misinterpret those words. It is extremely unlikely, says Craig, that words which were misunderstood would be remembered in their exact form, thus making possible a correct rendering by later interpreters.²¹ Further, Dodd's theory "must assume that the great driving force of the earliest period of the church was due to their misunderstanding of Jesus, not to a great hope into which he had led them."²²

But Craig's criticism is too sweeping. It implies that in Dodd's view the followers of Jesus had an entirely perverted interpretation of his true meaning, that their view was wholly antithetical to that of Jesus himself. Rather, Dodd attempts to show that Jesus' teaching of the climactic coming of the Kingdom with him was at the heart of the expectation of the earliest disciples, who looked for the disclosure of the full meaning of that Kingdom immediately. The impact of the crisis of the events leading to the resurrection led them to expect the final intervention and triumph of God in the immediate future. The disciples did not mistake the essence of Jesus' teaching concerning the Kingdom of God, but they translated that teaching into terms of immediate historical finality. The fact that the deeper meaning of Jesus' teaching was increasingly emphasized by Paul himself is evidence enough that Dodd's theory does not mean that "Paul and the other early Christians were entirely wrong about what Jesus meant and had tried to do."

The most common objection to Dodd's theory of realized eschatology is that it reads into Jesus' view a modern or Hellenistic outlook which is out of keeping with the context of first-century Judaism, of which he was a part. Floyd Filson states that Jesus spoke, and was understood by his disciples, in terms of a time series.²³ C. C. McCown condemns Dodd roundly for ascribing "thoroughly modern philosophical ideas to Jesus himself."²⁴ C. T. Craig argues that Dodd's theory attributes a "gross anachronism" to Jesus, on the basis that Palestinian Judaism thought of "the age to come" as following "this age." He claims that since there is no evidence that there was a belief in a present eternal world in Palestinian Judaism, that Jesus' contemporaries would naturally understand him to

²¹ But James Moffatt noted in *The Theology of the Gospels*, p. 45, in 1912, that the Gospels preserve sayings of Jesus which must have seemed perplexing to the early church.

²² Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

²³ Filson, Floyd V., "The Kingdom: Present and Future," *Journal of Bible and Religion*, VII, 2 (May, 1939), p. 62.

²⁴ McCown, C. C., "Symbolic Interpretation," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LXIII (1944), pp. 336 f.

be speaking of a future event.²⁵ However, it is not at all certain that such a conception was not familiar to Palestinian Judaism. To R. Newton Flew's objection to Dodd's theory as "far too Platonic," W. D. Davies answers that his investigation indicates that the conception of the Kingdom of God advocated by Dodd would be familiar to Palestinian Judaism.²⁶ The twofold conception of the "*olam ha-ba*" as a future event in time and as an eternally existing reality was present in Rabbinic Judaism. Davies warns against making too sharp a dichotomy between the Hebraic and Hellenistic elements in Paul's thought. The evidence cited by Davies does not discount the originality of Jesus' teaching concerning the Kingdom of God, but it does show that his disciples would not necessarily "inevitably misunderstand because of their past experience"²⁷ when Jesus spoke in such terms.

IV

The weakness of Dodd's case for realized eschatology is not to be found in his contention that the Kingdom of God came in the ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus, for many recognize the value of that emphasis. It is in his excision of all futuristic references regarding the Kingdom, that he has exceeded the bounds of a balanced critical approach and has used his form-critical knife in the interests of his theory. In criticizing his basic position it is not enough to take issue with his interpretation of individual verses in the Gospels. These must be evaluated in light of the method and perspective of his critical approach.

Dodd's theory is more appealing than that of Schweitzer's "thorough-going eschatology," because it at least avoids the position that Jesus was mistaken in his eschatological expectations. But in safeguarding the spiritual integrity of Jesus, it lays a serious charge at the door of the early church. Dodd suggests a conscious reconstruction of Jesus' eschatological teaching by the early church in his effort to account for the actual historical situation.

The Church therefore proceeded to reconstruct on a modified plan the traditional scheme of Jewish eschatology which had been broken up by the declaration that the Kingdom of God had already come. Materials for such a reconstruction were present in profusion in the apocalyptic literature. The reconstructed eschatology of the Church therefore drew heavily on Jewish sources.²⁸

To say that the early Christians reconstructed an eschatological system on the framework of the Jewish eschatology is somewhat artificial. A more

²⁵ Craig, *op. cit.*, pp. 22 f.

²⁶ Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

²⁷ Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁸ Dodd, C. H., *The Apostolic Preaching*, p. 36.

organic view would take account of the historical nexus with the prophetic faith of the Old Testament. If, as would seem to be the case in Dodd's view, the significance of history ends with the resurrection, then the whole of the Old Testament faith must be considered to have been fulfilled in the time of Jesus (with the exception, of course, of those superficial or mistaken elements which were then to be seen in their true light). However, if continuing history has any significance in the providence of God, it is possible that some of the prophetic insights of the Old Testament point in the direction of a historical-transcendent consummation.

Jesus stood in the midst of the stream of Jewish life and thought. He recognized the danger that his followers would misinterpret the nature of his Messianic calling, and he sought strenuously to disabuse their minds of all notions of a Messianic calling in crude, materialistic terms of an earthly kingdom. Having been keenly aware of the dangers of misunderstanding on the part of his disciples in regard to his Messiahship, is it likely that Jesus would be unconscious of the dangers of misunderstanding in regard to his future "coming"? If it be granted that Jesus' references to his advent were few—even if with Dodd we limit the specific references to Mark 14:62—yet as long as it is admitted that Jesus foresaw his death and resurrection, the problem remains. If the authentic teaching of Jesus on this point is limited to this one enigmatic saying, then the confusion of the early church must be traced to the mind of Jesus himself.

It would seem that there are more satisfying alternatives. It hardly seems likely that having taken such pains to correct the current Jewish conceptions of the Messiah, Jesus made no conscious effort to inform his disciples of the true nature of his advent. He was aware of the current Jewish apocalyptic conceptions, and was certainly aware that, uncorrected, they would effect the eschatological thinking of his followers. In light of this it is reasonable to assume that if he referred at all to a future coming, he must have been concerned to delineate it in terms that would convey his meaning to his hearers in that context.

A further consideration is in order. The Christian interpreter is not governed solely by critico-rational presuppositions. It is not begging the question to assert that a spiritual continuity between the teaching of Jesus and the understanding and teaching of the disciples is implicit in the continuing work of the Holy Spirit in the church (John 16:13-14). A dichotomy between the mind of Jesus and the mind of the early church at the crucial point of eschatology endangers the conception of Christ's continuing interpretation of himself through the Holy Spirit in the life

of the church. To relieve Jesus of a mistaken conception of eschatology by shifting the responsibility to the early church is no real solution to the problem, for it obviates the actual, integral relation of Christ to his church.

With the centuries of intervening history, it is inevitable that the church's perspective on the second advent should be considerably altered. But if the time-scale of the early Christians' expectation was telescoped, it would at least seem that the qualitative aspect of their hope was an essential part of their Christian faith. It was a hope that could not be abstracted from the historical conditions of their life. It is natural that if Jesus' teaching included a future orientation, that aspect of his teaching would be firmly held in the early days of the church. As the church's experience of the life of the "new age" grew, it was inevitable that the emphasis should center increasingly on the present reality. But neither truth excluded the other, and in the latest writings of the New Testament there is still an expectation of the end. Hope was not displaced by the experience of present reality.

Dodd believes that the coming of the Kingdom was early thought of as one event, realized in two stages, and was conceived later as two events. But the spiritual logic of the early Christians' thinking and its organic relation to its source in Jesus' teaching would strongly suggest the truth of a final, victorious consummation. If the early church *looked* for fulfillment, is it not an indication of something in the nature of the gospel itself? The fact that they *did* so interpret it is empirical evidence that there is basis for such hope. They were closest to the event, and so had a marked sense of its tremendous import, which, indeed, was what wrought the transforming change in them. Why should they *feel* the need of something further, if it did not have roots in Jesus' own teaching?

Dodd interprets the situation of the early church thus: "In the recent past lay the ministry, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ; the experience of the present attested His power in the Church through the Spirit; the near future would bring the final revelation of the meaning of the whole."²⁹ If his interpretation is correct, the spiritual logic of the early Christians is more persuasive than Dodd's own conclusion. Their mistake in this case would be a foreshortening of the historical perspective; Dodd's is to be found in his radical devaluation of history in relegating the significance of the Kingdom wholly to the transcendent sphere. "The final revelation of the meaning of the whole" is an imperative part of the early Christian hope, and cannot be fully accounted for without intimately re-

²⁹ *Loc. cit.*

lating that "final revelation" in some way to history as the future complementary and conclusive denouement of the unique incarnational revelation in history.

V

Dodd develops his discussion of eschatology primarily in terms of the category of the Kingdom of God rather than of Christology. His emphasis is upon the "last Thing," rather than upon the "last One." In the light of his full thought on the subject, he can scarcely be accused of having no Christology, for the following statement is representative of other similar affirmations: "The life of Jesus on earth . . . was the place where God came to be with men, as never before, and the risen Christ, in communion with His people, is still the place where we find 'God with us' permanently."³⁰ However, such statements are supplementary to his conception of the Kingdom of God, which is his dominant and determinative theme.

This is, perhaps, to be traced to his early concern with the teaching of Jesus. His theory of realized eschatology was first set forth in *The Parables of the Kingdom*, and was the result of his historicocritical investigation of the nature of the Kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus. His conception of the Kingdom of God in the teaching of Jesus then became the norm by which the eschatological thought of the early church was judged. It is perhaps due to this interpretative approach that the teaching of Jesus concerning the Kingdom of God has been given the central place, rather than the preaching of the early Christians concerning Christ.

This is a paradoxical weakness in his discussion of eschatology, because of his solid critical and theological contributions along the line of the historical Christological content of the early preaching. The weakness is not in a denial, or even a lack, of a full Christology in Dodd's thought; it lies in a misplaced emphasis. Jesus proclaimed the coming of the Kingdom; the disciples proclaimed Jesus as the crucified, risen King. The theological—and eschatological—focus of the church is Jesus Christ.

The consequence of Dodd's emphasis is that the Kingdom tends to be idea-centered, instead of Christ-centered; it is related to the "timeless" eternal realm, rather than to the timefulness of the ministry of Christ in his risen humanity. In Dodd's thought, the Kingdom of God came historically through Christ in the complex of events of his life, death, and resur-

³⁰ Dodd, C. H., *Three Sermons*, London: S.C.M. Press, 1954, p. 14.

rection. By the reconstitution of the contemporary situation on the pattern of the original event, the crisis of the coming of the Kingdom may be recreated. But the person of Christ does not seem to be essential to the nature of these repeated comings of the Kingdom. Dodd's demythologizing tends to reduce the content of the Kingdom to a bare existentialism.

This problem is focused in his discussion of the sacraments. From the church's experience of the Eucharist he derives a conception of the nature of history in terms of crisis—challenge and response. By the reconstitution of the supreme crisis the inward reality of history is revealed. But this interpretation of history in terms of existentialism must be criticized as inadequate. It characterizes the *nature* of history (crisis), but does not adequately set forth the *meaning* of history (the sovereignty of God over the whole process of history). It indicates the essence of sacred history, but, by eliminating the futuristic perspective ("till I come"), does not account for process, movement, and the totality of meaning of all history under the lordship of God.

By stressing the Presence to the exclusion of the Parousia in his interpretation of the Lord's Supper, Dodd fails to give a satisfying interpretation both to the history of the church and to its future hope. His existential interpretation emphasizes the *context* of the coming of the Kingdom, but the *content* of the person of Christ is not sufficiently stressed as the center and heart of eschatology. The context concerns the particularity of history, but the content has to do in Dodd's terms with the Kingdom of God. Therefore, side by side with his stress upon the particularity of historical revelation is his concern with the timeless, eternal realm. In this way he has a window of exit from history into eternity. If his eschatology were focused in Christ it would be anchored to the ongoing historical purpose of God effected through Christ, and he would be bound to take the future of history seriously in its relation to the meaning of eschatology.

In his earlier writing on history and eschatology, Dodd recognizes the element of "sheer finality" as a residue of eschatology not exhausted in the realized eschatology of the gospel. But, he says, "An absolute end to history, whether it be conceived as coming late or soon, is no more than a fiction designed to express the reality of teleology within history."²¹ More than once he remarks that an end to the time series is as philosophically inconceivable as the infinite continuation of the series.

But the presuppositions of the New Testament are not philosophical.

²¹ Dodd, C. H., *The Apostolic Preaching*, p. 82.

This is the crucial point in the interpretation of the eschatological outlook of the early Christians. By interpreting the biblical language as a philosophical statement of teleology, Dodd is taking his stand on the territory foreign to the soil of first-century Christianity. The content of the New Testament's forward-looking language of faith and hope cannot be reduced to a bare timeless truth without rendering anemic the full-blooded biblical eschatology. Modern efforts to psychologize or rationalize the eschatology of the New Testament do not do justice to its essential nature. The fact that the future end of history has not been experienced by men does not obviate the fact that it figures prominently in the New Testament conception of the nature of history under the sovereignty of God. Though hidden to the sight of men, the providential ordering of the universe and its consummation can be witnessed to by faith as an integral part of God's dealings with man.

In the later writing of Dodd, he discusses a future end to the historical existence of the human race, but thinks of it only in terms of passing the last frontier of death into eternity, as happens in the case of each individual who dies. "That is how I understand the mysterious language of the Gospels about the final coming of the Son of Man. Unlike His first coming, it is not an event *in* history. It is the point at which *all* history is taken up into the larger whole of God's eternal purpose."³² This is a further development of his earlier views, but still gives no place to the historical-transcendent implications of the second advent. The scene is laid wholly in the timeless eternal realm. Even the emphasis upon the timeless nature of eternity has shifted in Dodd's later thinking, but it has not affected his conception of the end of history. The orientation is wholly "upward," and in no sense forward. As he says in *The Coming of Christ*, "Perhaps the coming of Christ is dateless, because it lies outside our system of time-reckoning altogether."³³

That makes a radical difference in the Christian hope, because if the expectation is not immediately and vitally related to historical existence, it is a hope that concerns only the other world, at death. To relate Christian hope wholly to the eternal realm is to remove from historical existence its dimension of expectation, a quality dependent upon the sense of the imminence of the Lord ("the Lord is at hand"). This is to cut the vital nerve of moral challenge by opening a door of escape into "the other world." Why should Christians be concerned with history if God has

³² Dodd, C. H., *The Coming of Christ*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1951, p. 27.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

no ultimate historical purpose? It is possible to agree with Dodd's contention that the purpose of history has been fully revealed, and yet to affirm that that purpose is in the process of being realized and will be completely realized only in the ultimate unveiling of the victorious Christ. The theory of realized eschatology does not do justice to God's teleological control of history nor to the nature of the New Testament hope.

Dodd's theory of realized eschatology is open to criticism on the basis of what it denies; its great value lies in what it affirms. As a reaction to liberalism and to Schweitzer's "thorough-going eschatology," it has been a "tract for the times." Dodd himself has modified some of his earlier statements of the theory, as has been pointed out. The presence of contradictory elements in Dodd's writings testify to the fact that he is more interested in the dedicated pursuit of Christian truth than in the defense of a water-tight, self-consistent theory. With clarity and cogency and convincing spiritual insight, Dodd has called the attention of his generation to the central truth of the gospel of Jesus Christ: life in the Kingdom of God is a present reality.

Evangelistic Song

ROBERT STEVENSON

I

IN THE BROADER SENSE, every hymn that proclaims some cardinal truth to be found in the four Gospels might well be called "evangelistic." Indeed even such Latin hymns as the *Vexilla Regis prodeunt* of Venantius Fortunatus, *Sacris solemnii*s by St. Thomas Aquinas, or *O Deus, ego amo te*, ascribed to St. Francis Xavier, are—in the larger acceptation of the term—just as surely evangelistic as "Rescue the perishing," "Wonderful words of life," or "Jesus, keep me near the cross."

There can be no doubt, however, that the stereotyped idea of evangelistic song held by most choirmasters precludes Latin hymns set by Palestrina and Victoria as well as German chorales set by Bach. *Jesu, dulcis memoria* ("Jesus, the very thought of Thee/With sweetness fills the breast"), with words attributed to St. Bernard and music to Victoria, would never pass muster for a gospel hymn with the average church musician, no matter how intimately devout or prayerfully Christian the sentiment throughout all five stanzas were acknowledged to be. A "gospel" hymn, at least as most church musicians understand the term, must be such a song as Dwight L. Moody might have used when he preached to a behemoth congregation in the New York Hippodrome, or such a hymn as Billy Graham will select when he fills the New York Coliseum. Whatever else its other characteristics, it must first be one that can speak to the vast generality of the Christian public.

As long ago as 1644 when the learned Puritan divine, Nathaniel Homes, published his tract entitled *Gospel Musick*, he emphasized the same idea: namely, that any true gospel music must inspire the whole congregation to say Amen. He in the next breath excoriated "cathedral singing," because not everyone in a worshiping congregation can understand and appreciate such "arty" music. Homes quoted at length from the preface to the famous *Bay Psalm Book* published at Cambridge in 1640; and although he published his tract in London, he obviously had

ROBERT STEVENSON, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Music at the University of California, Los Angeles, California. The present paper was read before the School of Sacred Music at Union Theological Seminary, New York City, on May 12, 1956.

in mind an American as well as an English audience. One may therefore do well here at the very outset to quote some of the choicer remarks from his pamphlet, more especially since its title comes so close to the subject of our present discussion.¹

The Apostle [Paul] joynes praying and singing together under the same notion. And saith that the joyst performance of either in the Church [should] draw all among them to say Amen, that is, to vote and devote the same desires of soul with the rest of the Congregation to God. . . . [On the other hand] Cathedrall singing . . . in which is sung almost every thing, unlawfull Letanies, and Creeds, and other prose not framed in Meeter fit for [general] singing, [is . . . utterly] abominable. Besides they do not let all the Congregation, neither sing, nor understand what is sung; *battologizing* and quavering over the same words vainly. Yea nor do all they sing together, but first one sings an Anthem, then half the Chore [choir], then the other, tossing the Word of God like a Tenice-ball. Then all yelling together with confused noise. This we utterly dislike as most unlawful.

After adducing the authority of Jerome and Augustine, our Puritan divine then rises to a climax with the following Latin couplet, which immediately thereafter he renders into English.²

Non vox sed votum, non musica cordula, sed cor:
Non clamor, sed amor, psallit in aure Dei.

Soul vows, not ayrie voice,
Not Art, but heart God hears:
Not loud noise, but love joyes
Make Musick in Gods eares.

Homes's first point was made when he contended that all true gospel music must be such singing as the whole congregation can endorse with a hearty Amen. He offers another test of gospel music, however, when after inveighing against cathedral singing he contends that God prefers not Art, but heart. In this piquant phrase he has, as it were, anticipated the very lyrics of an extremely popular hit tune in a baseball smash musical. The baseball players, as all who have seen the musical well remember, admit that they never score on the diamond but protest that they atone for missing the ball with acres and acres of heart.

Interestingly enough, then, Homes as long ago as 1644 rather succinctly stated two cardinal points in the philosophy of the gospel musician. First, evangelistic song must appeal to the generality of the Christian public. Second, it must never sacrifice heart for Art. He lays down still a third criterion when he claims that it ought to plough the sinner's con-

¹ Homes, Nathaniel, *Gospel Musick . . . unto which is added, the Judgment of our worthy Brethren of New-England*. London: Henry Overton, 1644, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

science so that seed dropped by the preacher will take root in prepared ground. To prove his case from Scripture, Homes retells the thrice-familiar story of Elisha and the minstrel who inspired his prophecy (II Kings 3:13-15). He uses the incident not so much, however, to prove the power of music to induce prophetic ecstasy, as to draw out of the familiar passage quite another moral, one that may seem novel even today. If we may again quote Homes's own words, he writes:³

The musick of him [the minstrel] that plaid and sung to Elisha was in part to make the Kings [who stood by] fit to hear, as [well as] to make Elisha fit to speak prophetically. Many that are not yet brought home to Religion as they should, may be brought in to some love with religious duties for the sake of that sweet one [of singing]. The Indians are drawn to the Churches in New-England, by delighting in their singing day, that is, their singing on the Lords day.

"Gospel musick" in Homes's opinion means therefore (1) music such as the whole congregation of the saved will understand; (2) "heart-felt" song; (3) music which will plough hardened ground for the planting of gospel seed. According to Homes, such music "after the Sermon sometimes hath done that which the Sermon alone could not doe. The Sermon as it were turned the wind into a warme quarter to begin to thaw the Soule; and then the [singing of a] Psalm hath been the breaking out of the Sunbeames, to make the heart run with melting."

Homes, a doctor of divinity of Oxford University and one of the more learned Hebrew scholars in a day when all doctors of divinity knew the sacred tongues, could well have been echoing the exact sentiments of an evangelist who calls for a half-dozen repetitions of P. P. Bliss's "Almost persuaded," when he wrote this last sentence. His rationale of gospel music—if not his implementation—would doubtless still meet with approval in churches which sing hymns by Robert Lowry, W. H. Doane, and Charles H. Gabriel at this very day. Even in such now classic statements as Ira D. Sankey's *My Life and Sacred Songs* (1906), or in George Cole Stebbins's *Reminiscences and Gospel Hymn Stories* (1924), we are not likely to find any more coherent or persuasive expositions of the philosophy of church music which the present-day gospeler accepts than in Homes's 1644 tract.

II

On the other hand, Homes, when he wrote what now seems to have been the earliest tract actually entitled *Gospel Musick*, did not at the same time select actual examples that would still be sung by proponents of gospel music

³ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

today. For him, metrical psalms constituted the ideal gospel music. Had he been alive a century later he would probably have been singing the same Ravenscroft tunes, but the words would perhaps have been picked from Isaac Watts's *The Psalms of David imitated in the Language of the New Testament*. Two hundred years later, say in 1842, he might have settled for some such collection as *Revival Melodies, or, Songs of Zion*, published in Boston by John Putnam and dedicated to "Elder Jacob Knapp." This latter collection deserves rather detailed description, for its contents exemplify some of the very features that latter-day church musicians have found most objectionable in so-called gospel music.

In the first place, the tunes are quite frequently borrowed from secular sources. All very well it may have been for a Palestrina to write masses parodied after such a purely secular chanson as *Je suis desheritée* (1594), or after such secular madrigals as *Già fu chi m'ebbe cara* (1600), *Io mi son giovinetta* (1570), and *Nasce la gioia mia* (1590), all of which were published after the reforming Tridentine decrees were promulgated.⁴ The secular models in these cases are comfortably remote and can no longer embarrass us. But in *Revival Melodies*, No. 26, "My Father's house," is set to the tune of the *Marseillaise*; No. 59, "Saint's sweet home," to the tune of "Home, sweet home"; No. 54, "Sing, sing His lofty praise," to the tune of *America*; and No. 64, "Thou sweetly gliding Kedron," to the tune of "The Last Rose of Summer." In a special category belongs No. 4, "The morning light is breaking." Nowadays the tune of this one has become so irrevocably associated with "Stand up, stand up for Jesus," that even well-rated hymnists sometimes forget that it too was originally a tune which George J. Webb (1803-1887) composed for a purely secular poem entitled, "Tis dawn, the lark is singing."

In the second place, if we are to list the objectionable features of this 1842 book, would be named the number of rather frivolous musical tags that are scattered through the book. In Nos. 23 ("I wish you well") and 48 ("When marshalled on the nightly plain"), the Scotch snap; in 18 ("All is well") and 36 ("When shall we meet again?") the mawkish fermatas; in 12 ("We're travelling home") melodramatic rests between the questions, *Will you go? Will you go?* and in 36 between *Never, no never, no, no, never*; all strike the trained ear as tags that belong more

⁴ Brenet, Michel, *Palestrina* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1914), pp. 181-182, points out that "Since in every case he did not abstain from publishing them, whether with overtly secular titles or not, one must conclude that he considered these secular themes as musical elements only, and that he chose them for their aptitude in furnishing interesting developments." The secular origin of any specific bit of music used in church worries those most who are imperfectly acquainted with the history of so-called sacred music in earlier ages.

appropriately in barber-shop and minstrel, rather than in religious music.

For a third matter, no sturdy individuality is apparent in a single one of the hymns by H. Baker, B. Carter, C. Dingley, and H. Parkhurst, found in the book. Most of the anonymous items are just as devoid of personality. The only really fine anonymous tune in the collection is that found at No. 14, "The happy land." All three of these general lines of objection will indeed be taken still today against the run-of-the-mill gospel hymnbook: (1) outright borrowings from the secular repertory; (2) aping of mannerisms current in the secular repertory; (3) absence of distinctive profile in individual items.

Were one to seek still other identifying characteristics that were to become badges of the gospel songbook, several could be found in this same *Revival Melodies, or Songs of Zion* published at Boston in 1842. The preface states, for instance, that the hymns in the collection were, for the most part, introduced at "the meetings of the Rev. Mr. Knapp in the city" (i.e. Boston). Gospel hymns have always taken root by preference in the sawdust of tabernacles rather than in the fine dust of stone masonry. Not only have they boldly challenged church hymns with historic associations, but they have even frequently ousted them when converts have become deacons and stewards. The story of almost every gospel hymn has been monotonously the same. Some prominent evangelist such as Major Whittle, Dr. Pentecost, Dwight L. Moody, or Billy Sunday, has taken a Perry Como in his entourage. He in turn has fulfilled his mission by singing older hymns of proven evangelistic worth and by introducing novelties that have quickly established themselves as favorites. Then again, this 1842 collection was dedicated to its very sponsor, the "Elder Jacob Knapp." When the later books have not been so dedicated, they have still carried the imprimatur of the evangelists who have sponsored Sankey or Stebbins, McGranahan or Rodeheaver.

It is quite fair to add that the 1842 collection, like others of its same stamp published both earlier and later in the nineteenth century, rather baldly emphasized matters of price. On the cover one reads, "\$10 per hundred, 12½cts. single." For so small a collection these prices were ambitious. One may, of course, appeal to Sankey's example, it having been his policy to turn back the profits of his collections into the work of evangelism itself. But it will still be conceded at once by anyone familiar with the history of such publishing houses as Biglow and Main and the John Church Company, that gospel hymnbooks have ever been money-makers, and have always more than "paid their own way."

To add, then, to the three lines of objections taken against such a revival collection as that of 1842 on purely musical grounds, these others might be listed: (1) the tendency of gospel hymns to spring up in gardens outside the church close; (2) their frequent success in ousting established church hymns; (3) the commercial odor often smelled in the copyright system and in sales for profit, it matters not whose profit.

III

These objections—and still others that might be taken—have undoubtedly turned some of our more prominent American hymnologists against so-called evangelistic song. A balanced viewpoint cannot, however, be reached until one rises above narrowly esthetic considerations and studies the achievements of such American gospel composers as Doane, Excell, Gabriel, Kirkpatrick, H. R. Palmer, Root, Sherwin, Sweney, and others of more recent date, from a sociological vantage point. If by folklore is meant such songs and sayings as have passed into the universal repertory, then, these composers have as surely contributed to our Protestant folklore as the composers of "Dixie," "Sweet Genevieve," "Darling Nelly Gray," "Carry me back to old Virginny," have been contributors to our national folklore.⁵ For it has been from the composers just named that we have received such songs as "I am Thine, O Lord," "Jesus, keep me near the cross," "More love to Thee, O Christ," "Pass me not, O gentle Saviour," "Rescue the perishing," "Safe in the arms of Jesus," "Saviour, more than life to me," "Tell me the old, old story,"⁶ or "Count your blessings,"⁷ or "Help somebody today," "O that will be glory," "Since Jesus came into my heart," and "The way of the cross leads home,"⁸ to name none other than hymns by the first three in the above list.

True, none of the composers just named is accorded even so much as a line in Dr. Leonard Ellinwood's erudite *The History of American Church Music*, published in 1953 by Morehouse-Gorham. But your gospel song apologist will offer in defense of the movement these well-known facts. Usage on sacred occasions redeems water and wine from a charge of commonness, and just as surely has the effect of redeeming tunes that in themselves may not appeal to the educated musician as intrinsically suited for church singing. If even "O sacred head now wounded" started

⁵ These were all written by composers whose names are preserved. Folkish they certainly have become. No ban can be placed on calling a song folkish, merely because it happens not to be anonymous.

⁶ Music by Doane.

⁷ Music by Excell.

⁸ Music by Gabriel.

its life as a secular song, then, animadversions against Richard Willis's tune for "It came upon a midnight clear," and George Webb's for "Stand up, stand up for Jesus," solely on the grounds that one was originally a piano piece and the other written for secular words, must be classed as captious. During even the "great ages of faith" composers from Machaut to Palestrina failed to make any very clear distinctions between the style of their masses and of their secular music. But, on the other hand, in even the most dogmatic of centuries—the sixteenth—sacred music destined for princes' chapels differed drastically from the gospel-type *laude spirituali* sung by hordes of common folk in the "Salvation Army" chapels founded by the Roman saint, Philip Neri.

It is often contended today that, since the God of the Ages is infinitely excellent, all music offered him in worship should also be as excellent as man's creative mind can devise. Following this same type of reasoning, one might also say that worshipers should always enter the House of God attired in their best clothes. But the best clothes for one parishioner will not necessarily match the best of another. It would be presumptuous to claim that one worshiper wearing a superb gown is more fitted to approach the Throne of Grace than another in faded denim, if that be the best he owns. Our accomplishments in the field of serious music should not betray us into supposing that, because we always wear musical mink coats, therefore we owe an obligation to drape every pewholder's back in musical ermine as well. If worship is to be a truly corporate experience we may with Christian charity sometimes be content to wear even sackcloth, if overalls are the Sunday best of our fellow parishioners.

Many of the gospel hymn composers were the veriest amateurs. Sankey was a bank clerk, Excell a bricklayer. They knew, however, the accents which the average man understands. We who are interested not only in the future of music but also in that of religion may do well to thank the creators of "I need Thee every hour," "Saviour, Thy dying love," "Shall we gather at the river," "Marching to Zion," "Up from the grave He arose,"¹⁰ or "It is well with my soul," "Hallelujah, what a Saviour," "Almost persuaded," "Let the lower lights be burning,"¹¹ or "There shall be showers of blessings," "That will be heaven for me,"¹¹ or "Jesus is calling," "There is a green hill far away," "Take time to be holy," "True-hearted, whole-hearted."¹² The list could be ten times extended. These

¹⁰ Music by Bliss.

¹¹ Music by McGranahan.

¹² Music by Stebbins.

songs have in part contributed to making America the one country in which the majority of the population adheres to a church on a purely voluntary basis. As long as numbers count and as long as a growing membership list is desired, such songs will in all probability continue to play an important role—not only in evangelistic campaigns, but in the normal church life of our more energetically evangelistic denominations.

In the meantime certain signs are appearing which presage a more balanced understanding of the gospel song movement. Drs. Carleton Sprague Smith and Charles Hughes are preparing an *American Hymnbook* for publication by the University of Chicago Press, which will contain approximately 500 hymns composed between 1750 and the present. A goodly number of these will be of the gospel hymn variety, and will illustrate the historical importance of this strain in American musical history. On the practical side, Seth Bingham has published in his *36 Hymn and Carol Canons* (1952) canonic settings of "Just as I am," "He leadeth me," "I love to tell the story," and "Jesus loves me," which lift these tunes far above the level of the commonplace. When musicologists and composers of eminence have given the movement their attention, it has been found that individual hymns of the evangelistic type are at least as worthy as any other manifestations of American folk art.

"Something For Your Comfort"

HOWARD G. HAGEMAN

THREE SIGNIFICANT BOOKS came out last year in connection with the racial problems of The Union of South Africa: *Naught For Your Comfort*, by Trevor Huddleston,¹ published in this country; *You Are Wrong Father Huddleston*, by Alexander Steward,² published in England; and *Whither South Africa?*,³ by B. B. Keet, published in South Africa.

After long years of living in a remote and virtually unknown corner of the world, South Africans have suddenly found themselves in the limelight. The number of books about that country in recent years is astounding, most of them written by visitors to the country after a brief tour and therefore of rather questionable value. Most visitors have a way of seeing what they want to see, with the result that South Africans are a little weary of being used as a sounding board for the prejudices of tourists from all over the world.

That criticism cannot be brought against any of these three books. The three authors have all had wide experience in South Africa. Father Huddleston, though a native of Great Britain, spent more than eleven years in South Africa as an Anglican priest in Sophiatown, one of the slum areas of the great city of Johannesburg. Mr. Steward now lives in England, but was raised in South Africa and served for some years as a reporter on one of the great English dailies in Johannesburg. Dr. Keet, the revered Professor of Theology in the Dutch Reformed Seminary in Stellenbosch, represents the Afrikaans section of the population, a native South African and the last surviving member of the Commission which first translated the Bible into Afrikaans.

These brief sketches of the three authors invite two further comments. The first is that the very nature of these books is proof that the struggle

¹ New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956, 253 pp., \$3.75.

² London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1956, 111 pp., 12/6.

³ Stellenbosch and Grahamstown, South Africa: University Publishers and Booksellers, 1956, 96 pp., 5s.

HOWARD G. HAGEMAN, B.D.,D.D., is Minister of the North Reformed Church, Newark, New Jersey. In 1956 he spent two months in the Union of South Africa under the Leadership Exchange Program of the United States Department of State. His mission took him on a trip of 3,000 miles through three of the four provinces of the Union and brought him into contact with church leaders of all denominations.

in South Africa is not, as so often suggested, one between the English and the Afrikaner point of view. Fr. Huddleston and Mr. Steward both represent the English section of South Africa, but they are on quite opposite sides of the race question. Dr. Keet, an Afrikaner, is in many ways much closer to Fr. Huddleston. That should be a warning that the whole situation in South Africa is a complicated one which cannot always be fitted into our preconceived pattern.

A second comment would be that, even though these three authors have all had wide experience in South African affairs, each one inevitably exhibits his limited point of view. Fr. Huddleston writes from the anguished pastoral experience in one small spot; he sees the microcosm with devastating and passionate clarity, but his vision of the whole picture of South Africa tends to be badly blurred. Mr. Steward, who as a reporter covered the crime-and-court beat, is much more detached in his writing; his interest in the human factor is much weaker than Fr. Huddleston's. Dr. Keet writes as a native of the Cape Province, where the tradition differs greatly from that in Johannesburg, and where the problem centers in the Cape Coloreds rather than in the Bantus as in the north. This comment is not made with the intention of criticising any or all of these books, but simply to remind the reader that none of them is a definitive work on the racial question in South Africa.

It is perhaps unfortunate that Fr. Huddleston's book has been highly touted in this regard. As a study in the racial problems in South Africa it is almost useless. The author admits in his first chapter that he will try to avoid that "most common and persistent error in all such assessments—the attempt to be impartial." It can honestly be said that he has lived up to his promise. The difficulty is that a great many people buy the book, read it, and then think they understand the South African problem, when in fact they probably understand less than if they had not read it at all. Its picture of conditions in Sophiatown is utterly misleading; the impression it leaves about African ownership in the area is a false one; its strictures against the Dutch Reformed Church are almost humorous, coming from a narrow Anglo-Catholic who never once in eleven years spoke with a Dutch Reformed Church leader in the area in which he was working and, theologically, refuses to recognize it as a church.

So one could continue with his criticisms, if *Naught For Your Comfort* is meant to be taken as sociological discussion of the South African problem. I do not think that Fr. Huddleston meant it to be that, whatever his publishers have done with it. If it be read as a piece of prophecy

instead of a work in sociology, then it makes sense. The Sophiatown priest is somewhat like the prophet Amos. Doubtless Amos' picture of life in Bethel was distorted, partial, and prejudiced. But it spoke mightily all the same when judged on its own terms. *Naught for Your Comfort* is prophecy, a hot and passionate protest against man's inhumanity to man, even to its serious if somewhat silly plea for the expulsion of South Africa from the British Commonwealth of Nations. The man has no grasp of the complexities of the problem, no understanding of the Afrikaner mind and its aspirations, no balanced view of the program which the government is undertaking. But he does have a tremendous hold on simple, elemental justice. And it is that that gives the book its power. The author happens to be describing events in Johannesburg. They might just as well be in New York or Chicago, or Mississippi. Anyone writing from the same situation of degradation in our country could write a book equally bitter, equally true, and equally false.

In his reply *You Are Wrong Father Huddleston*, Mr. Steward (who must have written his book in a remarkably short time, though, he claims, without any official prompting) has chosen to interpret Fr. Huddleston, not as a prophet, but as a sociologist. That is to say, he chooses to grapple not with the burning issue of injustice and inhumanity, but with numerous side issues of fact. And since Fr. Huddleston's facts are not always accurate or, by sins of commission or omission, are badly slanted, Mr. Steward has a fairly easy time of it.

Thus, for example, Mr. Steward can and does dwell at some length on all kinds of things which Fr. Huddleston forgot to mention, the educational program, the slum clearance, the health measures undertaken by the present government. He can and does cite numerous instances in which black and white dwell together in amity. He can and does, out of his evidently wider experience with the Bantu peoples, take a much broader view of their problems and situation than Fr. Huddleston who knows only a small segment of the detribalized natives who lived in Sophiatown. In this way Mr. Steward can draw up a very impressive list of counts on which he claims that Fr. Huddleston is wrong. And if two months in the country entitle one to an opinion, I have to say that in these respects Mr. Steward is perfectly right. In more ways than can be told, Fr. Huddleston is wrong.

But I put down the two books with an uncomfortable feeling that the two men are talking about completely different things, that in a strange way both men are wrong, just as both men are right. And it is

just this kind of confusion that makes South Africa so difficult a country. I had the feeling (and these two books confirm it) that many right things are being done for essentially wrong reasons. Mr. Steward's list of things that are being done is impressive and needs to be read to correct many false impressions left by various reporters, not least by Fr. Huddleston. But Fr. Huddleston's passionate outcry against the injustice and suffering which befall individual natives is left unanswered by Mr. Steward's treatment.

It is a shame that Fr. Huddleston's wrath against present policies in South Africa, much of which is certainly justified, should have led him into the awkward position of seeming to defend such things as the slums of Sophiatown. From every humanitarian point of view the Bantu is better off in Meadowlands, the new development to which he is being moved as Sophiatown is being destroyed (the destruction will still take some time to complete.) Fr. Huddleston even grudgingly admits (p. 191) that the Bantu is better off in his new home. His own attitude toward Sophiatown is clearly influenced by the feeling which he has for it as the place where he spent eleven creative years. Thus on p. 121 he writes, "In that sense Sophiatown is not and never has been a slum. There are no tenements; there is nothing really old; there are no dark cellars." (But where in a young country like South Africa is there anything really old? Where in South Africa are there any tenements? And above all, where in South Africa are there any cellars, light or dark?) But on p. 190 he writes, "Sophiatown *was* a slum. Those of us who have lived there would never wish to deny that."

Such ambiguous attitudes are pretty clear indication of Fr. Huddleston's emotional involvement. And, of course, that involvement makes him an easy target for the shafts of Mr. Steward, who can coolly marshal all kinds of statistics about Sophiatown and Meadowlands and their respective situations. But once again, it is not that one man is right and the other is wrong. They are writing about two different things. Fr. Huddleston is writing pastorally; Mr. Steward is writing sociologically. Fr. Huddleston is writing about the intense personal feelings of a relatively small group of people who were forced to leave their homes. The fact that the new homes to which they were moved were a great improvement is not quite the point. Mr. Steward is writing about the sociological betterment of a group of people in his whose personal feelings he has little interest.

Such a difference in interest, to be sure, points up one of the great

problems in South Africa today. Many large-scale projects for the welfare of the native are under way; many more, certainly, than at any other time in the history of the country. They have been carefully conceived; they are being skillfully executed. The best minds in the country have been put to work on these schemes and there is nothing slipshod or half-hearted about the way in which they are carrying out their assignments. South Africans have a right to be irritated at the way in which the world generally ignores or misinterprets their very solid accomplishments in the realm of education, health, slum clearance, etc. Even "apartheid" itself finds many enthusiastic supporters in South Africa among the theoretical class, as the measure best suited to insulate the primitive native from the dangers and complexities of European civilization until his cultural deficiencies have been supplied.

The blueprint for all this (which should certainly be assigned reading for anyone interested in South Africa) is the report of the Tomlinson Commission "for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South Africa." It outlines a program for the next fifty years in impressive and thoughtful detail. Professor Tomlinson, the Commission chairman, is Professor of Economics in the University of Pretoria, and his commission was composed of similar leaders from other fields. Whether the government chooses to follow the report in detail or not, it will certainly have a vast bearing on the future of South African policy.

But neither Mr. Steward's book nor the Tomlinson report take any account of the basic fact with which Fr. Huddleston is dealing. The Bantu peoples in South Africa are not a vast statistic; they are human beings with feelings, reactions, aspirations just as great as those of the Europeans. They are not an inert mass on which the European expert can go to work for the next fifty years. His program may be the finest in the world. But unless the Bantu feels that it is also *his* program in which he is sharing, at those levels at which it is possible, it is doomed to ultimate failure. For history, as truly in South Africa as anywhere else, will not stand still for fifty years while the cultural and economic patterns of the country are rearranged by a group of experts, no matter how high-minded or well-meaning.

If one can penetrate beneath all the shrill hysteria and unfair innuendo of *Naught For Your Comfort*, that is its important meaning and inescapable truth. In lurid shades, Fr. Huddleston is reminding South Africa that planning for the Bantu is quite different from planning *with* him. Even that, of course, can be an over-simplification; for the defender of present

policies can easily retort that at the present moment the Bantu is too far down on the cultural scale to be an effective partner in planning for his own future. To which I can only reply that, while statistically that is true, it will be less true with every passing month. And the important thing is not the extent of the partnership, but the beginning of it. The important thing is not destination but direction. And of that, unfortunately, I see very little sign. I am forced to say with Mr. Steward on all kinds of technical counts, "You are wrong, Father Huddleston." But on the all-important count of treating the Bantu as a fellow-South African instead of a sociological problem, I am forced to say with Fr. Huddleston (though I desperately wish he had said it with less venom and passion and more Christian charity), "You are wrong, Mr. Steward."

But this matter of beginning and direction leads to a consideration of the third book in our trio, Dr. Keet's *Whither South Africa?* Though it is a slight book, it is perhaps the most important of the three. First of all, it is, as the author states, a book in which he writes as an Afrikaans-speaking Afrikaner to his fellow Afrikaners. But, more importantly, it is a book which, brief as it is, goes behind any question of detail to a consideration of the Christian principles involved.

This is not Dr. Keet's first venture into the field. Years ago, as a biblical scholar, he denied the soundness of that popular exegesis which sought to base the Bantu's inferiority on the curse of Ham, an exegesis which, incidentally, is never used today in Dutch Reformed circles. But in more recent years, especially at one of the conferences on race relations, Dr. Keet outlined the position which in *Whither South Africa?* he takes up in detail. I know something from first-hand experience of the impact which this book, first published in Afrikaans, has had upon the thinking of the Dutch Reformed Church. For that reason I consider it one of the really significant publications in South Africa's recent history.

The most significant chapter is the sixth, entitled, "Where Are We Going?" Dr. Keet begins the chapter with the general observation that "one of the most dangerous phenomena in human thought is the tendency to abstract" (p. 74). Especially dangerous is such a tendency when carried into the field of human relationships which "are not static, but are constantly changing for better or for worse" (p. 75). The one thing which a situation such as that in South Africa requires is that men make sure that they are going in the right direction.

That is perhaps the heart of Dr. Keet's message. With the details of planning, the accomplishments or lack of them, he has no concern. Nor

is he concerned with the artificial dilemma that South Africa's only choice is between total integration and total apartheid. He is concerned with direction, and the implication of his book is that, despite certain undeniable achievements, South Africa's direction has been wrong. At the end of the book he indicates the three essential requirements for a right direction, none of which has been observed up to this point. 1. Race relations must be lifted out of party politics. 2. All groups within multi-racial South Africa must have a share in planning for the future of their country. 3. The tendency to make of each racial group in the country a power bloc, the first aim of which is to safeguard its own interests, must be abandoned for "joint deliberation in the interests of the whole" (p. 95).

It can be objected, of course, that Dr. Keet's little book is an extremely theoretical one and provides no blueprint for the future of the country. But such an objection misses two significant points. It misses the obvious point that Dr. Keet believes that blueprints at this stage of development are rather dangerous, that, in fact, South Africa suffers at the moment from too many blueprints! It misses the more subtle point that the Afrikaner mind, for which Dr. Keet is writing, is still theologically and biblically oriented. If new directions can be opened from these points, they are more likely to be followed in South Africa than directions opened from mere humanitarian or democratic considerations.

And it ought to be said that Dr. Keet's book has not fallen on deaf ears, so far as his own Church is concerned. To be sure, it has been hotly debated and warmly attacked. That was to be expected. But anyone who reads the statement on race relations published by the Dutch Reformed Church in April, 1956, will see that the point of Dr. Keet's book, which represents a long-settled and known conviction, has not been entirely wasted. And in the swiftly-moving pattern of events in the Union of South Africa, certain legislation now contemplated could easily force the Dutch Reformed Church to a position where its witness must be still more sharply defined.

I should say that, despite their unequal value, all three of these books must be read by the person who wants to grasp all of the factors involved in the South African situation. None of them offers a solution. But perhaps, though they offer many temptations to despair, they do offer something for comfort.

Book Reviews

The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Volume I. Faith, Trinity, Incarnation. By HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956. xxviii-635 pp. \$10.00.

The new book of Dr. Wolfson is a welcome contribution to the study of Christian antiquity and of the history of Christian thought. The strength of Dr. Wolfson is in his skillful analysis and his comprehensive erudition. He has a perfect command of the primary sources, and handles them with competence and discretion.

His present book is but a part of his ambitious project to survey the history of philosophy from Philo to Spinoza. His study of the Fathers is a continuation of his previous study of Philo, and his first objective was, as he says, to trace "the development of Philonic problems into Patristic problems" (vii). The main problem of Philo was that of the relationship between the truth of the Bible and the Greek philosophy. The same problem stood before the Christian writers. In their theological exegesis of the Scripture they were deeply influenced by Philo. On the other hand, there was the problem of relationship between "faith and reason," or between Revelation and Philosophy.

Now, it has been variously suggested that in the formation of the Christian doctrine "philosophy" did actually override the Revelation, although it has at the same time been treated as just a "handmaiden of Scripture" or as an *ancilla theologiae*. The Catholic dogma has been more than once represented as a product of an "acute Hellenization" of the original "Semitic" faith. In our own days, not a few would plead consequently for "de-Hellenization" of Christianity, for a return to the original *veritas hebraica*. From this point of view, a careful restudy of the "Christian origins" is called for.

The task is arduous and involved. The sources themselves are sufficiently difficult and obscure. In addition, the access to the sources is seriously handicapped by the dissent between the interpreters and constant fluctuations of scholarly fashions. Desirable as a fresh and "unbiased" approach to the sources obviously is, no student should claim his absolute freedom from all prejudices and presuppositions. Nor is such a "freedom" really desirable. Indifference to the issues involved is also a bias, and not the most helpful one.

Obviously Dr. Wolfson has his own bias; this is quite natural and should not be imputed to him. In any case, he is biased already by his preoccupation with the "Philonic problems." It seems that very often he overlooks the other, distinctively Christian problems in the philosophy of the Church Fathers. In fact, he discusses in his book Christian doctrines, and not "the philosophy" of the Fathers. Indeed, are "faith, trinity, incarnation" *philosophical topics*? Are they not rather *theological*? Not only those who are committed to the rigid, "Thomistic" discrimination between theology and philosophy would contend that these two areas of study are basically different. If we ignore this difference, many distinctive features of both fields will inevitably escape our attention.

The main distinctive mark of theology is in its constant appeal to Revelation, to

faith and experience. Early Christian writers, beginning with St. Paul, were not primarily philosophers, but rather prophets and preachers. They were not primarily concerned with systems, but with the "message," the *kerygma*, which they were inwardly moved and urged to proclaim and to announce. Only in the light of this crucial "message" can their "speculations" be adequately assessed and properly understood. This kerygmatic source and background of Christian philosophy is almost fully ignored in Dr. Wolfson's exposition. Accordingly, he cannot properly focus the Christian endeavor. The starting point of the Christian writers was a *new religious experience*, a *new vision or intuition*, "*the vision of faith*," and it was in the perspective of this new vision that they read and interpreted Scripture and thought about God and the world.

No student of Christian philosophy can evade this preliminary query: Was "the philosophy of the Christians" actually a "Christian philosophy," and what was distinctively Christian in it? It is not an idle or rhetorical question. The very existence of Christian philosophy has been recently questioned and even bluntly denied. Curiously enough, this negative conclusion has been arrived at from very different points of view. Certain historians of philosophy, such as e.g. Emile Bréhier, contended that Christianity had no "rational" substance, and therefore could not contribute anything to the philosophical research. On the other hand, it has been argued by certain prominent French Thomists that Christianity, in fact, had no impact whatever on the development of philosophical ideas. In the sharp phrase of Père Mandonnet, "Christianity has indeed transformed the world, but it did not change philosophy." Again, from the Calvinist side, it has been urged that Christians behave in philosophy as "the old man," and consequently philosophy can never be "Christian" (Roger Mehl).

Of course, Dr. Wolfson had a perfect right to dispense with all these questions. But the reader of his book cannot fail to be curious to know what was actually the status of that "Philosophy of the Fathers" which Dr. Wolfson endeavors to expound. In fact, our *historical interpretation* closely depends upon our option precisely at this point. Is "Christian philosophy" just an illegitimate confusion of faith and reason, in which both components are twisted and distorted? or is it a fortunate cross-fertilization of faith and reason, out of which certain lasting values have emerged?

It is profitable to compare the book of Dr. Wolfson with the recent contribution by Professor Étienne Gilson, formerly of the Sorbonne and Collège de France, and now at the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto: *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (Random House, 1955). The main concern of Gilson is to discover whether there was anything *philosophically new* in the thought of the Fathers and of the later Christian thinkers in the Middle Ages. He leaves out the purely theological issues. He comes to the conclusion that the Christian "universe of discourse" differed radically, at a number of points, from that of the Greek philosophers, and this difference was due to the new perspective in which all things and all problems were apprehended and faced. The most radical change was brought about by the discovery of the "contingency of creation." The new *philosophical category* has been accordingly introduced, the concept of "creature."

Now, the problem of creation was the main *philosophical problem* in the doctrinal or theological disputes of the fourth century, the main philosophical issue between the Arians and the Nicene trinitarian Orthodoxy of the Fathers. In his interesting analysis of "the Mystery of the Trinity" (pp. 305-363) Dr. Wolfson avoids this problem. But this was the *philosophical core* of the whole controversy. Was the concept of God

primarily a *cosmological* concept, as it seemed to be in the Hellenic philosophy, Philo included, or did this concept have its own independent content? "Philonic problems" were superseded at this point by new, properly Christian "patristic problems."

Again, Dr. Nathaniel Micklem has aptly suggested that the thought of St. Athanasius could be properly assessed only in the context of the liturgical experience of the Church; only, as he put it, in the context of the Eucharistic *Anaphora* of Sarapion of Thmuis. That is to say, the thought of Athanasius was not "purely philosophical" but was existentially inspired and guided by his religious insight. The same is true, of course, also of the whole doctrine of the Incarnation. It was not an autonomous intellectual speculation, but an intellectual assessment and interpretation of the new experience, of the living encounter with the Lord Jesus. "The Philosophy of the Church Fathers" was not just a continuous development of the inherited tasks and trends. Between the Greeks, including Philo, and the Fathers stands "the Christ event."

Dr. Wolfson did not solve the problems with which he wrestled. And obviously he would not claim that he did. In any case, he has greatly contributed to their clarification and restatement. His contribution is mainly philosophical. But theologians also should be grateful to him. In his book he has admirably demonstrated the immense philosophical vigor and richness of the legacy of the Church Fathers.

THE VERY REV. GEORGES FLOROVSKY

Lecturer on Eastern Church History, Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Early Christian Fathers. A Selection from the Writings of the Fathers from St. Clement of Rome to St. Athanasius. Edited and translated by HENRY BETTENSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. vii-424 pp. \$4.00.

Mr. Bettenson's anthology, *Documents of the Christian Church*, first published in Oxford's "The World's Classics" in 1943, has been an indispensable ready-refer- ence to the principal sources of the Church's official statements of faith and polity. The present volume, though more limited in scope, will quickly prove to be equally popular and useful, with a minimum of material overlapping the earlier collection. His new work contains salient selections from I Clement, Ignatius, the Didache, the Epistle to Diognetus, Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Cyprian, and Athanasius. The translations are all his own, thus giving a unity of style to the entire anthology. No work is translated in entirety; and the selections of each Father, with the exception of Ignatius, are arranged topically by subject matter rather than in the order in which the material occurs in the original writings. The table of contents thus serves as a convenient major concordance to the book, no less than the index.

The collection has a greater unity of subject matter, not to say a more scholarly annotation, than Miss Anne Fremantle's *A Treasury of Early Christianity* (Viking Press, 1953). The material gathered here is almost entirely theological. One can trace in it the developing doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, the Church, Ministry, and Sacraments, and compare the divergent positions and emphases of the Fathers who were chiefly responsible for the laying of foundations of orthodox Catholic theology down to the creed-making era that began with the Council of Nicaea. Hence the inclusion of selections from Athanasius rounds off a period of basic theological formulation. None of the key passages are overlooked. One can only admire Mr. Bettenson's ability to comprehend so much in a single volume. The

format is comparable to the Galaxy edition of his *Documents* volume; it can be carried in a large pocket.

The introduction to the writings is put together in a smooth-flowing essay of 37 pages, which is itself a masterful summary of the theological development of the Ante-Nicene period. (A couple of slips were noted on p. 36: Athanasius had five, not four, periods of exile; the Council of 381 met at Constantinople, not at Ephesus.) The texts used are the standard ones of Lightfoot for the Apostolic Fathers, Harvey for Irenaeus, the Berlin and Vienna editions, supplemented from Migne, for the other Fathers. The layman may at times find the technical vocabulary hard going; but a little effort will be immensely rewarding.

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

Professor of Church History, Church Divinity School of the Pacific, Berkeley, California.

God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism. By ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1955. 437 pp. \$5.00.

This is a book about Judaism, by a Jew and for Jews. It is one of those rare publications which successfully combines vast learning, urgent commitment, and immediate relevance.

Although it is almost exclusively concerned with a philosophy of Judaism, it is a book for Christians as well as Jews. Only as we have come to terms with the substance of this book can we know the source from which our own faith derives, as well as the way in which Christ has fulfilled without destroying *Torah*. It is also a book for philosophers. Here the philosopher encounters wisdom which, while refusing reason the last word on the issues of life and death, vigorously opposes all anti-rationalism.

The book is organized into three major divisions, which represent the means by which Judaism believes the living God may be known: God's presence in the phenomena of the material world, in the Bible, and in *mitsvot* (sacred deeds). Professor Heschel recognizes that the crucial need today is the rediscovery of those questions which are answered by biblical religion. Without the questions, answers are unavoidably sterile and irrelevant. Dr. Heschel does not look either to science or to rationalism for answers to ultimate questions.

Heschel distinguishes two major tasks of the study of religion: analysis of the act of believing and of the content of belief. His book is concerned primarily with the problems of faith rather than with the content of creed.

His discussion of the awareness of God in the world presupposes a sharp distinction between the several ways in which nature can be approached. Modern man is enamored of nature's power and the Greeks were enthusiastic for her beauty. Biblical man was impressed by the grandeur he sensed everywhere in the world. The implications of these attitudes are seen in the respective attitudes toward learning. Modern man's education aims at utility; the Greeks sought comprehension; biblical learning enhances reverence.

The interests, therefore, with which one approaches nature are determinative of what one finds there. It is the urgent question which determines the range of possible answers. Sublimity, wonder, mystery, and awe (the awareness that there is "something more" than we can apprehend empirically or explain rationally) are among the experiences possible to those who rightly seek God in his creation. Yet, in

this effort to seek God through the phenomena of the world, one must guard against the twin dangers of equating God with nature and of being satisfied with the mere awareness of "something more" in the orders of creation. Judaism insists that God's immanence is "accidental" to his transcendence. It also resists the temptation of religious estheticism by maintaining that the real problem is what one should *do* in response to the experience of the numinous.

The discussion of revelation concentrates upon Judaism's uniqueness as a religion of time. Over against Greco-Oriental contempt for time, Heschel places Jewish insistence that historical events are the points at which God meets men. In contrast with those who want to associate revelation with the continuities of process, Judaism insists upon unique events as the extraordinary occasions of revelation.

He discusses most of the questions which have been raised about the reliability of the prophetic claim that "God spoke." He admits the impossibility of proving prophecy. He also illuminates the serious difficulties involved in outright rejection of the prophets' claim. Concerning the issue of divine inspiration of Scripture—which he distinguishes sharply from the necessity of critical scholarship—he asserts that one must first accept the Bible in order to know it.

The third division of the book, "Response," introduces material less familiar to Christians, whose study of Judaism frequently ends with the intertestamental literature. This section also raises the most serious questions for the Christian reader. The issues concern the third phase of Israel's great discovery: that "the God of nature is the God of history, and the way to know Him is to do His will" (p. 31).

The fundamental religious question for the Jew is not the question of being but of doing. What does it mean, to do? By what right do we act at all? *Mitsvot*, sacred deeds, is the answer to these questions. The Jew is not satisfied with such knowledge of God as men may gain from nature and Scripture. The corollary of revelation, the completion of Israel's vocation, is *mitsvah*, wherein man acts in the likeness of God. Against the Pauline dichotomy of faith and works, and the Kantian distinction between motive and act, the Jew postulates the sacred deeds by which the indivisibility of life, the unity of being and deed, is affirmed.

Heschel is no mere legalist—he rejects the "religious behaviorism" of Spinoza and Moses Mendelssohn—nor is he unaware of the problem of sin which infects every *mitsvah* (cf. 361 ff.). But he assumes at least partial human ability to fulfill God's demands. "At the end of days, evil will be conquered by the One; in historic times, evils must be conquered one by one" (377). Imperfection in motive is not to be the cause of despair, however it may rightly be the occasion for contrition. The good deed, even if not done originally for its own sake, will eventually transform the doer into one who acts for God's sake. "The way to pure intention is paved with good deeds" (404).

There are major issues for Christians at stake in this book: e.g. his insistence that for the Jew to leave Judaism is "spiritual suicide" (424). There are for every reader minor problems, of which the innumerable subdivisions within each short chapter may be the most aggravating. But *God's Search for Man* is a major statement of a genuinely biblical Judaism. It seeks not mere reflection on its themes but attachment to the Living God, whose glory and grandeur are not absent from many of its pages.

DAVID J. MAITLAND

Chaplain and Assistant Professor of Religion, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.

Prophecy and Religion in Ancient China and Israel. By H. H. ROWLEY.
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. 154 pp. \$2.75.

Professor of Hebrew languages and literature at Britain's University of Manchester, H. H. Rowley here discusses the chief themes and emphases in the prophets, from Samuel and Elijah through Amos to Malachi. Dr. Rowley, in this most recent of his always scholarly and readable biblical studies, includes an examination of analogies between the concepts of the Hebrew prophets and those of several Chinese sages, chiefly Confucius, Mencius, and Mo Tzu.

Professor Rowley's acquaintance with texts from classical China is generally less well known than his work in Hebrew texts. The six lectures here gathered amply justify both his personal attention to Chinese texts, prior and subsequent to his own residence in China, and the wisdom of London's School of Oriental and African Studies in having invited him as a Jordan lecturer. Scrupulous in disclaiming a specialist's knowledge of the Chinese material, he is equally scrupulous in having mastered most of the pertinent contemporary scholarship in English, French, and German on basic texts selected for these lectures in comparative religion.

Professor Rowley carefully delimits his area of analogy. He examines his selected Hebrews and Chinese in their roles as consciously God-summoned advisers on problems of government policy and government reform, in terms of their attitudes toward the idea of a "golden age," and with regard to their concepts of the person of God and forms of worship. Unlike one or two modern apologists who have attempted to retranslate Confucius in the mask of a Hamiltonian Republican or Jeffersonian Democrat, Rowley recognizes Confucius' emphasis on monarchy. He recognizes also that even Mencius' acceptance of the right of revolution does not extend to so un-Confucian a premise as that God, as ruler of the universe, might be imagined as tolerating a society which failed to prescribe fixed orders of submission according to office, occupation, age, and sex. Rowley recognizes also that both Confucius and Mencius place excessive faith in the power of the benevolent ruler by mere existence to induce goodness, as by magic, in the whole population. Rowley observes also the unvarying emphasis on the managers of the state as sole thinkers for the rest of the people—whose presumed capacity amounts to no more than passive and unreflective obedience.

That Rowley's appraisal of Mo Tzu as a Chinese social reformer is less incisive than his survey of the views of Confucius and Mencius reflects, as Rowley himself would doubtless concede, the fact that he had accessible a lesser number of translations in which to compare versions of Mo Tzu's doctrines. Rowley's analogies between Mo Tzu's concerns for the whole human family, and his doctrine of universal love, and themes in the much earlier Isaiah had best be accepted, perhaps, with the following cautionary qualification. Rowley, like the few Chinese and English commentators on whom he depends, does not mention that Mo Tzu, in his semimilitary organization, not only assumed the theory of fixed orders of superiority and subordination but expected from his "world brotherhood" uncritical submission to Mo Tzu as supreme commander. In other words, Mo Tzu's doctrine is not as close to the theme of "servant of servants" as Rowley's analogy might seem to imply. Mo Tzu's authoritarian world brotherhood, not unlike some more recent versions, would be likely to "readjust" in early adolescence any incipient Jeremiahs or Isaiahs.

Rowley's concluding lectures on attitudes toward worship and on the concept of God are particularly careful to indicate that no prophet or "forthteller" should be

judged adversely for failing to perceive what he could not be expected to perceive in the context of his particular place and time. With this qualification Rowley indicates that several of the Hebrew prophets had the comparative advantage of critical encounter with already ancient and complex traditions, involving many ancient neighboring empires and many competing religions. Out of this heritage of criticism and countercriticism several of the prophets had already reached, in the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., a relationship to a God of love and mercy—inducing a liberating perception of dignity, irrespective of official status or fixed age-group, accessible to all adult human beings. In this connection Rowley adds, most pertinently, on his closing page, the reminder that the Hebrew prophets "did not rise out of nothing, but out of a background of religious heritage and tradition which the Chinese sages did not have."

Given Rowley's equipment in Hebrew studies and very considerable attention to Chinese classical texts, we might hope for a subsequent essay in which he may explore these prior differences in the earlier history of Israel and China. Such an essay might well reappraise the harvest of nearly five thousand years of earlier towns, kingdoms, and empires in the Near East, the long-transmitted and complex world experience winnowed in the wisdom of Jeremiah and Isaiah and, ultimately, by the Christ. In pertinent contrast, China, beyond the horizon of a neolithic and animist village world, had accumulated scarcely fifteen centuries of transmitted urban political and religious experience before the birth of Confucius.

This difference in cultural depth and complexity neither demeans nor exalts the pertinent insights of the early Chinese teachers. A further review of that difference, however, can remind us that, up through the time of Mo Tzu, China was still "young" in comparison with the Near Eastern world which supplied sources of reflection to the Hebrew prophets. Rowley's present lectures provide a relevant introduction to this next level of awareness: the recognition that a significant difference in depth of historical preparation helped condition the insights of the Hebrew prophets toward their "forthtelling" as to the stature of God and the destiny, the common fallibilities, and the potential common dignity of all human beings.

JEREMY INGALLS

Professor of English and Asiatic Studies, Rockford College, Rockford, Illinois.

He That Cometh. By SIGMUND MOWINCKEL. Translated by G. W. Anderson. New York: Abingdon Press, 1956. xvi-528 pp. \$6.50.

The subtitle of this volume reveals its subject: "The Messiah Concept in the Old Testament and Later Judaism." Published in Norwegian in 1951, this English translation is welcome indeed. The translator, lecturer in Old Testament at St. Mary's College, University of St. Andrew's, acquired his knowledge of Scandinavian languages while studying at Lund, Sweden.

The author of this book has long been acknowledged by Old Testament students as an outstanding biblical scholar. Especially well known among his many writings is his *Psalmstudien*. In this study of the Psalms, Mowinckel sets forth with great emphasis his conception of divine kingship and its ritual as he finds evidence of these in a number of the psalms. He accepts with caution the view of other Scandinavian scholars that the ritual pattern peculiar to this concept definitely influenced the writers of these psalms as well as other biblical authors.

He That Cometh surveys carefully and comprehensively all of the material in the

biblical text which relates to the idea of the Messiah. Intertestamental writings are also used in this study. Further, the ideas of the Servant and the Son of Man are examined in the light of available evidence. Mowinckel's outline includes the theme of the ideal kingship in Israel, the concept of the future hope, with particular reference to the prophetic views, the problem of the Servant of the Lord, the national Messiah, and the Son of Man. In the concluding part of his book the author examines the Messianic consciousness of Jesus on the basis of the Jewish concepts which were available to him. Extensive documentation, notes, and bibliography evince the scholarly competence of the writer.

An adequate review of such an impressive work as this is not possible here. It will suffice simply to raise certain questions which require attention, and then to give an evaluation of the entire volume. In spite of his occasional conservative use of Near Eastern cultic material, the author at times reveals that he has been influenced unduly by this. For example, he declares that the Israelite king is viewed officially as a divine being. "He is a god," Mowinckel asserts (p. 62). Can this view be squared with the idea of God and of man which the Old Testament so emphatically affirms, in which the transcendent power of the one is set over against the mortality and weakness of the other?

On the other hand, Mowinckel appropriately declares that the distinctive biblical ideas of election and covenant dominate Israel's use of concepts drawn from Near Eastern mythology. Due to this influence, to the renewal of nature Israel added the idea of the renewal of history, for Israel's faith centered in the covenant-promises of the God who acted in history and who controlled nature for his purposes. Exegesis of so-called Messianic passages in Isaiah shows how thoroughly our author is steeped in the atmosphere and thought of the Asiatic cult patterns. With respect to "The people who walked in darkness have seen a great light (Isa. 9:2)," it is said that here we have an idea derived from the myth of the sun god. We may ask whether the language here is simply that of poetic imagination rather than of mythology, though without rejecting the possibility of the latter.

Our author's view of the Immanuel passage (Isa. 7) is interesting but unacceptable to this reviewer. The author thinks that the prophet wishes to emphasize the birth and the name of the child, and properly rejects the view that this points to the birth of Jesus. He goes on to explain that the passage refers to a popular belief that a supernatural woman would bear a son whose appearance would be an omen of good fortune. The unusual food eaten by the child and the suggestion that for a time the child would be in danger are said to be parallel to several ancient myths.

However, this view fails to give sufficient weight to the possibility that Isaiah is referring to *any* young woman, and that the birth is less important than the time required for the child to learn how to distinguish between food and filth. The prophet is actually saying, "In a few years the enemies of Judah will be overthrown and dispersed." While the use of terms drawn from well-known mythologies is quite conceivable, rather obvious meanings related to the historical purpose of the prophet ought not thereby to be precluded. There is a difference between the origin of words and the use to which an author puts them.

Of interest to students of the prophets who have learned that words of hope were added to the original prophetic writings by later editors, is the suggestion made by Mowinckel that the combination of hope and doom constitutes a prophetic pattern which reflects a "typical eastern attitude to history." This pattern influenced the edi-

torial arrangement of the sayings of the prophets. We may ask whether there is not a psychological principle at work here, whereby the human mind, including that of the ancient biblical editor, alternates between despair and hope.

In his treatment of Second Isaiah the author consistently stresses the cult and the enthronement ritual as an important source of the prophet's language. We may again inquire whether the prophet may not have been influenced rather by the contemporary situation, by the nature and claims of the Babylonian culture which confronted him and his fellow exiles. His argument is shot through with allusions to this culture because his people are being seduced by it. This prophetic motivation explains the use of the ideas and language which are found in the sermons of this and of all the other great prophets. For this reason an empirical rather than a mythological explanation of the language used is desirable.

Of special interest to the reader is the discussion of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus. Our author asserts unequivocally that "Jesus came to be, not the Messiah, but the Son of Man." Jesus' use of the Messianic idea was influenced decidedly by the idea of the Son of Man. The latter idea Jesus used for his purposes in conjunction with an idea which had never before been related to it, namely the concept of the Servant of the Lord. In Jesus' thought the Son of Man, originally regarded as the pre-existent One, suffers and dies. Thus the Jewish idea of the Messiah is so transformed as to receive a wholly new meaning, a meaning that contains a paradox and reflects a tension in the soul of Jesus. He viewed himself as the exalted Son and at the same time as the lowly suffering Servant.

Here is a highly important volume, clearly and persuasively written, logically outlined, fully documented, and both critically and spiritually oriented. The preacher and the Bible student cannot adequately understand the meaning of Christ until he possesses the information which this book makes it possible for him to secure. He ought to read and study it before he preaches any more Advent sermons. The publishers are to be congratulated for making it available in English.

OTTO J. BAAB

Professor of Old Testament Interpretation, Garrett Biblical Institute, Northwestern University Campus, Evanston, Illinois.

The Gospel According to St. John: An Introduction With Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text. By C. K. BARRETT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955. xii-531 pp. \$10.00.

The New Testament Background: Selected Documents. By C. K. BARRETT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957. xxiv-276 pp. \$3.50.

Dr. C. Kingsley Barrett, a Methodist clergyman, has been Lecturer in Theology at the University of Durham since 1945. He established his position in the world of theological scholarship with the publication, in 1947, of *The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Tradition*. He edited the 1955 edition of the late W. F. Howard's *The Fourth Gospel in Recent Criticism and Interpretation* and has contributed articles to *The Journal of Theological Studies*. These two books will increase his reputation by their solid competence and will serve as indispensable aids for study. Each book fills a gap. There had been no full-scale commentary in English on the Greek text of John's Gospel since that of Bishop Bernard in 1928. In the field of New Testament Backgrounds there has been no comprehensive source book at all in English.

Barrett's commentary on John will be indispensable for years to come. His clarity and conciseness make the volume a joy to study (for example, see pp. 5-8, 101-4, 127-9). Though no good commentary can have a high percentage of strictly new material, Barrett has reworked the available information and added his own insights. While it is impossible to summarize a commentary, the views expressed in the Introduction indicate the commentator's general direction. According to Barrett the Gospel must be linked with the Apostle, though he was not its author. He offers the conjecture that three individuals, the Evangelist, the author of the Epistles, and the final editor of the Apocalypse, were all pupils of the Apostle—who may himself have written the earlier portions of the Apocalypse. The Gospel was probably written in Ephesus between A.D. 90 and 140. "John used the methods of Hellenistic-Jewish propaganda to transmit the, originally Semitic, content of primitive Christianity to the Greek world" (p. 107 f.).

Barrett rejects Mandaean influence. He also rejects theories of Aramaic translation, though recognizing that "in language as in thought John treads, perhaps not unconsciously, the boundary between the Hellenic and the Semitic" (p. 11). He views with skepticism the various theories of redaction, interpolation, and dislocation. While recognizing that the Evangelist used sources, notably Mark and probably Luke, he is unable to distinguish a "Discourse Source." However, he favors the suggestion that much of the material may have been shaped in sermons before being adapted to the Gospel pattern.

With respect to the crucial problem of history and theology in the Gospel, Barrett believes "that the actual history of Jesus is of paramount significance because in it the eternal God confronted man," but, "the mere historical data of the life of Jesus are trivial, apart from the faith, God-given, that he is the Word become flesh" (p. 4 f., cf. p. 44 f.). However, a reading of the commentary itself reveals that Barrett has little confidence in the historical value of John's independent material. The Evangelist, "perhaps the greatest theologian in all the history of the Church" (p. 114), has reworked the tradition in the light of the distinctive Christian experience and restated it in the terms of his Hellenistic world.

Unfortunately the above summary cannot reveal the wealth and brilliance of the commentary. It is superb.

The New Testament Background: Selected Documents will be immensely useful for anyone attempting to teach "Backgrounds." No two scholars would choose precisely the same passages for inclusion in an anthology, but Barrett has given a remarkably well-rounded picture of the available literary sources. Confronted with the decision whether to pick and arrange selections in relation to their direct bearing on New Testament or whether to give a more balanced and comprehensive picture of the first-century world, Barrett has made the latter choice. The material is classified in twelve chapters and an appendix according to subject (The Roman Empire, The Philosophers, The Hermetic Literature, Mystery Religions, Jewish History, Rabbinic Literature and Rabbinic Judaism, The Septuagint, Apocalyptic, Jewish Sectarian Documents), authors (Philo, Josephus), and materials (Papyri, Inscriptions). In an *Introduction* a brief statement is made about the material in each of the twelve chapters, and titles for more extended reading are indicated. In addition each chapter has a useful preliminary statement and there are notes on obscure passages.

Despite satisfaction in the existence of such a source book, the reader is reminded of the ultimate inadequacy of any such approach to the materials. It may be hoped

that these excerpts will tease students into a more extensive study of the original sources. If petty criticisms are in order it may be asked whether it would not have been useful to include the dates of authors such as Suetonius, Sulpicius, Severus, etc. Could not quotes from the Old Testament Apocrypha have been omitted? Or is it too much to assume that students possess a copy? Does Barrett mean to imply (p. 208) that the Septuagint translation did not begin until the second century B.C.? Or is this a typographical error?

Dr. Barrett deserves the gratitude of all students and teachers of the Fourth Gospel and of New Testament Backgrounds. In addition to scholarship he has a faculty for lively writing. For example: after commenting on the inadequacy of the evidence for John's martyrdom he comments ". . . in any case we cannot martyr the apostle for our convenience in handling critical problems." These books will be read as well as bought.

HARVEY K. MCARTHUR

Professor of New Testament, The Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Connecticut.

Introduction to New Testament Study. By DONALD T. ROWLINGSON. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956. xvii-246 pp. \$3.95.

Before any real understanding of the Christian faith can be formed, modern man must certainly make the acquaintance of the New Testament. It is an occasion for great expectation when a seasoned scholar arranges such a meeting. To this purpose Professor Rowlingson addresses himself in this little book. Selected problems are discussed in the light of a study procedure which he believes will open up the true richness of the New Testament for that vast public of clergy and laity which is scarcely aware of what scholarly research is all about, but which is concerned to discover the modern relevance of the message. Perhaps the author underestimates his public's preparation in his claim that these people have only the slightest inkling of scientific contributions to biblical study, including archeology. That may have been true B.Q. (Before Qumran), but hardly any longer! (Is it disdain for such popular enthusiasms that leads to the omission of any mention of the Scrolls? Mr. Wilson and Mr. Davies will surely chortle.)

It turns out that the method designed to discover "the living vitality of this marvelous collection" is an old familiar friend: historical criticism, which alone, it is soberly held, can help us see the real supremacy of Jesus, "the agent who makes God most real to men." The method with its component disciplines is effectively illustrated for the beginner by an application to the reading of Philemon. Nevertheless the procedure employed here and throughout the book takes little if any cognizance of contemporary reappraisals of the historical method, and virtually no attention is given to the new interest in biblical theology. We learn that a "religious sensitivity" is required beyond historical understanding of the text, but it is not clear that this seriously faces the New Testament claim that a transcendental encounter has occurred in the experience of Jesus and the early church, or asks what may be the permanent significance of this for the Christian community.

The historian, as historian, obviously can only *describe* the events which the New Testament interprets as a meeting with suprahistorical reality. Yet must we not ask whether the New Testament scholar, and certainly the readers, are not more than

historians, who as members of the community of faith must both heed and appraise the claim that a unique and final revelation of God has happened in this historical situation?

A detailed and helpful comparison between the Synoptic and the Johannine interpretations of Jesus is followed by an account of how the Gospel tradition was formulated. With the guidance of definite rules for biographical reconstruction, the surviving records are examined in search of the real earthly personality of Jesus, who is the sole criterion for distinguishing the value of the remaining New Testament books (p. 12). This literature is then briefly considered in terms of its chronological development down to A.D. 150. Critical problems are dealt with in line with the consensus of American liberal scholarship of the last fifty years. There is a helpful description of the formation of the canon, and some valuable charts of comparative literature of the New Testament period, a Pauline chronology, and a concluding annotated bibliography are appended.

While this reviewer is grateful for the expert way in which the author introduces the general reader to some of the important matters of New Testament study, he must record his disappointment that this book reflects so little of the live issues in biblical study today. We are told that much of Paul's theology is outmoded. Beyond his appreciation of Jesus' teaching about God and man and the ethical life, "almost everything else is irrelevant" (p. 127). In Bultmann's terms, this is not to demythologize Paul's thought; it is simply to discard it without explanation.

The historical Jesus behind this "Jesus Book" as the New Testament is frequently called, is the liberal Jesus of critical orthodoxy who is interpreted less in biblical categories than in rationalist terms of ideas and ideals and values. He is described as the "champion of ethical love," God's agent who "worked out a personal synthesis of ideas which was unique both in conception and expression" (p. 90). To be sure, the author flies no false colors; he reminds us that he is trying to present a point of view rather than to review opinions. Nevertheless the uninitiated reader might easily conclude that this is *the* rather than *a* conclusion of critical scholarship about Jesus in the Gospels. He may be a bit bewildered, though, to learn that the criterion of the "original Jesus" which is the *result* of critical investigations is at the same time the *presupposition* of historical study, enabling us to distinguish between Jesus' views about himself and those of his followers (p. 40).

The book deserves a place in the literature of New Testament study; but for a deeper understanding of the early church as a covenant community created by a saving act of God in history which is faithfully reported in this literature, we shall have to look elsewhere.

ERNEST W. SAUNDERS

Professor of New Testament Interpretation, Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois.

No Cross, No Crown. By WILLIAM J. WOLF. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1957. 216 pp. \$3.00.

Professor Wolf of Episcopal Theological School has given us the most useful and complete study of the doctrine of the Atonement available today. It is quietly and clearly written, carefully documented, and at a number of important points, lively and original.

The book has three parts. The first is a careful collection of the biblical material that underlies his subject. The New Testament, the author rightly says, provides the forms of language from which all subsequent doctrines of atonement spring. He studies carefully this language in the Synoptics, in Paul, and in Hebrews, and two points emerge from his study. First, he suggests that the idea of reconciliation, and the field of personal relationships, are likely to provide the most useful clues for our reconstruction of the meaning of the atoning work today. Secondly, he notes the value of the contribution of Vincent Taylor, Bishop Hicks, and others, in stressing the essential background of Old Testament sacrifice for an understanding of the New Testament. The author's analysis of the profundity and the danger of the sacrificial idea is one of the best parts of this first section.

The second section is historical, and it is even better than the first. Here the author is on his home ground, and he needs to rely less on other scholars in the field. He sets himself against any attempts to ride one metaphor too hard at the expense of the others, and he strongly pleads for no separation between the person and the work of Christ. One of the most telling criticisms yet made of Aulén's "classic" theory is precisely at this point, when Professor Wolf interestingly enough criticizes this view for a Nestorian separation of the divinity and the humanity of Christ, purchasing a doctrine of the atonement at the expense of an inadequate Christology. The author is pretty hard on Anselm, surprisingly so in view of his appreciation of the sacrificial motif in his biblical section. And he probably can be disagreed with in his affirmation that Anselm tries to derive his theory of the atonement from rational necessity. Both in *Prosligion* and in *Cur Deus Homo?* Anselm is more a churchman and an apologist than a rational philosopher of religion.

The most interesting and original section of the author's historical study is his strong plea for a serious revaluation of the Greek view of salvation as deification. This rediscovery of Athanasius is very well done, and is a most useful corrective to Aulén's rejection of this tradition. Luther would have been a useful ally for the author's insistence on the unity of the person and work of Christ, but he is not dealt with. Calvin's doctrine of the threefold office of Christ, however, is admirably described. All in all, this historical section is brilliantly done, and if we had only this, we would have enough to be grateful for.

The final section of contemporary restatement is in the form of a study of Christ's redemption of the past (redemption from guilt), of the present (justification), and of the future (sanctification). Here the preacher of the Cross will find a superb description of the way in which the atoning work of God in Christ actually affects the lives of men. The Church as the atoning community, and the Lord's Supper as the central witness to the atoning event, are vividly described.

The reviewer has noted some disagreements with the author. (1) In spite of a number of perfunctory references to the need for keeping the Cross and the Resurrection together (and this need is surely implied in the title of the book), there is no satisfactory description of the resurrection of Christ as part of the atoning work. Had Professor Wolf followed through on his suggestive reinterpretation of Athanasius, this omission would not have been allowed to stand. The author's belief (p. 196) that suffering must be directly ascribed to God indicates that the victory and joy of the resurrection has not fully played the part that it could.

(2) It is too bad that the author is influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr's view of the Reformation as deficient in an understanding of sanctification. A look at Calvin's

description of the Christian life would have qualified this judgment. Here is an analysis of holiness and the new creation far more suggestive than the Catholic tradition which the author feels obliged to commend.

(3) The author has some bold and sensible things to say about the Church as a continuation of the atonement and about the Lord's Supper as a continuing witness to it. But on p. 130 he has so identified atonement with the crucifixion, that his remarks on the Church and sacraments seem merely advice to remember a past event. Here perhaps he is not sufficiently "Catholic," and some use of the eternal atonement as a fact about God from the beginning, and as a fact about him now, would have enabled him to bring the atoning work into the life of the Church in a clearer way. Here it is possible to learn even more from Canon Masure's work on the relation of the cross to the Church.

The thing that delights this reviewer more than anything else is the excitement the author conveys about the richness of the Church's tradition as a source for interpretation of the New Testament message. Here is biblical, and above all, historical theology, put to reverent and effective work in enabling the Church to understand and to act out the meaning of the death and resurrection of its Lord. This is a book that will be with us for a long time.

WILLIAM HAMILTON

Assistant Professor of Theology, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, Rochester, New York.

The Moment Before God: An Interpretation of Kierkegaard. By MARTIN J. HEINECKEN. Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956. xiii-386 pp. \$5.95.

For many persons this volume will be an interesting introduction to the work of Søren Kierkegaard. Actually this is not the sole purpose of Dr. Heinecken. Rather he seeks through the manifold nuances of the gloomy Dane's reflections to bear witness to the truth of the everlasting gospel, or in other words, to declare what it means to become and to be a Christian.

All this is based on the conviction of the author that SK possessed an incomparable insight into the truth of genuine Christianity. For if Hegelianism by its dialectics had blurred the truth of the gospel, the prophetic skill of SK put it back into proper focus. SK made no pretence to be a system-builder of any philosophy but in the best sense of the word was a preacher of many gifts, who sought to make evident the situation of man conscious of his existence as a sinner and at the same time confronted by the righteous God who constantly demands purity of heart and life.

As an earnest reader turns the pages of *The Moment Before God*, following carefully its unique message, it may seem to him that before the time of SK few men and women really understood the gospel! Maybe the apostles did, like Peter, James, and John in the days following Pentecost, certainly Paul, probably Augustine but not Aquinas, undoubtedly Luther, and possibly Barth, though here he is designated disparagingly as an extremist. Finally, when the fullness of God's time had again come, providentially the work of SK began. For him truth was subjectivity, which meant that man did not stand in a corner on one leg discussing the so-called ancient proofs for God's existence but encountered him in obedience, submission and faith.

Ultimately SK's theology centers in the doctrine of the incarnation; yet this means no mere acquaintance with a historical person whose example might inspire

emulation. That might give the actual eyewitness of a carpenter from Galilee a peculiar advantage and to us a disadvantage, were it not that faith makes us contemporaneous with the very Jesus Christ at any time and at any place where the gospel is proclaimed and the sacraments are administered. Thus one never becomes a Christian through philosophical insight or even by the most rigorous adherence to certain principles of righteous conduct. Rather it takes place when God through Christ communicates himself to man and thus man accepts this communication unconditionally. Then man becomes involved in an incomparable event, God walking upon the earth and entering into the homes of sinners and taking into his own suffering heart the sins of the world.

At this place, there is a temptation to list the various topics treated to indicate the riches of this volume. The duty of the reviewer, however, seems to lie rather in indicating how well the author has achieved his self-appointed task. Dr. Heinecken is well aware of his great responsibility, and with SK's seriousness goes about fulfilling it.

Like the genial professor that he is, Dr. Heinecken presents this interpretation of Christianity by laying a good foundation, removing erroneous notions and substantiating certain philosophical ideas which he deems necessary to understand this point of view. For instance, he seeks to clarify the difference between synthetic and analytical propositions; then lest his readers err by a mistaken confidence in reason he shows its insufficiency in solving, for example, the old paradoxes of Zeno in regard to motion. At times, Professor Heinecken seems embarrassed by two major foci of his reflections. According to SK and the clear testimony of the New Testament, the simple-minded are not excluded from receiving the promises of the gospel, and the wise are included only through the crucifixion of the understanding. On the other hand, SK's philosophy, with its profound probing even to the depths of despair which is at the basis of this interpretation of Christianity, is no less difficult and erudite than Hegelianism, the proper understanding of which dares not demand to any degree the repudiation of reason. Any easy depreciation of this difficulty would hardly be convincing.

Certain minor criticisms we dare not pass over even in this brief review. In the first place, the book has not been provided with an index, though the publisher might have felt that for a book costing a trifle less than six dollars this would be an unwarranted luxury. Then, too, the author more frequently than occasionally uses a German term to indicate, seemingly, the inadequacy of what might be its English equivalent. This work is full of references and quotations with an appalling lack of documentation. Among these references and quotations are many clichés obvious to Lutherans but likely obscure to others, who would find it almost impossible to locate their sources.

Yet after all is said, the reviewer can only hope that this book will find its way into the hands of young readers of all Christian communions. Dr. Heinecken has made clear the demands which Christianity, as interpreted by SK, makes upon those who have heard the stern injunctions of God's law and with them the sweet promises of the eternal gospel.

BENJAMIN LOTZ

Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Susquehanna University,
Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania.

The Prayers of Kierkegaard. Edited by PERRY D. LEFEVRE. The University of Chicago Press, 1956. pp. ix-245. \$3.50.

Following within a year on T. H. Croxall's *Meditations From Kierkegaard*, Perry LeFevre has made a further contribution to devotional literature by assembling and publishing ninety-nine of Kierkegaard's prayers drawn from a variety of his works and especially from his as yet unpublished papers. The fresh translations from this latter source are most competently made and the whole collection forms a valuable treasury in itself. But this little volume does not stop there. Added to it is an essay of a hundred pages interpreting the religious insight of Kierkegaard, which for quality would be hard to match in any of the Kierkegaard literature that has come to my attention.

Using the thesis that Kierkegaard's religious approach is for the purpose of intensifying the awareness in man of his basic instability on any other plane of existence than that of the abandonment to the grace of God as revealed in Jesus Christ, LeFevre interprets the three stages and even the philosophical attacks on Hegel as literary devices for compelling attention and inviting decision on the one thing needful. The objective of "wounding from behind" is taken to be the basis of the conscious cunning of this Danish hound of heaven, who like Pascal is a master of a spiritual jiu-jitsu that can make a laughingstock of the stolid postures of religious complacency.

The final chapter of this essay deals with Kierkegaard as a man of prayer and indicates that the dominant note of his prayers is the acute awareness of man's utter dependency upon the grace of God. Prayer is the principal tool of man's individuation, and is as vital to the continuance of the religious life as breathing is to the maintenance of physical existence. "If you don't breathe you die. If you don't pray, you die spiritually" (196).

Kierkegaard lived in the house of prayer that he commended to others. "It might almost be said that prayer was his existence medium through all of his adult life" (198). He also "devoted a definite time each day 'regularly and with monastic precision' to the reading of edifying books" (197).

Kierkegaard is careful never to suggest that prayer becomes easier as its practice becomes more familiar. "To pray, to know how to pray, becomes more and more difficult, the more one prays. The more one understands what he is trying to do—to have a relationship with God—the more presumptuous this appears to be." (Quoted p. 202.)

This growing difficulty in prayer, however, is not regarded as a mystery by Kierkegaard. The reason, alas, is all too clear. Prayer at bottom is a silent surrendering of all to God. "Prayer is unconditional surrender" (quoted p. 208). This is at once the most menacing of threats to the surface ego and at the same time the ground of the soul's most promising hope. Kierkegaard could confess that "I have lived with God as one lives with a father, Amen," and again, "Through the unspeakable grace and help of God have I become myself." (Quoted pp. 203, 202.)

Instead of the earthly security of being like others, Kierkegaard has known the wisdom of that greatest insecurity which is the only earthly security that exists, namely, that of being a "called-out one," a "solitary individual" whose life rested on the 70,000 fathoms of water which was Kierkegaard's picturesque description of what it was like to be in God's hands, to be in a state of "tranquil abandonment to God."

Certainly this dimension of prayer that Kierkegaard has concentrated his analysis

upon does not exhaust the full spectrum of prayer. Even the object of prayer in this dimension is "less the Father, more the Lord!" Yet there is almost nothing in the history of the analysis of prayer which can surpass it in the power of its consistent probing of the dimension of abandonment.

This book deserves to take its place not alone on the shelves of the libraries of Kierkegaard scholars, but on the work tables of Christians of all species who are willing to face what it would mean if God had more and more his undivided way in their lives.

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

Professor of Philosophy, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania.

The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought. By JOHN BAILLIE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. viii-151 pp. \$3.00.

The Idea of Revelation in Recent Thought is the published form of the Bampton Lectures delivered by Professor Baillie at Columbia University in 1954, somewhat revised, as the author tells us, and considerably expanded. In the course of this essentially thematic discussion of revelation, Dr. Baillie adverts to a large number of today's representative thinkers in Protestantism and the Catholic traditions outside of Rome. Since much of the time Dr. Baillie permits his exposition to be carried forward by extensive quotations from his sources, and since he does not devote any appreciable space to analyses of the authors he so uses, readers of this book should not expect easily to acquire an understanding of the author's own view of revelation, nor should they take it up in the hope of finding in it an introduction to contemporary theology of revelation. However, his earlier work *Our Knowledge of God* has answered the first in detail, though along lines quite different from those apparently suggested in this book; and the anthology entitled *Revelation*, of which he is an editor, does the second most succinctly. This small volume is, as the preface states, an extended review.

Professor Baillie focuses these chapters on a discussion of the sense in which God's revealing of himself may be said to be (or not to be) genuinely cognitive, adding to our knowledge of God. The nineteenth century, according to a preliminary chapter, in effect rejected the idea of revelation as such, either by reducing the content of revelation to Christian self-consciousness (Schleiermacher) or self-valuation (Ritschl); or by assimilating revelation to speculative thought (Hegel). In either case, revelatory knowledge is not distinguished by a unique content. The motive of this reaction is attributable, the author believes, to the almost universal misunderstanding of revelation as it was defined by scholasticism and Protestant Orthodoxy, that is, as the communication of a body of doctrine.

The remainder of the book examines various ways in which theology can recover the reality of revelation without falling into the error of intellectualizing it. Drawing upon such varied thinkers as William Temple, F. D. Maurice, Paul Tillich, Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, and others, the author seeks to establish the superiority of the view that God reveals *himself* in Jesus Christ over the view that God reveals propositional truths or images of truth about himself. In this latter connection, he has in mind chiefly Austin Farrer and L. S. Thornton, who find it impossible to dissociate revelation from biblical images. The adoption of this position leads finally to an epilogue in which Professor Baillie aligns himself with Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann in the

affirmation that the primary expression of faith as response to revelation is obedience rather than knowledge.

The conclusion of Professor Baillie's lectures comes rather as a surprise, since it is remarkably similar to the picture of the nineteenth century's idea of revelation that he initially criticized. The Kantian emphasis on obedience, together with a disparagement of the cognitive possibilities of faith responding to revelation, is the only solution for a theology that tacitly accepts Kant's metaphysical agnosticism on the one hand and does not inquire into the distinctive categories of religious understanding or faith on the other. Consequently, one wishes that the author had seen reason to discuss more thoroughly Austin Farrer's suggestions; for faith even as obedience requires some inherent rationale corresponding to the logos of revelation, and a discussion of propositional truth or images thereof remains fundamental (not merely ancillary) to the theology of revelation.

RICHARD R. NIEBUHR

Assistant Professor of Theology, Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Mass.

God's Way With Man: Variations on the Theme of Providence. By ROGER HAZELTON. New York: Abingdon Press, 1956. 204 pp. \$3.00.

In his latest book Dr. Hazelton has developed the meaning of Providence in the Christian faith through the skillful use of a mode of existential analysis which is becoming increasingly important in theology. He begins with the assertion of faith in a "guarding, guiding, governing God," and raises the questions which we must ask about the meaning of this faith. These questions are framed as they appear in a dialogue with contemporary culture, and especially with the secular critics of Christianity.

Thus he develops the meaning of Providence in relation to human freedom, to fate, to the meaning of time, the nature of tragedy, and the significance of modern technology. In each case the meaning is illuminated in new ways through putting the questions which contemporary men ask concerning these perennial human themes and dilemmas. Dr. Hazelton makes further use of themes developed in modern religious existentialism when he argues against the deterministic schemes of some traditional theories of Providence. Whatever we mean by Providence, we are not to involve ourselves in a mechanical scheme of divine causality; but rather to see God's way with man as his personal and gracious activity in the midst of the real freedom and risk of human experience.

The book takes the form of a series of "variations on the theme" rather than a systematic statement, and is thus based, in the author's words, on "a musical rather than an architectural pattern." Thus the design of the argument allows Dr. Hazelton freedom for the probing exploration of many aspects of his theme; and he shows his mastery of many dimensions of religious experience, and his grasp of the Christian faith. If the reviewer may choose another image to express the effectiveness of this book, he would say that Dr. Hazelton uses the doctrine of Providence as a burning glass through which to focus the light of the gospel in a concentrated way upon concrete human problems. For example, in his confrontation with Jaspers' view that Christianity denies tragedy, Hazelton shows how the real meaning of Providence involves an acknowledgment of tragedy which is not annulled by the ultimate perspective of final victory. Again, the chapter on modern technology offers a vivid critique of the way in which preoccupation with technological skill brings about a subtle deflection of human attention from the things that matter most.

It is in the analysis of time in human experience that Dr. Hazelton probes perhaps most deeply of all. By concentrating attention upon the concrete features of our human experience of time, he achieves an important criticism of existentialist philosophies in the modern period. One might say he uses the existentialist method to refute some versions of existentialism. And his interpretation of Plato brings him close to a Christian Platonism as the ground plan of his theological thought.

The meaning of Providence as it looms up through this many-sided analysis is the "directedness of the world" within God's personal care and guidance. It is the "structuring of God's sovereign concern for each and every creature" (p. 201).

Every method of theological exposition has its characteristic problems. The one danger of Dr. Hazelton's method is perhaps that the ultimate presuppositions do not get fully stated. I find myself wanting to ask at the end, in what sense are we to regard everything as providential? Is the presence of malaria in the world providential? Dr. Hazelton declares that God takes a "risk" in creating man. How great a risk? Does Providence mean that everything is saved? These questions must be asked. And it makes a difference in all one's thinking about God and the world what line is taken in the answer.

In any event, one who wants a neat guide to "Providence" will not find it here; but rather, a sensitive and able exploration of the things that matter above all in the Christian faith, and their relevance for our time. It is a moving and important book.

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

Professor of Systematic Theology, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

The Pulpit RedisCOVERS Theology. By THEODORE O. WEDEL. Greenwich, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1956. \$3.50.

Life-Situation Preaching. By CHARLES F. KEMP. St. Louis, Mo.: The Bethany Press, 1956. \$3.00.

At first glance it may seem as though these two books ought not to be bracketed in a single review. One deals with preaching in the context of the revival in theology, and the other deals with preaching in the context of human problems to be solved. But they do touch, and together they remind anyone who reads them that the discipline of theology exists but to bring the gospel more effectively to the changing of lives, and that the problems of life are but scantily answered apart from a gospel with theological substance.

Canon Wedel of Washington Cathedral has written a book which is in some ways, coming from an Episcopalian, surprising in its emphasis. When you name Phillips Brooks, you are hard put to it to think of another great Episcopalian preacher. It just isn't the central note in that Church. But here comes Wedel, quoting liberally from Congregationalist P. T. Forsyth, to put the preaching of the Word in a central place, and this firmly in the context of the new theological awakening. We had thought that the new vitality in theological thought had not come to the Episcopalians quite as it has to other groups up to now. Their main divisions and discussions have been over high and low Church doctrines, and their theology has been classic and formal, incarnational and sacramental.

So when Dr. Wedel takes the mighty acts of God seriously in an actively evangelical sense, he approaches the Church, not from the more Catholic point of view, as the dispenser of grace through its sacraments, but as itself the final result of the

atoning work of Christ. Churchmanship is discipleship, he says, "the brotherliness of forgiven and forgiving prodigal sons in the Father's redeemed household" (p. 136). Discipleship does not produce the Church as a social resultant, nor does the Church produce disciples. To be "in Christ" is to be "in the Church" and "in the Spirit" and in the "new Covenant" life, the New "Testament." All these follow each other, as equals. Baptism and communion take on new meanings in this context. God's Regeneration, the new life, is God's holiest purpose. The sacraments seal and feed that evangelical rebirth. Deep echoes of Forsyth's stubborn insistence on the "saving work of Christ" are here, and Forsyth's "high Congregationalism" and Wedel's "evangelical Episcopalianism" are strangely close in their doctrine of the Church. It is interesting how, when you press back into biblical roots, the surface distinctions tend to recede and blur. All in all, this is an excellent, clear statement of the main emphases of biblical theology, in Wedel's lucid manner, and with special reference to preaching and the Church.

Charles Kemp, pastor of the First Christian Church of Lincoln, Nebraska, has put together a collection of a dozen of the very best sermons addressed to life situations, by pulpit masters from Horace Bushnell on. If the book had no other value, it has that of being a superb collection of sermons in this area; and best of all is one by Fosdick, "Handicapped Lives," which has Christian insight and healing, force, clarity and winsome appeal in it. It is indeed, as Kemp says, a result of the "methods of a master."

Each sermon deals with a specific human problem and is prefaced by an introductory comment on the preacher and his particular skill. Kemp also contributes a general introduction and conclusion to the entire collection. They are very clear and helpful as a setting for the sermons.

This is far from the cheap self-help and popular psychology kind of thing which clutters our pulpits today. This is life-situation preaching in the real sense that the gospel is never irrelevant to the needs of men, though it never panders to them. In fact, here is revealed again that the chief relevance is to man's needs, and not to his wants. Sermons like these will always do God's business.

Canon Wedel and Dr. Kemp have both written helpfully for the serious preacher who is concerned to keep the gospel centralities and to speak to the real situation of his people. Though primarily for the working preacher, any layman will find Wedel's book an interesting and intelligible introduction to biblical theology.

HARLAND G. LEWIS

The Church of Christ at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

The Theology of Calvin. By WILHELM NIESEL. Translated by Harold Knight. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956. 254 pp. \$4.00.

Calvin's Doctrine of the Work of Christ. By JOHN FREDERICK JANSEN. London: James Clarke & Co., 1956. 120 pp. 8/6.

The first work is a translation of Niesel's *Die Theologie Calvins* (1938). The author has added two brief paragraphs to this reissue in English of his work, in which he alludes to several important studies that have appeared since the original edition. Apparently, some changes have been made in the body of the book (e.g., footnote, p. 80 to Torrance's *Calvin's Doctrine of Man* [1949]).

Dr. Niesel sets forth the program of his book and of future studies of Calvin's

theology as twofold: ". . . the theology of Calvin must be examined at as many points as possible in order to discover his underlying intention. In this connexion the essence of his theology must be more clearly elucidated than has been the case hitherto" (p. 20). The author offers "no comprehensive survey" but an attempt "to illuminate the whole body of his teaching by a few fundamental examples" (pp. 20-21). This may be an over-modest statement, as the chief heads of doctrine are covered in a succinct way, with greater space devoted however to certain topics, e.g., "The Knowledge of God" (pp. 22-53), "God's Eternal Election" (pp. 159-181), and to points under current debate. With a few minor exceptions, the order of treatment follows that of the 1559 edition of the *Institutes*.

The initial chapter, "The Present State of Critical Studies," examines a number of modern attempts to get at the "secret" of Calvin's theology and rejects them all as one-sided and inadequate. Dr. Niesel begins his quest for the fundamental principle of Calvin's theology, "the tendency of his teaching as a whole" (p. 120), by inviting us to examine what Calvin himself tells us is his point of departure (p. 22). Thereafter, each chapter of the book reiterates the theme, summarized at the end, "that in every respect of doctrine Calvin is concerned only about one thing: namely, the God revealed in flesh" (p. 246), in Jesus Christ. Seen in this light, such topics as predestination assume their rightful place in Calvin's thought. All one-sided appraisal of his theology is surmounted, and the ancient caricatures of John Calvin are swept away. For this service we are much in Dr. Niesel's debt. He seems, theologically, a trustworthy guide to Calvin's thought.

Yet we cannot forbear to mention several minor matters which, while they do not impair the validity of the book, still tend to draw a curtain between us and the man John Calvin. Our author (p. 247) tells us: "We do not wish to deny that Calvin has moulded his doctrine by the help of those resources which history and his own disposition suggested. How could it have been otherwise? But the observation of what is after all a matter of course does not take us far in the understanding of Calvin." True. We admit that "Jesus Christ controls not only the content but also the form of Calvinistic thought." Yet to give us a Calvin virtually abstracted from the history and the lively controversies in which he fought, and to quote copiously from the *Institutes* in words that sometimes flatten out the vibrant, bold, impassioned prose—this may give us a "part" but not a "taste" (*gustus*) of Calvin's thought (cf. p. 24). We may view the grand architectonics of his theology, but we get little of its incandescence.

Still, the author may be defended against such a criticism by reminding us of the title of the book, *The Theology of Calvin*. But surely Dr. Niesel would be the first to admit that his admirable guide should lead the reader directly to the *Institutes*, the *Commentaries*, and the *Sermons*, historic documents of the Reformation time, and thence to the very Word of God. We suspect that the form, at least, of Calvin's thought was touched by the vicissitudes of his time and by his long inheritance; and that his thought needs that history for its interpretation. A rereading of Book IV of the *Institutes*, for example, gives one a new respect for Calvin as a Church historian. And the major editorial strata of the *Institutes* immerse us, with Calvin, in the controversies of his day. His thought, we feel, cannot be so beautifully abstracted from his historical station.

This is, however, a great and useful book; and Harold Knight has achieved a smooth and readable translation.

In *Calvin's Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, Professor Jansen holds, like Dr. Niesel, that Calvin's "Christological thought . . . is the key to his doctrine of God, to his understanding of revelation, to his view of scripture and sacraments" (p. 24). Dealing as it does with the "offices" of Christ, this little book elaborates a topic, however, that is but mentioned in the larger book. Professor Jansen is concerned with the ambivalence between a twofold and a threefold conception of the office of Christ in Calvin's thought, its roots and its influence. He points to the gradual addition, beginning with the 1539 edition of the *Institutes*, of "prophet" to the original "priest-king" conception of 1536, and attributes this addition (which he finds biblically and theologically malapropos) to Calvin's anxiety about the pastoral office.

After a rapid survey of the views of Christ's work in post-Reformation thought, the author turns to a selection of patristic excerpts, first in favor of "priest-king," then in favor of "prophet-priest-king" (unfortunately not always tracked to their source), followed by similar citations in the Reformers before Calvin. There follows a systematic presentation of Christ's offices according to Calvin the theologian, which is then tested against Calvin the exegete and preacher through a combing of the commentaries and sermons. The result of this investigation, for the author, is the conviction that "Calvin the exegete must . . . [and does] explain and interpret Calvin the dogmatician" (p. 59).

The doctrine of the three offices is found in biblical and Messianic terms (and in terms of Calvin's own thought outside of *Institutes* 2:15) to be in actuality a doctrine of two offices—of priest and king; and the function of prophet, of teacher, is supposed to be inherent in the other two offices. ". . . the gift of prophecy in Saul was a kind of mark of royalty. . . ." Also ". . . there is no priesthood without doctrine or teaching, and no priest except he [sic] who faithfully performs his office as a teacher" (p. 99). And so, the author deems the doctrine of the three offices not to be ". . . an adequate or true expression of his own [Calvin's] theology" (p. 106). By going back to Calvin's earlier twofold formulation (also that of Luther), the true doctrine of Christ can then be preached, without danger of the liberal restatement of Christology in terms of a teacher shorn of his Messianic unction as priest-king.

Professor Jansen provides a very stimulating thesis in his little book, but one that his readers will want to test for themselves. The contrast between Calvin the dogmatician and Calvin the exegete is perhaps a bit overdrawn for the sake of argument. Further sifting of historical evidence seems necessary.

FORD L. BATTLES

Associate Professor of Church History, Hartford Theological Seminary, Hartford, Connecticut.

The Prophetic Voice in Protestant Christianity. By RALPH G. WILBURN. St. Louis: Bethany Press, 1956. 298 pp. \$3.00.

Published as the sixth volume in the "Bethany History Series," inaugurated as recently as 1954, this study should be considered first of all in its bearing on the Disciples of Christ. As such it contends for a modification or reinterpretation of the "restorationist" view which has characterized the beginnings and much of the history of the Disciples movement. That is to say, the Disciples were so intent on restoring apostolic Christianity that they neglected post-apostolic Christianity, sometimes regard-

ing all later developments in doctrine and life as corruptions. The author of the present volume shares with others in his denomination a dissatisfaction with this position, and finds much to commend in the history of Christian thought.

The book is of interest to others than Disciples, however, for it treats matters of basic importance and of great current interest to all Christians. After a cursory analysis of what he takes to be the genius of Protestantism, the author treats the contributions and shortcomings of Liberalism so as to set the stage for the revival of Reformation theology, which he commends with qualifications to the reader. The heart of the book is an extended discussion of the problem of revelation. The "doctrinaire view" of revelation as the impartation of information about God is swiftly sketched as it developed in the Middle Ages and as it was reintroduced into Protestantism in the seventeenth century. Revelation came to be equated with doctrine, and Liberalism's reduction of Christianity to the ethical teaching of Jesus was simply a variation of the same theme. Over against such conceptions of revelation the author advocates a "dynamic view," according to which man is personally confronted by God who himself addresses man instead of man's being confronted by an impersonal body of knowledge about God.

The last two chapters are devoted to a presentation of various understandings of the church and the ministry which stand in the way of church union. On the one hand are variations of the Catholic idea that "where the bishop is, there is the church," and on the other hand are variations of the Protestant view that "where Christ is and exercises his lordship, there is the church." Such conflicting opinions and practices can only be resolved, it is maintained, by a humble recognition of the limits of our knowledge and by an openness to the insights of those who disagree with us.

In his major contentions, especially concerning the problem of revelation, Dr. Wilburn's voice deserves a hearing. He seeks threads of unity in surprisingly diverse minds of the past—in Ignatius, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Alexander Campbell, Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, Pauck, and Van Dusen. As this partial list will suggest, the author is widely read; but his work is marred by a tiresome use of current theological clichés and by hasty writing and careless reading of proof.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

Professor of Church History, Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia 19,
Pennsylvania.

The Ten Commandments. By SOLOMON GOLDMAN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956. xxv-225 pp. \$3.75.

This book, prepared for publication after Rabbi Goldman's death, is a part of what was to have been the third volume of a general commentary on the Old Testament. (The second volume, *In the Beginning*, dealing with Genesis, was published in 1949 by Harper & Brothers.) It covers only Exodus 19:1—21:21. The passage is divided into three sections, for each of which the author made his own modern and dignified translation.

The text is followed by a "general commentary." A verse-by-verse "textual commentary" constitutes the latter half of the book (pp. 91-192). The editors have included without change Rabbi Goldman's bibliography, 28 pages, citing Jewish and Christian sources of wisdom (or otherwise) from 180 B.C. to A.D. 1950.

The Christian reader will find the wealth of Jewish material in the book,

especially the quotations from early Rabbinic sources, both unfamiliar and enlightening; and he will enjoy the author's comparisons of Jewish and Christian thinking.

To Rabbi Goldman, the giving of the Law at Mount Sinai "constitutes both the climax to the Egyptian-Israel saga and the basis of Judaism and Christianity." "It is the '*Kernstück*,' the 'core' or 'kernel' of Scripture." The question of whether these commandments came from God or are "man-made" is fundamental. But this is not a question of the authenticity of the *account* as such—of whether the account is composite or by one hand. It may well be a "fusion" which cannot be made coherent in detail. The readers' aim should be a true appreciation of the event. The biblical writer recorded without comment the Ten Words, then used his finest artistry to present "the climax," "the impact of the Ten Words on Israel," for "there would be no significance in God's Word reverberating in space."

Rabbi Goldman's aim was to ensure that these Ten Words also make their impact on the men of today. Much of the book is therefore devoted to comments on the separate commandments, setting them forth with a freshness and forcefulness which compel attention. Take, for example, a part of the discussion of the close of the second commandment. "The condemnation of the 'jealous and monstrous God' of the old dispensation began long ago." But "only the scribes . . . counted the letters of the *Torah*." The biblical writers used figurative language, especially hyperbole, freely. *Showing kindness to the thousandth generation* "is a figure of speech, a way of saying . . . that God's mercy will endure for a very long time. Nor is it otherwise with the *third and fourth generation*. . . . And a God the ratio of whose loving-kindness to His jealousy is a thousand to four cannot be as vengeful as some carping gentlemen have made Him out to be. . . . Our philosophers may be able to make of God the First Cause and our scientists the Principle of Concretion, but our poets and orators, musicians, painters and sculptors . . . cannot speak of God without hypostatizing." And the author goes on to point out that we all personalize patriotism, justice or reason as "jealous," that is, as requiring to be served without compromise.

The whole volume offers so many quotable phrases, is such a mosaic of enlightening references and illuminating comments, that a reviewer is tempted to make a new mosaic from its pages. The Decalogue has been "homiletically . . . a veritable fountain bubbling with ever fresh ideas." Its language abounds in "symbolic torsos, the unfinished, the evocative, the suggestive." The last commandments "come upon us . . . like a rapid series of explosions."

The book is difficult to classify. It is not a collection of sermons, but it will perhaps be most used by men who have weekly sermons to prepare. The fundamentalist will find in it much ammunition against the "higher critics"; yet he will also find much which conflicts with his own views. The modern critical scholar will probably feel that the critical position is at times not fairly presented; yet he will more often be impressed by the scholarly treatment of detail, etymological, grammatical, geographical or historical, and by the persuasiveness of the interpretations offered. The general reader can well ignore the occasional polemics and devote himself to enjoyment of the insight into fundamental values, for (to quote Maurice Samuel's Foreword) "technical problems [are] always subordinated to the larger and more fascinating problems of the power of the whole."

LOUISE PETTIBONE SMITH

Professor of Biblical History, Emeritus, Wellesley College. Now in Hartford, Connecticut.

Joy in Believing: An Inspirational Treasury. By HENRY SLOANE COFFIN, edited by WALTER RUSSELL BOWIE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. viii-248 pp. \$2.95.

There will be thousands who will be grateful to Dr. Bowie for his labor of love among the papers left by Henry Sloane Coffin. For some the resulting volume will be a mirror where they can see again the face of a beloved friend and teacher; for others, like this writer, it is a happy means of introduction to the inner life and conviction of a man they would fain have known.

Even if we had never heard of the writer of these sermon-extracts and short prayers, an hour spent with them would convince us that we were in the presence of one of those select spirits whom to know is not only "a liberal education" but an inspiration for our Christian life. Few preachers could stand this kind of test—the odd pages from sermons and addresses over a wide span of years, grouped loosely under general headings, and interspersed with prayers. It could reveal too much—recurrent phrases, tricks of style, obsessional ideas; or too little—hiding the man behind his pulpit manner. This volume is a triumph, for it leaves one with the sense of having been for all too brief a time under the spell of a preacher whose spirit burns undimmed, and whose words are never trite. If "the style is the man," then here is a man whose grace, force, and clarity it is a joy to know.

The title, *Joy in Believing*, aptly states the mood of the selections (although these words against a dim gothic background on the pallid jacket of the book give a rather misleading impression). In the extracts these two notes predominate—and they are profound. The joy is one that is seen against the background of suffering, and the belief is one that does a real, and not sham, battle with skepticism. We know that the preacher has "been there." He does not speak an observer's joy to the sufferer, or offer a preacher's straw-man skepticism for destruction.

From a wealth of reading we are offered here the natural overflow, and from mature wisdom and experience the sagacity that we can use. A command of language, image, and metaphor is brought like all else to the simple service of Christ. This is the simplicity that is an end result of hard thinking. "Jesus is not a giver of rules, but a maker of men." It takes some of us a fat book to say just that.

This is "religion in life." Social concern, problems of mind and heart, the widest sympathy, a gracious tolerance, warm humanity—all are shot through with the evangelical spirit of one who would surely say with the apostle: "To me to live is Christ—and to die is gain."

DAVID H. C. READ

The Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York City.

The Whole Gospel for the Whole World. By ALAN WALKER. New York: Abingdon Press, 1957. 128 pp. \$2.00.

Few will deny the evidence of a current revival of religion, but too few are willing to deny that the religion being revived is Christian. Alan Walker, distinguished missioner of Australia, who has just completed a year's program in his "Mission to America," and is currently a visiting professor at Boston University's School of Theology, is one of those few. It is Dr. Walker's thesis that the Church eventually proclaims only a fractional gospel when, in its concern with itself, it does not fulfill its ministry to "the whole world." The gospel, under such circumstances, ceases to be

"gospel" and becomes "old stuff," primarily because it has not dared to engage in the necessary proclamation of its message to the outsider. The church, says Dr. Walker, must learn to convey its gospel to the man who is hostile, who is the complete outsider. We have leaned too heavily upon mere revitalization of ourselves and the winning of the man who was already one of our constituency. In this we have lost the "good news" content of our gospel; in the demoralizing effect of this loss we have accepted the cultural accretions of religion as the substitute for its Christian essence and are rejoicing in the restoration of the accretions rather than the essence.

Dr. Walker knows whereof he speaks. His work in Australia as head of the now famous "Mission to the Nation" has brought him world acclaim, and the Order of the British Empire from Queen Elizabeth.

His evangelistic approach is the stark presentation of the gospel without benefit of "a hymn and a prayer." He likes to speak in "neutral places" and in a completely neutral situation. There are no musical "warm-ups" in an Alan Walker meeting, for here is a man who is aware of the situation in the life of the man and woman outside the church. He refuses to compromise the gospel by an exploitation of the peripheral possibilities in the man he seeks to win for Christ.

This is not to say that Walker's evangelism operates at the expense of the Church. Nothing could be further from the truth. Likewise it is refreshing to note that the call to Christian commitment is delivered from vagueness by its consistent call within the framework of social implication. The decisive commitment carries with it the acknowledgment that this is but the beginning of a committed life. "No man," says Dr. Walker, "is truly converted who does not reveal Christian attitudes on issues of race, economic life, political affairs, and peace and war."

WALLACE J. CUMMINGS

Pastor, Newberry Methodist Church, Williamsport, Pennsylvania.

A Year of Grace. By VICTOR GOLLANZ. Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1955. 576 pp. 85 cents.

From Darkness to Light. By VICTOR GOLLANZ. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. 683 pp. \$5.00.

Anthologies continue to have their appeal; they have a special value and perform a useful service. Here are two more big, solid, and superbly arranged contributions to this important kind of literature. And for this reviewer, they are among the most unique and inspiring anthologies ever assembled. They are noble and fascinating collections—in conception, sequence, and range. They were published last year, but they are also "means of grace" for this year and next year and all the years.

Some anthologies are just an interesting series of snippets culled from wide reading. Others are like a stew made from ice-box leftovers. Not so, these two. They are great and savory, cohesive and deeply satisfying blendings of the wisdom of the ages—veritable treasures, the one (a paperback) chosen and arranged "to express a mood about God and man"; the other "a confession of faith" in the form of an anthology. Make no mistake: these are unusual books by an unusual man, the richness and grandeur of whose life are caught in these passages.

Victor Gollancz is an English Jew—writer, editor, publisher, long active in the British Pacifist Movement and in many other liberal causes. He is a remarkable man of immense erudition, deep religious insight and commitment, great moral

courage, a lover of men and of God. He is highly respected by people of all faiths and parties in England. And this catholicity is reflected in these treasures of religious devotion, philosophical insight, and psychological experience drawn from hundreds of illuminated saints and sages, ancient and modern, and demonstrating again what William James once called "the unanimity of the saints."

The limitations of these books are only those of space. Even so, there are, taken together, 1,200 pages of beauty and wisdom. Every reader will find familiar material; but he will also hear new and powerful voices. Many of the lovely things in it I had never seen before, being an ignorant fellow. But they all belong here.

They cannot help but be a blessing to anyone who reads them, whatever the mood, need, or occasion. They are not "doctrine" or "polemic"—but the profile of a noble spirit, the rich precipitate of one man's mind and moods after a lifetime of intense study and search into the meaning and mystery of God and man. Readers will therefore feel that they have been graciously permitted to share in the personal devotions and struggle of a modern saint.

I commend them with all my heart. It seems too obvious to say that to read them is an important and enduring spiritual experience. The reader will return to them again and again. And then, as Silesius bids us do: "If thou wouldest go on reading, go and thyself become the writing and the meaning."

PAUL E. PFUETZE

Professor of Philosophy, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.

Nelson's Complete Concordance of the Revised Standard Version Bible.

Compiled under the supervision of JOHN W. ELLISON. New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957. 2,157 pp. Buckram, \$16.50; leather, \$27.50.

This volume marks a step forward in the history of publishing, as the first book of its kind to be compiled by electronic methods. Its plan is similar to that of Strong's *Exhaustive Concordance* of the King James Version, except that it has no listing of Hebrew and Greek terms. References are given for each form of a word, as, for example: sojourn, sojourned, sojourner, sojourners, sojourning, sojournings, sojourns. No references are given for eighty of the most common words (136 forms), which would have more than doubled the size of the book without increasing its usefulness. There are about 320,000 entries, enough to furnish ample clues to the 31,173 verses of the Bible. Most of the entries consist of eight words, and others of seven or nine.

A week of constant use, including a collation of Nelson with Strong, has convinced me that we have here an indispensably valuable tool for the study of the Bible. Some of the words of the King James Version which no longer appear are: advertise, apparently, bullock, candle, candlestick, carriage, condescend, convenient, haply, heave, heaviness, howbeit, kine, moderation, outlandish, peculiar, Potentate, servile, spouse, suburbs. Some of the words which appear for the first time in the Revised Standard Version are: ahead, aim, endurance, explain, exult, genuine, goal, human, invoke, mature, Nile, Negeb, outcome, plan, property, real, recognize. In place of "they have addicted themselves to the ministry of the saints" RSV has "they have devoted themselves to the service of the saints"; and in place of "given to wine" it has "addicted to wine." The word "associate" is used seventeen times in RSV, notably to replace the erroneous "condescend" in Romans 12:16; it is used only once in KJ, Isaiah 8:9, where it is a mistaken translation of the Hebrew. For some guid-

ance in the study of the vocabulary of the English Bible, see my pamphlets, *The Living Word* and *Bible Words That Have Changed in Meaning* (both published by Thomas Nelson at 35 cents each).

The publishers deserve great credit for their pioneering use of new methods of concordance-making, and for the promptness and accuracy with which this work was completed. For so large and detailed a volume, there are amazingly few errors.

LUTHER A. WEIGLE

Yale University Divinity School, New Haven, Connecticut.

A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature. By WALTER BAUER; translated and edited by W. F. ARNDT and

F. W. GINGERICH. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. xxxvii-909 pp.
\$14.50.

It has long been recognized that the most comprehensive and authoritative lexicon of New Testament Greek was Walter Bauer's Greek-German Dictionary, the third edition of which appeared in 1937 and the fourth in 1949-52. For a number of years now Messrs. Arndt and Gingrich, with the support of the Missouri Synod of the Lutheran Church, have been engaged in translating and further revising this great work. They now have presented students of the New Testament with what is without question the best Greek-English lexicon in existence. It is beautifully printed and bound, and would be far more expensive but for the generous financial support the enterprise has received. The translators, the University of Chicago Press, and the Missouri Synod are all to be congratulated upon a really monumental scholarly achievement.

JOHN KNOX

Professor of Sacred Literature, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

The Kingdom Beyond Caste. By LISTON POPE. New York: Friendship Press, 1957. xvii-172 pp. Cloth \$3.00, paper \$1.25.

This book deserves full-length review in this "Race Relations" issue of *RELIGION IN LIFE*, but has reached us at too late a date. Dean Pope's study (a Religious Book Club selection) is "written out of a welter of experiences involving race relations," from his childhood in the South through adulthood in New England to observation of "the world-wide revolution" in his extensive travels. He attempts "to discuss one aspect of the relation of Christ to contemporary Society, and to discern the lineaments of a kingdom beyond caste, already foreshadowed but yet to come."

In a lucid historical analysis he shows that prejudice and discrimination have varied in pattern throughout history, and discrimination based on race alone is rather recent. He treats of the theory and the strategy of integration, and proceeds to "The Involvement of the Local Churches," "Race Relations Elsewhere in the Church" (national, state, and international levels), and "The Testimony of Scripture and Church." "Dr. Pope's book is both scholarly and readable, sharply analytical and humanly intimate."

E. H. L.

Book Notices

Friendship Press this year has brought out two little books dealing with "Christ, the Church, and Race." These are *Seeking to Be Christian in Race Relations*, a revision of a former work by Benjamin Mays. (cloth \$1.50, paper \$1.00), and *Progress Against Prejudice*, by Robert Root (\$2.50, \$1.25). President Mays maintains that the necessary basis for good relations is in the understanding and application of Christianity. "The ideas in this pamphlet might well be considered a Christian theological basis for a declaration of human rights," and give "a general background for Christian interracial living." Questions for group discussion are included. Mr. Root, journalist, takes a forthright Christian position but is also "an optimist with a sense of reality." He gives a swift survey of what churches and individuals are doing throughout the land, and reports a great number of encouraging events and activities.

A pamphlet, *Psychiatric Aspects of School Desegregation*, is published by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, 1790 Broadway, New York 19, N. Y. (Report No. 37, 95 pp. \$1.00 each; 10-99 copies, 80 cents each; 100 or more at 60 cents each.) This represents the "pooled observations and findings on the psychological aspects of desegregation" of "a group of more than 250 psychiatrists and social scientists." It shows how segregation impairs the psychological growth of those discriminated against and those who discriminate, and lowers the economic and human resources of whole communities. The "racial myths" and consequent fears which becloud the issue for whites are also examined.

The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law is No. 3 of the *Ecumenical Biblical Studies*, published by S.C.M. Press under World Council auspices, and distributed here by Alec R. Allenson, Naperville, Illinois (\$1.75). Mostly written by Heinz-Horst Schrey of Tübingen and Hans Hermann Walz, German ecumenist, interpreting the results of the Study Conference at Treysa, 1950, it is translated (or rather adapted to Anglo-Saxon readers) by W. A. Whitehouse. The booklet treats of "Justice and the Law," "The Bible and the Righteousness of God," "The Bible and Human Justice," "From the Bible to Systematic Theology."

Oxford University Press sends us *Saint Peter*, by John Lowe, Dean of Christ Church, Oxford (\$2.50). Supporters of Papacy, he finds, have claimed too much for Peter, and Protestants too little. Surveying the New Testament material along with other literary, liturgical, and archeological evidence, he discusses Peter as the foundation-stone of the church, the traditions of his going to Rome and his martyrdom, and the significance of the recent excavations in Rome. Peter "emerges as one whom all can claim with gratitude and pride." From Oxford Press comes also *The Bright Cloud: The Bible in the Light of the Transfiguration*, by J. R. Macphail of Scotland and South India. This is a readable theological commentary on the Bible for the intelligent layman. In a novel order, it starts with the Transfiguration and the Incarnation, then treats (1) "Acts and some Epistles," (2) the Old Testament, (3) the Gospels. Himself a professor of English, the author is well grounded in contemporary British and European theology.

Richard B. Gregg, author of *The Power of Non-Violence*, has written a new book, *The Self Beyond Yourself* (Lippincott, \$3.75), pointing the way to self-transcendence both by yea-saying and nay-saying to self, and through meditation.

After living several years in India, Mr. Gregg reached a serene, eclectic type of faith and thought, designed to appeal to intelligent, sensitive souls who are left cold by orthodox Christianity. Henry Cadbury commends the book's "deep wisdom and helpfulness"—"a kind of modern Marcus Aurelius."

Day Is Dawning is a "biography" of "Otto Dibelius, Bishop of Berlin, servant of the Word of God," compiled largely from his own proclamations and authentic documents, by an unnamed author who first conceived this task in a subterranean prison cell in Eastern Europe. James E. Wagner, President of the Evangelical and Reformed Church, writes the foreword; he points out that "the Bishop speaks to America as meaningfully as he speaks to any other part of the world," to "the faithful of our ecumenical fellowship . . . in practically every country," and to the intelligent outside the church. Christian Education Press, Philadelphia, \$3.50.

This same Press sends us *Private Devotions for Home and Church*, compiled and partly translated by John Joseph Stoudt (\$3.00). "This layman's prayerbook, made of time-tried prayers for home and church, seeks to preserve the spirit of private devotion of the churches in Reformed tradition. From the warmth of German devotion, the Huguenot courage, from doughty Holland, noble Hungary, and devout Switzerland have come these private prayers to fashion the inner spirit of the Reformed faith." A moving and valuable collection which deserves attention also from Christians of other denominations.

Seabury Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, sends us an attractive volume, *Great Christian Plays*, collected and edited by editor Theodore M. Switz and playwright Robert A. Johnston (\$7.50). Book I contains five of the best extant medieval dramas: the Brome *Abraham and Isaac*, the York *Resurrection*, the Digby *Conversion of St. Paul*, the morality plays *Totentanz* and *Everyman*. Each has an editorial introduction; music cues and suggestions for the director are supplied. Book II contains selected fifteen-minute choral readings, similarly supplied, of modern origin or arrangement. A revelation of the possibilities of "reverent, mature drama."

From the Ronald Press comes *One Marriage, Two Faiths* (Guidance on Interfaith Marriage), by James H. S. Bossard and Eleanor S. Boll (\$3.50). In this book two sociologists, both with long practical experience in marriage counseling, bring out clearly the problems and difficulties involved in interfaith marriage. From abundant case material they show the kinds of difficulties that arise, "they point out that almost all religious bodies oppose mixed marriages and that the weight of human tradition is against them. Finally they show that interfaith marriages can be made to work through honest understanding."

Dr. George Gleason, Church and Community Co-ordinator in Los Angeles, has written a timely and practical guidebook, *Horizons for Older People*, based on wide experience, travel, and correspondence. Chapters include: "Old Age in a New Age," "Why a Church Group Is Important," "How to Start a Group," "Group Programs," "Meeting Personal Needs" (employment after retirement, financial security, health, housing, hobbies), "Selected Resources for Group Leaders," "Homes for the Aging," bibliography. Macmillan, \$2.50.

E. H. L.



